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Phenomenon and Abstraction: Coordinating Concepts in Music Theory and Analysis
Benjamin Hansberry
This dissertation explores the habits of thought that inform how music analysts con-
ceptualize the music they study and how this conceptualization affects the kinds of claims
they make and the discursive practices adopted to express them. I attempt to clarify these
issues in music-theoretical conceptualization with an eye toward mediating analytical dis-
agreements by tracing the influence of two types of concepts used in contemporary music
analysis. I differentiate what I call theoretical concepts, which refer to abstract theoreti-
cal objects, from phenomenal concepts, which refer to elements of felt, musical experience.
Drawing on theories of concepts from philosophy of mind I argue that these concepts have a
complex structure, featuring both a reference and mode of presentation. The musical concept
Dominant, for instance, might be used as a phenomenal concept, referring to the conscious
experience of hearing a dominant, or it might be used as a theoretical concept, referring to
a kind of abstract object, presented as either the triad the leads to the tonic or the triad
built on scale degree five. In analysis, the kinds of concepts that analysts use will determine
the scope of their analyses as well as define what sorts of critiques are best deployed against
them.
I explore four different ways that these conceptual types are used. These case studies
include conceptually simple theories that attempt to foreground one type of concept or an-
other (from the formalized model proffered by Eugene Narmour, to the drawing-analyses
of Elaine Barkin) as well as more common analytical strategies that rely on both kinds of
concept in concert, such as Schenkerian analysis and transformational and neo-Riemannian
theory. I enrich my study of analytical approaches with insights drawn from my own ana-
lytical practice, including a wide range of styles and composers, though foregrounding the
complexity of tonal analysis especially, and close readings of various authors in different an-
alytical traditions. In general, I am concerned less with testing the soundness of any given
approach than with understanding what ways of conceptualizing music underlie them and
how analysts coordinate these concepts in practice. I find that while most approaches rely
on both types of concept in some combination, their differences come in the roles these con-
cepts play in analytical methodology and the degree to which each type of engagement is
foregrounded in practice.
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The opening measures of Gebet, the final Lied from Schumann's Gedichte der Königin
Maria Stuart, op. 135, permit multiple readings and hearings. These different interpretations
come from different ways of thinking about the music, different criteria to justify music-
analytical claims, and different perspectives on what music analysis is or ought to be. Two
distinctions central to this kind of meta-analytical reflection is the oft-argued dichotomy
between abstract, theoretical, or systematic approaches to the study of music on the one
hand and experiential or phenomenological approaches on the other. These different ways
of engaging music have different goals and, in turn, call for different methodologies. In this
dissertation, I explore how these two modes of engagement are used and coordinated in
contemporary music-analytical practice by tracing the ways that these kinds of engagement
are conceptualized as well as the imperatives that lead theorists to make some analytical
choices over others.
Let me begin with the harmony at the beginning of Gebet. The Lied is fairly chromatic
and withholds a clarifying authentic cadence in the apparent key of the piece, E minor, until
1
Figure 0.1: Schumann, Gebet from Gedichte der Königin Maria Stuart, op. 135, mm. 13.
the final measure of the piano accompaniment. Over the course of the short Lied, the mediant
is briefly tonicized (mm. 68) and a tonicization of the subdominant spans nearly half of the
song (mm. 918). In short, while a number of features weaken the hold of E minor as the
organizing key of the piece, music-analytical norms for selecting keys (the scale collection
indicated by the key signature and the final cadence) are not grievously violated, making it
difficult to seriously assert any key other than E minor. The first three measures, shown in
Figure 0.1, present the short phrase that opens the Lied, the main harmonic action of which
is to tonicize V for an extended half cadence.
E min: iv i6 | vii◦ 4
3
; V6 | V4
3
; V
This harmonic analysis of the first three measures points to formal possibilities (and in turn,
interpretive possibilities) that reinforce an E minor reading. The root-position B major
triad is the only chord emphasized with a fermata in the entire piece, effecting a strong
break afterward. And one might even describe these measures as an antecedent phrase to
a much longer consequent (almost seven times as long), making the entire song a singleif
2
grotesquely proportionedperiod.1
This analysis, I expect, is what many trained theorists would come up with when first
examining this passage. It conforms to the norms that analysts use to determine the key,
and the roman numerals account for all of the notes present in the score. More importantly,
it asserts large-scale relationships and provides an image of the piece as chromatic but still
tonally coherent and explicable.
But this reading fails to describe the experience I have when I listen to this passage.
Without relying on the score and attempting to use only my experience of the passagethat
is, bracketing as best I can my theoretical expectationsmy phenomenology has a quite
different profile than the one implied by the E minor analysis. The E minor analysis gives a
i6 for the second chord, so one would expect listening to this passage to feature the experience
a first inversion tonic harmony. But I find the E minor triad in the first measure to play
a much weaker role, not as a statement of tonic at all, but as part of an entirely different
gesture in a different key. As I play and sing through the first few measures, introspecting
my experience of the harmonies, I hear instead a truncated progression in A minor followed
by a tonicization of B major. Thus,





To my ear, the harmonies in the first measure sound as if they are setting up a lower-voice
accompaniment for what might have been a 3ˆ− 2ˆ− 1ˆ descent in A minor in the voice.
1In this case, the formal function of the half cadence is fulfilled already in m. 3, but the closure-
producing final cadence is delayed to m. 23. This fits William Caplin's form-functional definition
of an asymmetrical periodall the necessary pieces are there, even if they do not unfold with the
symmetrical proportions one would expect. Caplin (1998), 57.
3
Figure 0.2: Re-composition with descending bass line.
When listening to the first measure, the crying out, O Gott, accompanied by the
descending motion in the bass, gives the experience not of a plagal motion in E minor (i.e.,
from iv to i6) but a sense of initiating a descending, stepwise progression bound for V of A,
implyingfor a moment anywaysomething like the re-composition shown in Figure 0.2.
But this A minor progression is cut short after the v6, with the A] diminished seventh
chord on the downbeat of measure two. It is not immediately clear from my experience
where this seventh chord is pointing. At the very least it disrupts my sense of A minor,
curtailing the anticipated progression and causing some harmonic disorientation. My
impression of this moment is of being in a sort of suspended space as if I were some thrown
object at its apex; the fall is coming, but I do not yet know where. The resolution to and
prolongation of B feels foregone (thought apparently it was not) and the tonicization of B
thereafter follows in a relatively unmarked fashion. My sense of this passage is as though
the weight of the presumed A minor with which the prayer began is lifted as a major mode
shines through. Incidentally, this A-minor/B-major analysis also provides some striking
interpretive options. At the beginning of the prayer Mary calls out, perhaps to demand
something of God, before quieting down by m. 2, remembering her manners and adopting a
more humble disposition. This is reinforced, also, by the dynamics, with the root position
4
A minor triad that starts the song emphasized by the forte-piano marking while the rest of
the phrase fades and slows.2
The processes and justifications for these two analyses make use of the two different
conceptual categories explored in this dissertation and represent different approaches to
music theory and analysis. They use the same music-theoretical vocabulary (i.e., roman
numerals), but what these terms stand for and the criteria that guide their use differ. I
categorize these two types of concepts as phenomenal concepts and theoretical concepts.
Phenomenal concepts, featured in the second analysis, derive their utility from referring to
musical experiences, whereas theoretical concepts, featured in the first analysis, are used in
abstract theories and place a higher premium on consistency. Using one kind of concept or
another entails thinking differently about the music, and to properly understand an analysis,
readers must make use of the correct concepts and accept the related correctness criteria.
The first analysis assigns roman numerals based on the overall coherence and efficiency
of the explanation within the context of a single tonal system, as well as its conformance to
traditional analytical norms. The analysis was generatedor at least could be generated
from the score alone. Interpretive decisions come from knowledge of the best or most widely
accepted analytical practices instead of the what the passage sounds like (in these first couple
measures, anyway). And though there is something it would be like to hear this analysis,
2Taking stock of what I have done so far, something does not seem quite right. I tried to faithfully
translate my experiences, but I see a number of defects that ought to concern any music analyst.
Most concerning, it is unclear what kind of relationship should exist between the semi-prolonged
A minor and the B major prolongation. Conforming to my phenomenology, any explanation for
this relationship is more-or-less absent. The A] diminished seventh tears me out of A minor and
deposits me in B major, but at this level of analysis, I do not have any good story to tell about
their underlying relationship. How they should be related is unclear in the phenomenology, so it is
unclear in the analysis.
5
its value comes not from reflecting or prescribing an interesting phenomenal experience,
but from asserting large-scale claims of tonal and formal structure. All of these ideas are
graspable without hearing or mentally recreating the experience of hearing so long as the
reader understands the music theories from which this conceptualization of these terms
gains its purchase. In short, what the roman numerals stand for is not necessarily a certain
experience, but is rather an abstract object with particular formal properties.
I drew the second analysis, conversely, as directly as possible from my phenomenal ex-
perience of the passage. Only once I had a sense of the phenomenal story that I wanted
to tell did I try to affix labels to these experiences as a means to communicate them. The
criterion for assigning harmonic labels in this case was just that the phenomenal experience
that they can stand for featured in my phenomenology. This kind of analysis could not
be done without listening. This analysis is a little messy; I assert key areas that are brief
and unconnected. But this analysis also better grasps what the passage sounds like to me.
Moreover, not only must I use concepts that refer to my phenomenal experience to create the
analysis, but the reader must either play or mentally recreate the experiences for themselves
to get at what the roman numerals and accompanying descriptions are meant to represent.
Of course, the way that I have cast this distinction, with respect to this analysis, is too
tidy. Real analyses are much more complicated than this. It is just as possible to assert an
E minor analysis based on phenomenology (one might really hear it that way) or to assert
the A minor/B major analysis from abstract, analytical preference rules. In the former case,
one would need to hear the E major sixth chord as the tonic, setting up the prolongation of
B major, and experience the final progression not as an imperfect authentic cadence in B,
but a half cadence directed back toward E minor. This is a plausible experience, but not the
6
one that I had.3 Conversely, one could assert the A minor/B major case by weighting the
preference rules for determining the key of the piece or passage differently. One can imagine
caring less about the final cadence or key signature and more about the first harmony to
determine the tonal context for the passage. Since tonic begins compositional section is
among rhetorical techniques for asserting harmonic function, and the harmony that ends the
piece is so absent from most of the song, one can imagine asserting A minor for this passage
on this basis.4 Some of the theories examined in this dissertation are like this, combining
both ways of thinking into a single methodology instead of locking into one perspective or
another. As we will see, attempts to use only a single kind of concept are rare because, as
a general rule, music analysts tend to want methodologies that engage both parts of their
musicality.
I want to be clear. It is not my goal here to make normative judgments about these
approaches. I am not especially concerned, at this juncture, with saying that one approach
is, on the whole, superior to another or that music theory ought to be properly concerned
only with experience or with abstract or formal properties. Different approaches flow from
different motivations and beliefs about music and about discourse, from different axioms
about what music theory should be. This discussion is not about arguing for one position or
another but rather about understanding the practices that manifest once these axioms are
adopted. Analysts all must decide for themselves which approaches they prefer, and it is my
hope to make the fallout of this decision clearer. When normative language is used, it is aimed
3I can cause myself to have this experience, and might do so if I decided that I wanted to hear
this piece as coherent overall. But this experience does not usually happen for me spontaneously.
4Harrison (1994), 79.
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at methodological or validity problems, not meta-theoretical, musical values. Studying the
conceptual vocabularies of different approaches reveal the scope of their claims and analytical
approaches run into problems when they overreach the limits posed by conceptual resources.
0.2 Outline
The chapters of this dissertation can be divided into three groups: the first chapter lays out
and contextualizes the conceptual distinction, the second and third chapters treat what I
call simple theories, and the fourth and fifth chapters treat what I call complex theories.
The first chapter presents the basic distinction between theoretical and phenomenal con-
cepts which informs my latter studies of various analytical approaches. Chapter one draws
a good deal of its theory of concepts in philosophy of mind and other branches of cogni-
tive science, primarily the theory of concepts advanced by Christopher Peacocke. I argue
that theoretical and phenomenal musical concepts differ both in the kinds of things they
refer to (abstract objects and phenomenal contents, respectively) and in modes of presen-
tation available to them. The structure and scope of these conceptual types, when put
into practice, will limit the kinds of claims that can be made while engaging each type. In
this chapter, I also compare the extension and structure of my conceptual distinction with
other accounts of music-theoretical concepts and other theory-versus-experience distinctions.
Finally, I present a collection of analytical imperatives that I take to underlieeither ex-
plicitly or implicitlymost of the analytical decisions that are made using these two types
of concepts.
Chapters two and three explore simple theories, while chapters four and five investigate
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how both conceptual types can be coordinated into complex theories. This simple/complex
division is based on how diverse the approach's conceptual resources are. I call approaches
that rely on only a single type of concept simple theories, and there are two subcategories of
simple theories. Theoretical approaches rely only on theoretical concepts and are the topic
of chapter two. I examine two different ways that analysts engage music on this level, first
using Damon Scott and Eric Isaacson's fully formalized interval angle, then using quasi-
formal, psychological models with Eugene Narmour's implication-realization model as an
exemplar.
Phenomenal approaches rely only on phenomenal concepts and the topic of chapter three.
Here I examine different strategies to communicate the richness of musical experience, pro-
viding commentaries on the work of Elaine Barkin, Benjamin Boretz, and J. K. Randall.
Each simple theory faces certain pragmatic challenges flowing from the conceptual frame-
work it embraces. And, as it turns out, the realities of communication and practice often
preclude any truly simple theory. Contamination by the other conceptual type in concep-
tion, description, or interpretation is nearly always inevitable. Because they rely only on a
single conceptual type, chapters treating simple theories focus primarily on the motivations
for deploying particular conceptual types and the sorts of music-theoretical and -analytical
practices that are best suited for that type of concept.
Complex theories, conversely, rely on a combination of both conceptual types. Chapters
that treat complex theories focus on a single analytical tradition and attempt to tease out
how the two conceptual types are combined in that tradition. These approaches attempt to
benefit from the strengths of each conceptual type while also mitigating their complications.
I explore two ways that this combination can occur in chapters four and five. Chapter four
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presents what I call the segregated approach. Segregated approaches, like transformational
and neo-Riemannian theory, engage both theoretical and phenomenal aspects of music, but
do so in a disciplined manner, separating the usage of each kind of concept into different
phases of the analytical process. Chapter five explores the most common and most difficult
kind of conceptual coordination, what I call mixed approaches. In mixed approaches the
central analytical concepts themselves have both theoretical and phenomenal aspects (like
the roman numerals used in the analysis above) and can be asserted using either kind of
criteria. My primary exemplar of this approach is Schenkerian analysis.
My primary sources will be contemporary theoretical and, especially, analytical texts.
I provide a number of close readings of texts in these different traditions and analyze the
explicit and implicit conceptualizations implied by their language, focusing on the kinds of
concepts they deploy and how they shape the analytical argument.
The aim of this dissertation is to develop a better understanding of the ways that con-
temporary music analysts think and speak about music and to analyze the habits of thought
and conceptual resources that underlie different kinds of engagement. The majority of work
done in the following pages is more reflective on how music theory has been done and, hope-
fully, provides a guide to how to think more carefully and consciously when doing analysis
or criticism. Understanding these different ways of thinking is tremendously important for
many facets of music theory. My final, concluding chapter briefly explores two of these
applications.
First, I examine how developing an understanding of music-analytical concepts can help
analysts to have more productive disagreements. Often, it seems, when analysts disagree
they constantly point back to the music to settle their debates, but usually their disagreement
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comes not from misunderstanding the musical features but from understanding those features
in a different way. In this sense, aesthetic debates like those in music analysis are analogous
to ethical debates, where the debate is not about what an action is but rather about what
it means and the latter judgment always issues from a particular perspective that consists
of certain habits of conceptualization.
Second, understanding more clearly the various ways that we as analysts conceptual-
ize musical features can help us to better teach these ideas to students. The conceptual
framework of a trained theorist will be quite robust and consist of a web of concepts, all of
which bear relationships to each other. Students approaching this material for the first time
however, may only understand the material in one wayinstead of the multiplicity of ways
already available to the professionaland they will also lack the rich web of connections
from which many concepts derive their importance. Crucially, the more comfortable one is
with this web of concepts, the more transparent this perspective becomes, making it more
and more difficult to imagine the perspective of a new student who lacks this perspective.
Analyzing the varieties of conceptualization that inform our practice and make this perspec-




Phenomenal and Theoretical Concepts
1.1 Introduction
The two analyses of Gebet given in the introduction relied on different ways of concep-
tualizing the musical objects they presented. This chapter outlines the structure of these
two types of concept. Each conceptual type, I will argue, is best suited for certain kinds of
discourse and tends to produce particular sorts of claims. Moreover, the decision to use one
type or another depends on oftentimes-tacit beliefs about the nature of music theory and
analysis.1 Analyzing music-theoretical claims in terms of these concepts and being aware
of how we use them when crafting analyses clarifies some of the foundational notions that
1To be clear from the outset, I do not think that these are the only types of concepts available
to music analysts, nor are the criteria and procedures outlined here meant to represent the only
or even the best way to go about the business of music theory. Other analytical projects, which
may invoke history or some political goal, will inspire different procedures and rely on concepts
with quite different valences than those discussed here. Furthermore, while the kinds of conceptual
distinctions I am concerned with apply to analysis of any kind of music in principle, in practice
the relationships between them are easiest to see and most analytically productive when applied to
tonal music.
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underlie much of our work as theorists and analysts.
This chapter has two goals. The first is to distinguish phenomenal and theoretical con-
cepts in terms of their conceptual structure. Understanding this distinction involves some
background in general theories of concepts from philosophy of mind and other branches of
cognitive science. As will become quite clear, there are very many different approaches to
the study of concepts, and different disciplines study concepts for different purposes relying
on different methodologies. While the resulting theories are sometimes treated as at odds,
I think it is probably more productive to construe them as merely incommensurate.2 Be-
cause adherents to one approach or another may be motivated by different methodological
commitments, they often talk past each other. But each perspective reveals something dif-
ferent about how concepts work or how we relate to them. My understanding of concepts is
drawn mainly from philosophy of mind. I will construe concepts as structurally analogous
to Fregean senses, considering both what they refer to and the way that they refer. I se-
lect this theory of concepts because it provides a strong account of re-conceptualization and
recognizes the complexities of conceptual structure.
The second task is to place my conceptual distinction into an intellectual context. I
show how the theory of concepts adopted here relates to other accounts of musical and
music-theoretical concepts, particularly those of Mark DeBellis and Lawerence Zbikowski.
While DeBellis's and my understandings are largely cut from the same cloth, some small
distinctions are worth noting. Zbikowski's work on musical concepts, by contrasts, originates
from cognitive psychology and linguistics instead of philosophy of mind and the differences
2Laurence and Margolis (2014) presents the best introduction I have found comparing different
stances on concepts and highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of different positions.
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between our approaches and underlying theories are as a result quite stark. Our eventual
goals, however, remain aligned, even if we take different paths to get there. The distinction
between theoretical and phenomenal concepts also participates in a long history of theory-
versus-experience distinctions. I examine a few of these in detail, showing how my way of
parsing these two kinds of music theory differs from previous approaches, foregrounding the
motivations that lead to a different way of making this distinction.
1.2 Theoretical and Phenomenal Concepts Defined
Concepts in General
Concepts concern a diversity of fields across all of cognitive science, including linguistics, psy-
chology, and philosophy of mind. Each of these disciplines has different assumptions about
what concepts ought to be and what kinds of evidence ought to count toward claims con-
cerning them. For psychology and psychologically influenced fields, the criteria of scientific
methodology exert a tremendous influence. Any theory of concepts that comes out of these
intellectual traditions places a high premium on explaining various experimental results. For
many philosophically influenced traditions, by contrast, more concern is placed on analysis
of theories of concepts or on how these theories conform with concepts' phenomenology. I
will try to avoid interdisciplinary debates about conceptual structure and ontology as best
I can (my concerns do not go as deep as understanding the underlying nature of concepts).
My interest is just in how different types of concept are used in music theory.
In this section I make some basic claims about concept differentiation and structure that
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are useful when doing the sort of conceptual analysis of music analyses that occupies the
rest of this dissertation. If the reader is disinclined toward philosophy of mind, these ideas
should still be translatable into linguistic or cognitive-psychological equivalents. It should
be possible to adopt my latter, more substantive claims about how concepts work in music
theories while disagreeing with some of my underlying assumptions about the nature of
concepts.
Concepts are sometimes referred to as the constituents of thought; they are the sub-
propositional makeup of intentional states (mental states of belief, judgment, and so on).
The sentence It is raining describes a proposition (a statement which is evaluable as either
true or false), and it consists of a number of concepts including one for raining. Propositions
such as this one feature in our intentional states, which is to say we have thoughts about
them. I may believe the proposition it is raining is true and so bring an umbrella or, based
on the sunlight on my desk just now, I may doubt it, and so on. Similarly, I may believe
the proposition that F is a suspension and, for this reason, affect my performance in a way
that I deem characteristic to suspension (e.g., laying into the dissonance a little bit).
The theory which underlies my account of phenomenal and theoretical concepts in music
theory takes concepts to be structured more-or-less like Fregean senses. In Gottlob Frege's
theory of meaning, presented most famously in Über Sinn und Bedeutung (usually rendered
On Sense and Reference). In this well known article, Frege asks, among other things, in
what way the terms morning star and evening star are distinct. They both mean the
planet Venus, after all, but then it should not be informative to learn that the evening star
and morning star are the same thingjust as it is uninformative to learn that Venus is Venus.
Frege's solution is to argue that a word's meaning consists of both a reference and a sense.
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Figure 1.1: Analysis of Hesperus and Phosphorus
A word's reference is the thing that it names while its sense is the way that the reference is
referred to. A word's sense is sometimes also called its mode of presentation. As illustrated
in Figure 1.1, Hesperus and Phosphorus (the proper names for the morning and evening
star) both refer to the planet Venus, but they do so under different senses, as the evening
star and the morning star respectively.3 This distinction allows words to mean the same
thing (that is, to refer to the same thing) while simultaneously and without contradiction
mean different things (that is, refer to the same thing but in different ways, under different
modes of representation).
Concepts, like terms, have a similar two-level structure. We take them as referring to
a particular entity and doing so in a particular way. We do not just conceptualize things,
but conceptualize them as something.4 For instance, I have the concept the author of Der
freie Satz, this concept refers to a particular man, Heinrich Schenker, and does so with a
particular mode of presentation, that is as the author of Der freie Satz.
This two-level structure recognizes that concepts can be distinguished either by referring
to different things or by referring to the same thing under different modes of presentation.
3Frege (1892 [2012]). It should be noted that here Frege only uses the terms morning star and
evening star. The proper names were added by later philosophers, notably Kripke (1980), to make
further points about proper names which are beyond our scope.
4Peacocke (1992), Zalta (2001).
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Thus the concept the composer of Gebet and the concept the husband of Clara Wieck
both refer to the same man, Robert Schumann. but can be distinguished by the mode of
presentation.
We can recognize whether two concepts are distinct or not by their degree of cognitive
significance. Christopher Peacocke defines this distinctness criterion as follows:
Concepts C and D are distinct if and only if there are two complete propositional
contents that differ at most in that one contains C substituted in one or more
places for D, and one of which is potentially informative while the other is not.5
It should be clear why concepts that refer to different things are distinct under this criterion,6
but this way of distinguishing concepts also provides a test to distinguish different concepts
which refer to the same thing. The concepts the composer of Gebet, and the husband of
Clara Wieck are distinct concepts for the same man, as is his name Robert Schumann. We
can test this by noting that the following three sentences are informative:
1. Robert Schumann is the husband of Clara Wieck.
2. Robert Schumann is the composer of Gebet.
3. The husband of Clara Wieck is the composer of Gebet.
Whereas learning that,
5Peacocke (1992), 2.
6Rehearsing this may be unnecessary, but working out an easy test case might help clarify how
the cognitive significance criterion works. Suppose, we have two concepts: brown and table. Now
consider the following propositions: Brown is brown, The table is brown. Under this criterion,
these concepts are distinct because table replaces brown in one place in the second proposition
and while the first is an uninformative tautology, the second is potentially informative. In this case,
this is so because the two concepts refer to different things, namely to the color brown and to the
table.
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1. The husband of Clara Wieck is the husband of Clara Wieck.
is not.7 Theoretical and phenomenal music-analytical concepts also are differentiated both
in what they take as references and in how they refer to these references.8
Theoretical Concepts
What I will call theoretical concepts encompass the majority of concepts that are implicitly
or explicitly defined in music theories or analytical methodologies. Theoretical concepts
refer to their abstract objects via a sense or mode of presentation, as described in the
previous section. This means that, like the different names for the planet Venus, we can
refer to the abstract objects of music theory using different concepts, each of which relies
on a different mode of presentation. For a musical example, consider the multiple ways to
conceptualize the dominant. We might conceptualize it as a triad built on 5ˆ or as the triad
which most commonly precedes the tonic. While conceptualized differently, both concepts
7The discussion so far has been couched in philosophical terms that some readers may find
grating. I said above that the important parts are translatable into terms befitting other cognitive-
scientific fields. The theories of concepts which I have drawn from so far (especially Peacocke
(1995)) consider concepts to be abstract entities and not mental representations. However, we
need not necessarily adopt this aspect of Peacocke's theory in order to recognize the distinctness
criterion or the two-level structure of concepts. Considering instead a prototype theory of concepts,
we might say that to conceptualize something is to recognize that thing (the reference) as belonging
to whatever family is represented by the prototype (the sense).
8This argument for conceptual structure implies certain things about conceptual ontology.
Namely that concepts are abstract objects instead of, e.g., mental representations or particular
abilities. See, ibid., 99ff. for Peacocke's metaphysical theory of concepts. Construing concepts this
way permits them to be shared across thinkers, to participate in the constitution of propositions,
and to serve as the bridge between thinking and speaking and their referents. Margolis and Law-
erence (2014) provide a brief summary of the alternative options for conceptual ontology and give
the typical responses to each position. In section 1.4.1, below, we will see that this difference in
conceptual ontology results in different approaches to the analysis of music-analytical concepts by
theorists with different commitments, specifically between Zbikowski and myself.
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Figure 1.2: Various sense for the abstract object Dominant.
share a reference; they both refer to the same triad and we know that these are, in fact,
different concepts because it is potentially informative to learn that the triad built on 5ˆ is
the triad that most commonly precedes the tonic. While these concepts have the relatively
straightforward structure described abovethey have both a sense and a referencethey
refer to abstract objects. Abstract objects are difficult to define but we can start with a
negative definition. They are not concrete; they exist in no specific time or place, but we
can still think about them, typically as types. Mathematical objects are commonly cited as
the prototypical class of abstract objects. The concept Triangle, for instance, refers to an
abstract objectthe reference is no single extant triangle but some abstraction of all triangles,
and our knowledge about the abstract object triangle (and other attitudes taken toward it)
will apply to all concrete examples of the same.9
Understanding theoretical concepts as referring to abstract objects allows two important
elements into music-theoretical discourse. First, it allows us to group various kinds of con-
crete musical objects as tokens of the same type. One can talk about whole-tone scales,
say, and general features that they possess without needing to invoke any given, concrete
9The exact nature of this abstraction is unclear and philosophical debates about it are ongoing,
and I'll try to stay out of the ontological weeds here. There are a number of plausible accounts for
the abstract/concrete distinction (Lewis (1986) famously gives four: the Way of Negation, the Way
of Example, the Way of Conflation, and the Way of Abstraction). The exact ontology of abstract
objects is not important for my purposes here, though, and I'll just assume that they exist in some
form.
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whole-tone scale. More importantly, taking theoretical concepts to refer to abstract objects
broadens the scope of music theory beyond only perceptual phenomena, allowing us to pos-
sess theoretical concepts for inaudible aspects of a composition that we may still want to
invoke in analysis.10
Theoretical concepts have a variety of epistemological and discursive roles in music theory
and not all of them behave in the same way. I'll define two subcategories of this conceptual
type that are especially common: formal concepts and representational concepts. Unlike
the distinction between phenomenal and theoretical concepts, which occurs at the level of
reference, this distinction is best placed at the level of sense. That is, both formal and
representational concepts refer to abstract objects, but the manner by which they refer,
their mode of presentation, is different. Each, moreover, is associated with different sets of
analytical practices.
Formal concepts are those which are classically structured and usually explicitly defined;
their application is always governed by a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficent
conditions and typically have a single definition within a theory. The necessary and sufficient
conditions for formal concepts usually obtain outside of perception, meaning that one can
determine whether the concept applies based on the score, sound, or other objective measure
alone without consulting a listener's experience (one may consult experience, but it is not
required).
We find these kinds of concepts mostly on the very abstract levels of music theories or in
10There is an argument to be made that this only concerns concepts for types. Token concepts
might instead refer to actual sonic events, instead of abstract objects. While this is sometimes
the case in specific analysis, the approaches that rely on these kinds of concepts typically favor
methodologies that can be repeated, and applied to various pieces, not just to specific sonic events.
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theories that hold to a kind of scientific, mathematical, or logical paradigm which require
formal, logical validity in its arguments. But we also find them in more audible situations.
Hepokoski and Darcy's concept of the essential exposition closure, or EEC, is an example of a
formal concept, even though their theory does not have the discursive style of a mathematical
treatise. EEC is a formal concept because it is defined explicitly as the first satisfactory PAC
in the secondary theme zone (which is to say after the medial caesura).11 What makes the
PAC satisfactory is also defined explicitly. The PAC is rendered unsatisfactory when there
is a retrospective reopening of the second theme (a return of that theme's motivic material)
or when the cadence is weakened in specific ways.12 Thus, the concept's application takes
on an if-then-except form: if a cadence is the first PAC after the medial caesura, then it
is the EEC, except in cases X, Y, and Z.13 Because this concept does not rely on experience
for its application, it refers not to something that is necessarily heard but to an abstract set
of relationships in a sonata exposition, it counts as a theoretical concept.
What I call representational concepts, by contrast, need not each be explicitly defined, but
they still refer to abstract objects and constitute a much broader category. Representational
concepts are those that are deployed in mental representation but are are distinguished from
phenomenal concepts, discussed presently, by not referring to phenomenal content and lack
the phenomenal richness of actual experience. This subcategory of theoretical concepts is
11Hepokoski and Darcy (2006), 18.
12Ibid, 151-152 and 163-170, respectively. One should note that not all weak cadences fail as
EEC's, Hepokoski and Darcy, in fact, make a point of saying that the EEC needn't be the strongest
sounding cadence in the exposition (Ibid., 124). Only those ways of weakening the cadence described
by the authors count as exceptions.
13I discuss this if-then-except structure at greater length in the following chapter in the context
of Eugene Narmour's implication-realization model.
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named because of its use in mental representations. In a mental representation one takes
the world to be a certain way, so the concepts are not about utterly abstract properties,
but about categories of real things, and, in some cases, refer to actual objects in the world,
represented via a certain mode of presentation. However, one can use this variety of concept
without needing to grasp any phenomenal contents whatsoever. It is difficult to grasp this
distinction without a fuller understanding of what phenomenal concepts are, so I will return
to a deeper discussion of representational concepts in section 1.2.4, after defining phenomenal
concepts in the following section..
Phenomenal Concepts
Phenomenal concepts, by contrast, are deployed in music theory whenever we conceptualize
a musical entity (note, term, sonic event, etc.) in terms of the phenomenal content of those
experiences which feature that entity. Phenomenal content is first-personal sense of what it
is like to have that experience.14 Phenomenal contents include things like the feel of tension
toward resolution from experiences of tendency tones like ]7ˆ or [6ˆ or the characteristic timbre
of instruments. By using phenomenal concepts, one can conceptualize these experiences, and
by conceptualize them one can think about these experience and use them in analysis.
Of course, the notion of phenomenal concepts reaches well beyond musical experience.
The sensation of the color red when you see a ripe tomato is phenomenal content and so
is the unpleasant sensation of pain when you stub your toe. One can distinguish these
14Elsewhere I and others have discussed phenomenal contents under the banner of qualia,
Hansberry (2017), discussed also in Rings (2011), Huron (2006), and Dowling (2010). The term
qualia has fallen out of fashion in philosophy of mind, though, and the phrase phenomenal content
is used to talk about more-or-less the same thing.
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qualitative, felt aspects from other parts of the more complex, general concept denoted by
the word for that concept. In the case of red, the phenomenal content of a red experience
and a belief that red is that color is distinct from a belief that, say, red is opposite green on
the color wheel or that it is the color is of a matador's cape or that it is typically caused by
a certain wavelength of light entering the eye. Importantly, the latter three red-concepts do
not invoke phenomenal experience of red, one could hold those beliefs, using those concepts,
without ever needing to have experienced the color.
The notion of phenomenal concepts originates in philosophy of mind as a response to
the knowledge argument, a famous anti-physicalist argument that invokes intuitions about
the nature of phenomenal and physical knowledge. Physicalism is the ontological position
that asserts that only physical things and physical properties exist. In a famous thought
experiment, Frank Jackson challenges this position with a counterexample. He asks us to
imagine a vision scientist, Mary, who is narrowly omniscient to matters involving color and
color perception but has lived her whole live in a black-and-white room. According to strict
physicalism she ought to know everything that there is to know about the physical objects
and properties involved in color perception. Yet when she is released from her room and sees
a ripe tomato for the first time, most people intuit that she would learn something, namely
what it's like to see the color red. So, the argument goes, there must be something besides
just physical facts and properties that is responsible for this what-it's-like-ness.15
There are a number of good physicalist responses to the knowledge argument. The
simplest is to deny the intuition that Mary would learn something. Daniel Dennett, for
15Jackson (1982). Jackson has since changed his mind about the validity of this argument (Jack-
son 2004), but despite the argument's author no longer buying it, it remains extremely influential.
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instance, argues that, when you look closely, it is in fact not conceivable that Mary could
have all the physical facts without having any grasp of what colors are like. Either Mary
knows everything physical and must know what they are like, or there is some gap in her
omniscience; our intuition is simply deluded.16
The phenomenal concepts strategy provides a more nuanced response.17 This rebuttal
supposes that what Mary gains when she is released from the room is not knowledge concern-
ing non-physical entities or propertiesone need not adopt dualismbut rather a capacity
to form new kinds of knowledge that depends on a new way to conceptualize the facts she al-
ready has. She gains the ability to conceptualize color phenomenally, and this does not entail
that there must be anything extra-physical added to the scenario. Such a conceptualization,
the argument goes, can only be gained through acquaintance and so was not available to
Mary in her black-and-white room. This strategy gives us a way to have our cake and eat it
too. We can believe our intuition that Mary learns something, namely what it's like to see
colors, but we do not have to reject physicalism. This knowledge becomes possible because
of the new concepts at her disposal that she could not possess while confined to her room.18
Like most debates in philosophy, whether or not the phenomenal concepts strategy in fact
provides an effective response to the knowledge argument remains controversial.19 But the
16Dennett (1988).
17As far as I can tell, this strategy was first proposed in Stoljar (2005) and a good summary of
its application is found in Chalmers (2010).
18David Chalmers calls this position Type-B Materialism. A Type-B Materialist believes in
epistemic dualism but is an ontological materialist. Chalmers (1996), 41.
19Chalmers proposes a Master Argument against phenomenal concepts. Chalmers (2010), 312-
320. He tests some replies himself, further responses to this argument are found in Papineau (2007),
136-143.
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ubiquity of phenomenal concepts among philosophers of consciousness has led to a number of
further debates about just what phenomenal concepts are, how they differ from traditional
concepts, and how they are structured.20 There are two features that persist through most
theories, however. First, such concepts refer to phenomenal content, that is, what it's like
to undergo that conscious experience. Second, phenomenal concepts refer to their content
directly, without any intervening mode of presentation or with a minimally transparent one.
Probably the simplest theory for this sort of direct reference is to consider phenomenal
concepts to act like a sort of demonstrative. Under this theory, the concept simply points
at the relevant phenomenal content and we might formalize it as containing the content
that (such-and-such experience).21 So when we talk about the phenomenal concept 7ˆ we
will say that what it refers to is the experience of what it's like to hear scale degree 7ˆ and
it refers to it with some minimally thin sense, making the concept something like that
(experience of 7ˆ).22 Lacking a mode of presentation means that there cannot be distinct
phenomenal concepts that refer to the same phenomenal content. There can be only one
phenomenal concept for 7ˆ since the concept refers in a direct fashion.23
20See Levin (2006), Papineau (2006), Levine (2006), Hawthorne (2006), and Nida-Rümelin (2006),
among others.
21Though, as I mentioned above, some philosophers still take issue with this construal. See
Papineau (2007).
22Because there is not a mode of presentation for such concepts, they are also not taken to involve
non-phenomenal parts of conscious experiences, affordances or emotions, for example. These aspects
of experience have their own phenomenology, certainly, but they do not structure phenomenal
concepts, which are meant to grasp something more basic.
23More precisely, there can be only one phenomenal concept for each phenomenal content that
is part of the 7ˆ experience. In my discussion of scale-degree qualia, I argue that there are actually
a variety of distinct but associated phenomenal contents in one's experience of a scale degree,
including a sense of its relationship to tonic, a pressure to resolve (or not) in a particular fashion,
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Theoretical Concepts Revisited: Representational Concepts
With an understanding of phenomenal concepts in hand, we are in a better position to under-
stand what representational theoretical concepts are and how they differ from phenomenal
concepts. Representational concepts include David Papineau calls perceptual concepts. Per-
ceptual concepts and phenomenal concepts are both used to think and talk about perceptual
experience, but perceptual concepts are non-demonstrative.24 Like phenomenal concepts,
representational or perceptual concepts have a perceptual origin (we have to have the per-
ceptual experience before we can think about it), but they differ in the direction of the
concept's intensionality; phenomenal concepts are directed inward, toward the subjective,
phenomenal experiences, while perceptual concepts are directed outward, toward an exter-
nal object.25 This distinction is worth making because perceptual concepts, once gained, can
become independent of the originating experience. We can think about perceptual concepts
without needing to undergo any particular kind of experience. We can talk about perceiving
a leading tone, say, without having to imagine the phenomenal experience of a leading tone.
This perceptual concept of the leading tone has its origin in perceptual experience, but our
etc. Hansberry (2017).
24Papineau (2007) discusses the relationship between phenomenal and perceptual concepts at
length.
25This follows David Papineau's suggestion that phenomenal concepts are simply special cases
of perceptual concepts...being used to think about perceptual experiences themselves rather than
about the objects of those experiences. (Papineau (2007), 122.) This is only a rough account
of their difference. In this version of Papineau's account of phenomenal concepts he no longer
considers them to be demonstratively structured, as I suggested in chapter 1 and Papineau himself
argued in Papineau (2002). These are quite fine distinctions regarding about the internal structure
of phenomenal concepts which are not crucial for the argument I make here. All we need is to
recognize that a distinction exists between phenomenal concepts (which deal in experiences) and
perceptual concepts (which deal in the objects of perception).
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concept refers to the leading tone without re-invoking the phenomenal experience.26
Moreover, while phenomenal concepts refer to actual experiences, representational con-
cepts are use to think and talk about these phenomenal experiences but they do not them-
selves refer to the phenomenal content of those perceptual experiences. We might discuss
that a stop sign is red, for example, without instantiating the phenomenal experience of
redness. Recognizing representational, theoretical concepts is an important way of tying
theories that rely on theoretical logic back to perception, even if the phenomenal content
of perceptual experience need not actually be required in understanding those claims. That
is, it is possible to have thoughts about perceptual, phenomenal experience without need-
ing to know what that experience is like. This is how, for instance that Mary could think
about color perception before escaping the room. She just could not do so using phenomenal
concepts.27
Representational concepts exist in a difficult place between how we normally think about
experience and theory. They are supposed to be about experience, but they do not actually
require experience in order to be used. Because they do not refer to actual phenomenology,
I take them to be a kind of theoretical concept.
26This is why psychological theories count, by and large, as theoretical approaches instead of
phenomenal ones. The concepts with which they are concerned originate in perceptual experience,
but need not include phenomenal experience.
27This is the view that phenomenal content is not reducible to mere representations. See Loar
(2004), Peacocke (1983), Chalmers (2004), Block (1990), and Raffmann (2008).
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1.3 Conceptual Types in Theory and in Practice
The Complexity of Music-Theoretical Terms
The distinction between phenomenal and theoretical concepts cashes out both in analytical
application and in the way we think about basic music-theoretical concepts. In his 1965 essay
The Structure and Function of Musical Theory, Milton Babbitt argues that meaningful
communication of music-theoretical claims requires a common, formal language.28 In the
course of the discussion, he makes the following distinction:
There is, then, this close analogy between interval and whatever we wish to
call the concept represented by the sum of pitch-class numbers [i.e., index of
inversion]. And yet, in some musically important sense, these two concepts would
seen to require differentiation at some level. Surely interval is an observation
concept; does the other concept require categorization as theoretical, in the
usual sense of the term, since it is not apparently translatable into perceptual
terms? Until, if ever, an ultimate disposition is made of this terminological
differentiation, this latter concept, for all of its hierarchical implications, will be
formulable only in theoretical terms.29
While I do not propose to serve as that ultimate disposition, the distinction sketched above
is of some use here. As a formal, mathematical definition for interval, Babbitt posits the
difference between pitches (a − b) or pitch classes (a − b mod 12). This definition is meant
to formalize a clear part of musical experience: pitches seem to have an experientially as-
certainable distance from one another, this distance does not change under transposition,
etc. The formalization of the observation concept of interval allows it to be comprehensi-
ble when it enters the discursive space that Babbitt imagines best befits music theory. But
28Babbitt (1965 [2003]), 191201.
29Ibid., 197.
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while the quotidian term interval can denote both theoretical and observation concepts,
this is not the case for all concepts used in music theory. Babbitt also discusses what he
calls the arithmetic extension of interval-as-difference: inversion as a sum in pitch-class
space (a + b mod 12). This formal definition, by contrast, lacks an observational analog;
it is is solely theoretical. These two types of concepts, observation and theoretical, are
analogous to my phenomenal and theoretical concepts.30
I ought to note, before getting deeper into this analysis, that Babbitt's rhetorical style
and bibliographic commitments are, like all scholarship, situated in a particular context. My
sharpening of the terminology puts a finer point on the distinction that I take Babbitt to
be making, but is probably best understood as an interpretation or extension of his original
point instead of an attempt to clarify it. I am forcing an interpretation about presence or
absence of phenomenal content, when the closest Babbitt gets is comments about perceptual
understanding and the like. Given the aims of his overall argument, this distinction is not
necessarily the point he is trying to make, nor is it especially nuanced by the intellectual
context Babbitt was participating in.31
30Depending on what one takes as observation, some argue that theoretical ideas are already
implicit in any concepts deployed such perception. This position is strongly argued in theories of
perception in philosophy of science, notably by Hanson (1958) and Kuhn (1962 [2012]). For such
philosophers of science, as well as some music theorists, the distinction between observation and
theoretical concepts would be a false one. It seems to me, though, that the relationship between
theories and perception is more complicated than such accounts allow. For arguments in favor of
such a relationship which permits some kind of perception or observation without implicit theories,
see Peacocke (1984) (chapter 3) or Dummett (1976). By and large, I think these disagreements are
mostly definitional; that is, the crux of the debate often stems from how expansive the particular
thinker's idea of theory is. Following Babbitt, I assume a narrower definition of theoretical which
makes the observation/theoretical distinction meaningful.
31Historiographies of this moment in the history of music theory are extremely important to
contextualize how the field developed into the practices engaged in now. Gleason (2013) explores
the philosophical underpinning of Babbitt and Princeton Theory more generally, and examines
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In the terms I have developed here, inversion exists only as a theoretical concept. The
concept refers to a particular kind of abstract formal transformation, namely addition; it is
conceptualized in terms of adding numbers that represent pitch classes. Interval, however,
is more complex because it can be conceptualized both phenomenally and theoretically. In
the latter case, we have something analogous to the case of inversion, where interval refers
to a particular kind of mathematical relation: subtraction. But specific intervals also have
a phenomenal conceptualization. The phenomenal concept for any given interval will refer
to the phenomenal content of hearing that interval.32
These different conceptualizations of interval are distinguished not just on the level of
sense, but also on the level of reference. It is not just a matter of representing the same
musical idea in multiple ways; they also differ in the kind of content. The theoretical concept
for interval refers to the subtraction relationship, while the phenomenal concept refers to
what it's like to hear this relationship. In music-theoretical practice, this distinction is often
complicated as both types of concept may be denoted by the same term.33
Babbitt's writing on theory and experience in pp. 116ff. Girard (2010) presents a reading and critique
of Babbitt's seemingly apparent methodological commitments (as well as the later interpretation
thereof) from the context of the institutional climate at Princeton.
32Though, it is hardly news to understand Babbitt's thought (both here and in general) as having
a close relationship to musical experience, despite some of his discursive decisions which seem so
far from contemporary experience-talk. See, for instance, Guck (1994) for discussion of Babbitt
in particular as well as Scherzinger (2002) similarly aimed accounts of other branches of Princeton
Theory.
33To be more precise, interval would in fact denote a set of phenomenal concepts, since the
phenomenal content of hearing different constructions of that interval (say hearing them in different
registers or compounded with an additional octave in between) would each have its own phenomenal
content.
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Figure 1.3: Conceptual analysis of Dominant.
For an even more complex case consider the concept (or concepts) denoted by the term
Dominant. The word denotes not a simple lexical concept (like cat) but rather a complex
amalgam of different conceptual types and different specific concepts within each type. We
can distinguish the phenomenal concept of a dominant, that is the concept that refers to
what it's like to hear a dominant. And we can can also distinguish concepts that refer
to an abstract object divorced from any phenomenal experience. This latter option is itself
composed of a number of concepts that, while referring to the same thing, differ in sense. The
theoretical concept of dominant that presents it as that triad with 5ˆ as the root is distinct
from the concept which presents it as that triad which functionally resolves to the tonic.
And we know that all of these concepts are distinct because it is potentially informative to
learn that they are equivalent. In the case of the two theoretical concepts, one can learn that
the triad that most often precedes the tonic is that triad that takes 5ˆ as its root. Likewise, a
musical analog to Mary in the black-and-white room could possess both theoretical concepts
but could learn that those concepts were associated with that sound when she was let out
of her silent room and allowed to listen to music.
31
This complicates music-theoretical discourse because most often we just make the simple
claim, This chord is a dominant, but our readers may not know how best to evaluate our
claim; in what sense is it a dominant? I call this a complication, but it is exactly this
complex nature which permits the most valuable kind of music-theoretical task: connecting
the phenomenal experiences of music to our theoretical thoughts and musings. The complex
concept denoted by terms like Dominant acts as this bridge, permitting our experiences
to be expressed in theoretical terms and permitting theoretical claims to shape our experi-
ences.34 In the analyses presented in the introduction, I caricatured the A minor/B major in
Gebet as occurring chiefly in phenomenal terms. I recognized the harmonies and relation-
ships solely based on what they sounded likedeploying phenomenal conceptswithout any
conscious recourse to non-experiential theory. This phenomenology, of course, was influenced
by the array of phenomenal concepts I had at my disposal, some of which was sharpened
by ear training, but all the analytical decisions remained firmly on the basis of phenomenal
criteria and any all of the broader concepts deployed were deployed only on the basis of their
phenomenal sub-concepts. The analysis also meant to illustrate the disconnect I heard at
the A] diminished seventh chord. This disconnect was not tied to any specific harmony but
was a general sense of disassociation when experiencing the harmony prospectively. Sepa-
rating the passages into distinct prolongations with curly braces was meant to indicate this
indirectly. The E minor analysis relied on theoretical concepts. When doing this analysis I
focused more on large scale coherence and conformance to normative harmonic grammars.
As a result the ways the music-theoretical concepts were deployed relied on the sub-concepts
34The ways that terms or analyses coordinate these two conceptual types are the topics of chapters
four and five.
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which showed these features. When coming up with this analysis, I didn't need to hear it
to know what relationships it drew between the harmonies. These relationships were chiefly
theoretical and did not rely on phenomenology. We also saw the invocation of ideas outside
of harmonic theory to argue for the second reading; I argued that we ought to read the final
progression as a half cadence not necessarily because I happened to hear it that way but
because it provides a tidy account of the form of the entire song.
The nature of the concepts used in these sample analyses introduced a further wrinkle.
Roman numerals are among those complex music-theoretical concepts that consist of both
phenomenal and theoretical sub-concepts. It is entirely possible for both analyses to be
conceptualized under the same paradigm (both in terms of their phenomenal content or as
flowing from a non-phenomenal theory) or even for their conceptualizations to be flipped.35
This is why I gave a narrative as to how the analyses were generated. When considering
these kinds of complex music-theoretical concepts, it is importation to be clear about your
criteria and your methodology if clarity about what the concepts represent is important.
Why Concepts?
The conceptual distinction I have outlined clarifies (or at least allows more precision about)
Babbitt's statements about transposition and inversion. But, one might ask, why construe
this distinction as conceptual at all? Instead of thinking that the concept for a dominant-
as-heard is distinct from a concept for the dominant as the triad built on 5ˆ, we might
35The fact that these alternate conceptualizations are possible is why I presented the analysis as
a story. It is possible to interpret each analysis under different conceptualizations, but that is not
what I did when I first wrote it.
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understand the distinction just one of context, as akin to Lewin's analysis of m. 12 of
Schubert's Morgengruß presented in his Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of
Perception.36 In this essay, Lewin presents a formula for musical perception, in the style of
artificial intelligence, which has the structure of an ordered quadruple.37
p = (EV,CXT,R− P − LIST, ST − LIST )
Following this formula, changes to the CXT argumentrepresenting ConteXTare critical.
In Lewin's example, the perception of the g6 triad in m. 12 of Morgengruß will differ
depending on what context is considered relevant; it is read as a minor dominant in C major
when considering mm. 912, but as a iv chord in d minor when considering mm. 1213.
Lewin cycles through nine additional readings each of which invokes a different context for
the percept. Figure 1.4 shows Lewin's entire set of CXT arguments and the various analyses
they imply.38
Recall the two analyses given for Schumann's Gebet in the introduction. It would be
easy enough to craft an analogous chart of changing contexts for my two proposed analyses
that opened this chapter. We might consider the context for the E minor analysis to be
the entire piece, embracing the final cadence and providing a perspective that takes the
tonicization of B major as a a half cadence. The A minor interpretation might arise from a
narrower context, I rehearsed as much when describing my experience of m. 1. The first two
36This essay was originally published in Music Perception 3, no. 4 (1986). I'll refer to the




Figure 1.4: Lewin's Figure 4.7, table of contexts for different analyses of a g6 triad.
chords set up an expectation of a descending bass line in A minor. From the context of the
first measure alone, A minor is the plausible (and, it seems to me, likely) reading. The A
minor reading of the opening might also be asserted if the context included mm. 918, which
feature a long prolongation of A minor and indeed conclude with a stronger cadential gesture
than has been encountered in E minor so far. While this interpretation is consistent with
the analysis, it does not reflect the processes which generated the A minor analysis, which
in part determined its meaning to me. The theoretical/phenomenal conceptual distinction
takes the difference to be more than just one of conflicting contexts: it considers a much
more fundamental difference in how I conceptualized the elements of these analyses when
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crafting them and in what I expect a reader to do to properly understand them.
Considering analyses as relying on different concepts also clarifies where in the analytical
process differences arise. The analyses diverge at the moment of conceptualization, when the
musical event is converted into some music-theoretical concept. Interlocutors representing
each position would agree presumably on descriptions that were more matter-of-fact (which
pitches we sung or played, for instance), and in this case both analyses draw terms from
the same kind of theory (i.e., roman numerals). By the time one gets to talking about the
analyses, though, conceptualization has already happened, the musical experience or abstract
entities have been converted into the language of music theory. This is where we notice the
disagreement, but they originate on a level lower with what kinds of concepts are brought
into play. In the case of Gebet, an analyst wishing to disagree with, say, the A minor/B
major analysis might point to the key signature or to the final cadence as evidence that the
E minor analysis ought to be preferred. This assumes that we share the same criteria by
which the roman numerals are applied. But the A minor phenomenological analysis relies
only on the phenomenology of the harmonies and their immediate context to attribute one
of these concepts, while the E minor theoretical analysis relies on a much broader view as
well as additional consideration of theoretical consistency and elegance.
I have been situating this distinction as existing at the level of concepts. Methodologies
differ because the concepts used in any given approach are epistemologically prior to the
techniques of that methodology. Note, though, that this epistemological priority need not
describe the motivations a theorist or analyst has for adopting that methodology. That is, a
theorist may like a particular technique and then be persuaded to adopt a certain strain of
concepts (or even insist that only those concepts are appropriate to music theory) because
36
those are the concepts that suit that theory or analytical strategy. Additionally, I think that
placing this distinction at the level of concepts better groups theories which have similar
aims instead of grouping approaches based on their methodologies.
1.4 Other Music-theoretical Accounts of Concepts
The distinction outlined in the preceding sections will be used as a framework for investigat-
ing the conceptual makeup of analytical practices and habits in contemporary music theory.
But, of course, this is not by a long shot the first treatment of the concepts involved in
music theorizing or the first time a theorist has distinguished between the experiential and
non-experiential elements of music theory or analysis. In the following sections I explore the
intellectual context of my conceptual distinction. I review other accounts of how concepts
are involved in music theory and music listening, focusing especially on how they differ from
my distinction presented above. For the most part, though, I do not see these differences as
especially in need of adjudication. Rather, different theories or meta-theories have different
goals and rely on different resources from outside music theory. My primary concern has
been to develop an account of music-theoretical concepts that foregrounds what happens
when a single piece is conceptualized in different ways or when analysts disagree about how
a piece ought to be described. These motivations inform how I have cast the distinction and
we will see that accounts with divergent goals, produce different conceptual analyses.
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Zbikowski's Cognitive Linguistic Approach
In section 1.2.1 above, I alluded to the huge diversity of disciplines that claims the study
of concepts as a part of their purview. Nearly every subfield in cognitive science purports
to study concepts and each discipline carries different methodological and epistemological
commitments. What results is an incredibly diverse set of theories of concepts. These
various explanations of concepts' ontology, structure, acquisition, application, and so on are
sometimes read as conflicting (especially when a new theory is attempting to make room
for itself in the theoretical landscape) but a healthier approach, I thinkand one more in
line with the putative interdisciplinarity of cognitive scienceis to consider these different
theories as accounting for the different uses of concepts in different situations.39 Different
subdisciplines will be concerned with different things and as a result, the kinds of answers
they give will be honed to those kinds of questions.
An approach to musical and music-theoretical concepts divergent from the one presented
here can be found in Lawrence Zbikowski's Conceptualizing Music.40 Zbikowski's theory of
musical concepts draws heavily from theories of mind and theories of concepts in cognitive lin-
guistics and cognitive psychology, especially compared to the mostly philosophically-oriented
bibliography here. As a result, his definition of concepts are tailored to answer quite different
questions about the role of concepts in our musical lives.
Zbikowski considers three characteristics as necessary conditions (and collectively suffi-
cient) for musical concepts:
39Lawrence and Margolis (1999) does perhaps a better job of highlighting these sorts of distinc-
tions than Margolis and Lawerence (2014).
40Zbikowski (2002).
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First it is the product of a process of categorization. A musical category then
is quite literally where our conceptualization of music begins. Second, a musical
concept is an essential part of the means through which we guide present and
future actions. These actions thus constitute a sort of indirect evidence for a
cognitive structure almost as ephemeral as music itself. Third a musical concept
can be related to other concepts, including concepts associated with bodily states
(both physical and emotional), perceptual categories (including sound, which,
after all, is not necessarily music), and linguistic constructs.41
Zbikowski's theory of musical concepts draws directly on the theory of concepts developed by
psychologist Gerald Edelman. Edelman argues that the most important feature of concepts
is that they give people the capacity to generalize, drawing the relationship of belonging
to the same category across different experiences.42 But in Edelman's and Zbikowski's
characterizations of concepts a further commitment comes out. In his discussion of concepts
(quoted by Zbikowski) Edelman says, An animal capable of concepts...must act as if it
could make judgments on the basis of category recognition or integrate `particulars' into
`universals. '43 Two ideas are worth highlighting, both of which are found in the assertion
that concept possession is closely tied to actions that indicate the usage of a given concept.
Since we must have a concept before we can use it, the story goes, we can count concept
usageor at least behaving as if a subject is using a conceptas a sufficient condition for
concept possession.
This emphasis on the actions performed by a given subject or animal instead of the






We are confronted with a dilemma. Like intentionality, phenomenal experience
is a hallmark of consciousness, but it is a first-person matterthe only external
criterion for its is the direct or indirect report of a person. While each of us is
sure of having phenomenal experience, it does not seem to be consistent with
the formulation of a completely objective or causal account...Is there any escape
from this dilemma? There is certainly mitigation: while we cannot be precise
about another person's particular feelings or sensations, we can correlate our
own phenomenal experiences with those of others verbally and under certain
observational restrictions.44
Edelman's mitigation of this dilemma is quite common is psychology and, indeed, in ev-
eryday life. It lays down an assumption that the sorts of experiences each person has are
more-or-less the same as everyone else's. Unless we have a particularly strange way of carry-
ing ourselves in the world, we all make this sort of assumption every day. The theory takes
for granted that the actions and verbalizations of others will constitute them as thinking in
particular ways.
Zbikowski and Edelman have good reasons for taking this neo-behaviorist path. There
are a host of well-known problems with scientific discussions of consciousness, all of which
flow from consciousness's inaccessibility to the tools of experimental disciplines and the not
very clear connection between brain events (and their associated verbal or bodily actions)
and phenomenal states.45 Since Zbikowski and Edelman are coming out of a tradition that
prioritizes experimentation that yields publicly accessible data (not things that are only
in the head), they must find way to mitigate the the problems with engaging phenomenal
experience.46
44Ibid., 22.
45This is called the Hard Problem of Consciousness, since it seems that the methodologies of
brain science may never be able to answer it satisfactorily. Chalmers (2007).
46I should say that a less compelling, though just as important reason for Zbikowski's and Edel-
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This method has tremendous utility. Bracketing phenomenal experience and allowing
the experimentation to go on has yielded a great number of insights into the human mind,
even if, due to the not-yet-bridged explanatory gap, we sometime go astray on how to in-
terpret certain experimental results. But while bracketing this Hard Problem is an option
for experimental psychologists, it is not clear how to get a good account of disagreement
between music theorists or the effect of re-conceptualization of experiences of music with-
out accounting for these experience's phenomenal content (or lack thereof). These sorts of
changes in experience may not be manifest as publicly observable behaviors. I might listen
to a piece of music and conceptualize it phenomenally but then decide to study the piece
and switch to only theoretical concepts with no outward sign that this is what I am doing.
As we have seen, the language of music theory (presumably the mode through which I would
do my reporting) permits identical descriptions to be given under either conceptualization.
But I want to assert that these different kinds of conceptualization are, in fact, different.
Indeed, our ability to alter our own conceptualization of a passage presents exactly a
case were we do seem to have direct access to a different person's mental states. That is,
I have access to my own past phenomenal states as mental recreations, and can compare
them to occurent experiences. When the different subjects are one and the same person
over time, the dilemmain only this casedissolves. So in some sense, while these ac-
counts base their methodology on external signs of cognitive structurea sort of outside
man's emphasis on behavior (and not just, say, thinking) is that they want to include other higher
animals in the extension of concept-possessing creatures. Concepts have unfortunately sometimes
been tied directly to language, the assertion being that you could only have a concept if you have
a word for it. (As an aside, I have never quite understood why we think this ought to be the case.
Surely there are all sorts of things we think about, all sorts of ineffable states that can figure into
propositions, but we can't put into words.) Zbikowski and Edelman assert, rightly I believe, that
certain animals in fact do possess concepts.
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in approachmy ambitions are to go the other way, to start from what it's like to make
certain music-theoretical judgments and consider distinctions in phenomenal content to be
of crucial import.
Zbikowski's definition of concepts also emphasizes categorization. Indeed, categorization
precedes conceptualization and forms the basis of the development of concepts which seem
to need nothing more than categories plus certain relationships between them. Zbikowski's
emphasis on categorization in particular allows him to develop a robust analytical framework
to describe the relations between musical features. But music-theoretical categories have
more complex structures than simple inclusion or exclusion. How something is categorized
is just as important as the category that it belongs to. When reflecting on categorical types
and the way that their constituent concepts are used, one finds that such category types
have their own phenomenologies. There is something it is like to take a theoretical stance
vis-a-vis an experience of music, which is different that what it is like to take a phenomenal
stance. Thus while categorization may in fact account for the behaviors of people listening
to music, we need phenomenal concepts to think about what it's like when we ourselves are
in these states.
Because of Zbikowski's emphasis on categorization, he takes concepts to be low-level
cognitive structures. These low-level structures are then embedded into hierarchical networks
that build up to theories. Concepts, according to his definition, are categories which bear
some relationship to one another. These concepts then exist in specified relations and
thereby create conceptual models. These models in turn form conceptual domains, these
domains, as best I can tell, consist of types of referents of the concepts in question. Finally,
conceptual models are coordinated by theories in order to guide inference, provide solutions
42
to conceptual puzzles, and simplify reality.47
Beyond the different relationship to phenomenal content of experience, it is clear that
Zbikowski's notion of concepts is much simpler than the one I want to use. To be sure,
Zbikowski is careful to point out that his distinctions are meant to be taken as practical.
He points out that recent work indicates that the lines between entities such as concepts,
models, domains, and theories are more often blurry than clear and that there are no simple
neurobiological explanations for any of them. My distinctions are thus pragmatic ones,
intended to reflect the different sorts of cognitive work done at different levels of structural
complexity and the compass of conceptual structures that result.48 I am quite sympathetic
to this desire to analyze our usage of concepts in order to better understand them, and in the
sense of concepts that Zbikowski is working under, increasing complexity from concepts to
models to theories helps to organize where on this spectrum given music-theoretical or music-
analytical claims are located. These distinctions serve a practical aim, and here precisely
is the rub. My practical aims differ from Zbikowski's. My project is much more concerned
with the phenomenology and practice of doing analysis. Because it invokes all sorts of
existing theories and practices and habits of the analyst, any examination at this level
will not make much use of the much simpler cognitive structures that serve as Zbikowski's
primary examples. Moreover, phenomenologically speaking, shifts in conceptualization seem
to involve many of what Zbikowski identifies as higher levels of organization. The types




and possibilities, making them seem much thicker than the relatively simple recategorization
that would underlie a conceptual shift under Zbikowski's framework.
DeBellis's Three Levels of Conceptualization
In the preceding section I spoke somewhat loosely about concept usage and concept posses-
sion. I did so because the theories of concepts in consideration did not make a fuss about
this distinction. However, I think it is a distinction we should uphold, for it seems to be
possible to use a concept but not to possess it.
Contrasting Zbikowski, Mark DeBellis, in hisMusic and Conceptualization, operates with
an understanding of concepts significantly closer to mine. Defining concepts, DeBellis says
that they are a certain psychological capacity, an ability to have beliefs (and thoughts
generally) in which one grasps a particular mode of presentation.49 Thus, the ability that
constitutes concepts, for DeBellis, is not just categorization, but extends to a capacity to
form beliefs. These beliefs involve modes of presentation and one can test for them by seeing
whether a thinker can successfully discriminate between instances where the feature the
concept refers to is present or absent. If a thinker can reliably sort in this way, its is a good
indicator that they possess the relevant concept.
There are certain elements of DeBellis's theory of conceptualization in music theory,
however, which run contrary to the sort of images I want to provide for music theory. DeBellis
argues for three levels of conceptualization concerning music.
1. Music might be heard conceptually.
49DeBellis (1995), 32.
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2. Music might be heard weakly nonconceptually.
3. Music might be heard strongly nonconceptually.
Understanding music conceptually amounts to the way that a trained music theorist might
understand some music, with access to the full gamut of complex music-theoretical concepts
with both their theoretical and phenomenal sub-concepts. In the case of hearing weakly
nonconceptually, one can satisfy an attribution [of a music-theoretical concept] without
possessing the (music-theoretical) concept contained in the attribution.50 This means that
one hears a musical feature and can take intentional attitudes toward that feature (which
requires conceptualizing it in some way), but without having the specific music-theoretical
concept. Finally, hearing strongly nonconceptually means the listener is unable to attribute
the pertinent music-theoretical concept at all.
One sees here a distinction not present in Zbikowski's account. Presumably hearing
weakly nonconceptually and hearing conceptually might lead to the same kinds of action
and thus not be distinct categories.
DeBellis's account is mostly consonant with my approach except for how he character-
izes weak nonconceptual hearing. It is misleading, I think, to refer to this kind of hearing
necessarily as a kind of nonconceptuality. A weakly nonconceptual hearer may still possess
and use phenomenal concepts over the course of the experience, though he lacks the ex-
plicitly defined theoretical or more complex music-theoretical concepts. Even without the
music-theoretical jargon, such a listener can conceptualize certain phenomenal experiences
as instance of that (experience) in the fashion of demonstratives.
50Ibid., 27.
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DeBellis agrees that such a listener would have the ability to use what he calls perceptual
concepts. These perceptual concepts, I expect, are different from Papineau's perceptual
concepts defined. Papineau makes his distinction in the context of a discussion of phenomenal
concepts, so his definition is quite precise. DeBellis, on the other hand, is not primarily
concerned here with understanding conceptual types, but with understanding the varieties
of conceptuality in music theory. The kind of nonconceptuality in play here is weak, in the
sense that the only absent concepts are music-theoretical ones. Phenomenal and perceptual
concepts might still be in play at this level.
If I am understanding him correctly, DeBellis does not admit these concepts into the
ranks of music-theoretical concepts. But, as we will see throughout the rest of this disserta-
tion, most music theories engage exactly these types of concepts somewhere along the way,
invoking them either as a way to lead to theoretical concepts or using only these kinds of
concepts combined with novel attempts to communicate them, as is the case with simple
phenomenal approaches discussed in chapter three. Expressing the phenomenal and percep-
tual concepts that come up when thinking or talking about a musical experience can still
be music analysis. Additionally, more traditional complex music-theoretical concepts (like
Dominant) are not a further step along a spectrum of conceptuality but rather themselves
analyzable into phenomenal and other conceptual types, all of which play a role in their
possession and their attribution. In short, I agree with DeBellis in the substantive distinc-
tions made between the different kinds of conceptuality involved with thinking about and
hearing music; my disagreement is mainly terminological. I would want to include weakly
nonconceptual hearing in the real of hearing music-theoretically, embracing a wider image
of the sorts of tasks that constitute music theory.
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1.5 Other Theory/Experience Distinctions
Distinguishing between music-theoretical approaches that rely primarily on musical experi-
ence (either of listeners or practicing musicians) and those that rely on some kind of non-
experiential, scientistic or rationalistic underpinnings is far from a new project. Indeed, since
the very beginnings of Western music theory in Greek musical thought, we see a version of
this distinction in place in the Aristoxenean and Pythagorean schools.51 Moreover, the
broader distinction between experience-based and abstract epistemologies is a cornerstone
of the history philosophy, starting with Plato and Aristotle, climaxing in the early-modern
disputes between empiricist and rationalist thinkers, and continuing today. And while most
versions of this distinction may agree on paradigmatic cases, they disagree on how exactly
to characterize nuanced admixtures. More importantly, the motivations which lie behind
these distinctions are diverse. In this section, I examine three other analogous distinctions
between experiential and non-experiential music theories, foregrounding how and why my
approach differs and the motivations which underlie these differences.
Nicholas Cook's Psychological and Formal Theories
Nicholas Cook envisions his pragmatic text, A Guide to Musical Analysis, Nicholas Cook
envisions his book as a sort of primer to the subject, and is frank about its pedagogical
orientation.52 Cook emphasizes the book's practical goals, but we may still find value in
studying a pedagogical text for its meta-analytical perspective since the habits of thought
51Barker, ed. (1989), 119189 and 2845, respectively.
52Cook (1987).
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presented therein might have a profound impact on how the student understands more
advanced theories and analytical approaches. These texts can form a sort of basic scaffolding
which often takes a much longer time to overturn than it did to erect. Pedagogical texts are
also helpful because they tend not to take too much for granted, explaining exactly what
is meant by any basic concepts. And often these basic disagreements about the meaning of
fundamental ideas underlie more substantial analytical disagreement down the road.
Cook's Guide begins by presenting what he deems traditional methods of analysis
(including basic harmonic analysis and analysis of form) followed by a quick introduction
to the basics of Schenkerian theory.53 The two chapters which follow present a distinction
between psychological approaches and formal approaches that may seem, at first blush,
to approximate my distinction between phenomenal and theoretical concepts.
Adherents to psychological approaches, according to Cook, include those theorists who
have based their work on explicit psychological principles.54 He ties these explicit princi-
ples (the sorts of things recognized by professional psychologists) back to a much broader
conception of psychology, which he also finds in Schenkerian theory. Cook points out
that this broader conception of psychology extends to how musical sounds are experienced,
rather than in the sounds themselves.55 This is to be contrasted with phenomenological ap-
53Cook's treatment of Schenkerian theory (ibid., 27-66) draws primarily from the methodology
presented in Forte and Gilbert (1982). He reconstructs and explains several analyses including
Schenker's own analyses of Bach's C major Prelude and Bach's chorale Ich bin's, ich sollte bussen
(presented in Schenker (1969)), as well as Mitchell's (1967) analysis of the Tristan Prelude and
his own analysis of Debussy's Puck's Dance from Preludes, book 1. Along the way he describes
the basic elements of Schenkerian theory (Ursatz, prolongation, interruption, etc.) and details the




proaches that use individual pieces of music as a means of discovering the general properties
of musical experience per se.56 Obviously, Cook is talking about a quite different notion
of phenomenology than I have used so far. The sense of phenomenology Cook means is
more specific. Cook defines phenomenology as the study of the essential qualities of human
experience.57 The key here is that Cook's phenomenology is aimed at a very specific task:
distilling essential qualities. Cook takes his cue here from Thomas Clifton, and this under-
standing of phenomenology is based on the the tradition of Phenomenology in Continental
thought (specifically that of Husserl).58 I use phenomenology in a much broader sense to
refer to a much more general idea as the study of experience from the first-personal per-
spective, without the specific aim of distilling essential qualities. My concerns also include
how to describe phenomenal contents and developing a better grasp of how one thinks about
them.
Cook distinguishes this approach from his psychological approaches which, rather than
taking their goals from Continental Phenomenology, borrow aims and concepts from psy-
chology. Cook further contrasts psychological approaches with formal analysis, by which
he means any kind of analysis that involves coding music into symbols and deducing the mu-
sical structure from the pattern these symbols make.59 Cook's primary examples of formal
analytical practices include pitch-class set theory and semiotic analysis. Somewhat unchar-
56Ibid., 69.
57Cook (1987), 67.
58Clifton (1983). Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), 19-28 provide a good, accessible summary of this
methodology. See also, Sokolowski (2000), 4265.
59Ibid., 116.
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itably, it seems to me, he insists on reading these approaches as concerning only musical
scores and as utterly divorced from experience.60
While at some level my phenomenal/theoretical distinction and Cook's psychological/formal
distinction might be read as analogous, the way that we divide approaches ends up to be
quite different. This is a result of the different criteria that we rely on when making our
distinctions, and ultimately flows from the different motivations we have for making a dis-
tinction in the first place. My concern is separating approaches primarily on the basis of the
sorts of concepts involved in making and understanding music-theoretical claims. Cook, on
the other hand, seems to distinguish the psychological approach based on what it borrows
from the discipline of psychology and formal approaches by reliance on scores. While un-
doubtedly all of the methodologies which Cook casts as formal would fall under my category
of theoretical approaches, I also think that many of the psychological approaches would
as well.61 In my following chapter, which examines the challenges of simple theoretical ap-
proaches, one of my primary examples in the following chapter, Eugene Narmour's theory of
melodic expectation, a scion of Meyer's theory that is presented by Cook as a prototypical
psychological approach. While Meyer tends not to get as formalized as Narmour's psycho-
logical model of melodic implication, Narmour's approach carries some the ideals of Meyer's
60It is simply not the case that all set theorists are concerned only with what can be shown on a
score. Andrew Mead (2004) presents a strong argument that at least some of the claims proffered
by set theorists are readily available to experience. And from this point, it may just be a matter of
ear-training to hear more substantive relationships.
61I explore the relationship between psychology and phenomenal concepts more in the following
chapter, but for now I want to point out that psychological theories make liberal use of what I
would call theoretical concepts. That is, many of the models for how the mind works are abstract
and attempt to reconstruct our psychological states and processes by relying on abstract concepts.
This comes, in part, from psychology's commitment to a scientific methodology, where subjective
phenomenology is difficult, if not impossible, to measure objectively.
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thinking to a logical conclusion, going all in on formalizing the cognitive process.
This is not necessarily to criticize Cook's distinction because it seems to me that the ped-
agogical goals of his text influence the way that theories are categorized. Cook's distinction
helps lay out some of the methodological possibilities available to a neophyte analyst; and,
by cutting the distinction in the way he does, basically in terms of what sorts of evidence
an approach relies on, he presents a starting point for generating new analyses.
This is really the foundation of Cook's distinctionwhat sorts of things an analytical
methodology relies on. Psychological theories rely on the literature in psychology, drawing
principles from that bibliography and applying them to musical experiences while formal
approaches rely on the score alone for their evidence, not on the way that people react to
the score. This is an introduction to the things we might want to do when staring out in
analysis and not necessarily an analysis of all of the ways that music theory might be done.
Caroline Abbate's Drastic and Gnostic Musicology
While Cook's distinction is based primarily on analytical methodology and the resources
it can draw on, other ways of carving up music-theoretical (and musicological) discourse
depends on underlying beliefs about musical ontology, the nature of musicological claims,
or the political implications thereof. Carolyn Abbate's distinction between the drastic and
the gnostic flows from all three.62 Her drastic/gnostic distinction is drawn from philosopher
Vladimir Jankélévitch's theories on music.63 Because of music's ineffability, the story goes,
62Abbate (2004).
63Most importantly, Jankélévitch (1983 [2003]).
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implications about specific musical meanings, either in hermeneutic or structural terms,
ultimately fail. Abbate proposes returning to live performance as the solution to the supposed
vacuity of formalist or hermeneutic musicology. Moreover, the drastic/gnostic distinction,
Abbate points out, means more than just practice vs. theory, with each side of the dichotomy
having a number of implications whose necessity are not immediately apparent.
[D]rastic connotes physicality, but also desperation and peril, involving a category
of knowledge that flows from drastic actions or experiences and not from verbally
mediated reasoning. Gnostic as its antithesis implies not just knowledge per se
but making the opaque transparent, knowledge based on semiosis and disclosed
secrets, reserved for the elite and hidden from others.64
Nothing is settled and the performance or our experience thereof may unfold in a variety of
unexpected ways. By tying the gnostic to live performance, we are meant to find the same
desperation and peril as in musical action. Latter in the article Abbate uses the example of a
tenor's failure to perform well as a drastic moment: the peril of this situation led to a unique
experience that could not be had if considering the music abstractly.65 On the flip side,
Abbate sees gnostic claims as necessarily concerning the discovery of hidden meanings taken
to be immanent in some kind of abstract form The music itself, and, crucially, Abbate
sees this decipherer's habit as always inhering in any so-called hermeneutic or formalist
approach, no matter how much hedging or scope setting is involved.66
The hermeneutic project fails, under Jankélévitch's thinking, because there is no specific





with meanings; there is an infinity of things that music can mean. And because music
can mean anything it can never mean only one thing in particular. Rings points out the
prevalence of these two positions on music discourse, that we can both say nothing and
anything about music, as at the heart of Jankélévitch's concerns.67 The gnostic approaches
that Abbate criticizes attempt to affix a single meaning to some abstractly existing musical
object, ignoring what actually exists, musical performances. This, moreover, is compounded
by the political ramifications of gnostic discourse. This way of engaging music, the argument
goes, involves promoting a single perspective above others and, often this it seems to involve
someone in a position of scholarly power oppressing the less powerful.68
The best way, it seems to me, to understand the gnostic/drastic dichotomy is in terms of
engagement. The drastic mode of engagement with music means experiencing and attending
to live performances of music and not abstracting away from them, while gnostic engagement
involves assuming that there is some abstract meaning or Music Itself to be understood and
that one ought to try to make claims about this abstract object instead. Presumably because
such claims would be about the work (whatever that happens to be) and therefore extend
beyond a single performance.
When looking closely at the distinction, however, we encounter a problem. Abbate
explicitly ties drastic engagement to live performance, she permits listening to sometimes
be drastic, but only when listening to a live performance.69 Something is missing in an





is). The problem is that there is not necessarily anything about the phenomenology of an
experience that marks its as drastic or gnostic in the terms outlined by Abbate.
Imagine sitting in front of a screen and behind it is either a performer playing a piece
or a high quality recording of the piece. Imagine that the recording and playback is of
such quality that you cannot tell whether you are listening to the live performance or the
recording. How can such engagement be typed one way or the other? If we think that we are
listening to a live performance and engage the experience as if it were a live performance can
such a seemingly drastic experience be rendered gnostic if it turns out we were only hearing
the recording? These questions complicate the nature of drastic and gnostic engagement and
seem to indicate that the distinction cannot inhere in whether or not one is experiencing a
live performance, as Abbate seems to claim.
This is where the phenomenal/theoretical conceptual distinction comes into play. Think-
ing of drastic engagement as relying on phenomenally conceptualized experience allows all of
the fringe benefits that Abbate claims for gnostic engagementprimarily the reintroduction
of engagement with actual performances into musicological discourse. Moreover, conceiving
of gnostic engagement as relying on theoretical concepts explains many of the features asso-
ciated with this type of musical engagement (or some abstract object that is called music).
Now, I have done a disservice to Abbate's distinction and taken some of the attention away
from what I take her primary goals to be, to re-include discussions of and interaction with
performance back into music theory and musicology. However, by recasting the distinction
in terms of engagement and aligning drastic engagement with phenomenal concepts and
gnostic engagement with theoretical ones, one sees how different discursive practices become
associated with one approach or the other.
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It should be noted, also, before moving on, that there are clear normative claims under-
lying Abbate's distinction. Aside from her specific examples of gnostic, hermeneutic claims
being used in outright racist ways by the likes of Wagner,70 she sees all this sort of talk as
resting on an imaginary foundation and not really engaging what music actually is for the
purpose of reinscribing scholarly authority. Overall I would like to hold off on normative
claims such as these. My goals in this dissertation are just to understand how these two types
of concepts work in music theories, a task I take to be prior to passing judgment on which
approaches are the correct ones. Moreover, I tend to think that each mode of engagement
has its own costs and benefits and that what mode of engagement, and therefore type of
concept, we use will depend on our aims at that moment.
John Rahn's Theory of Piece and Theory of Experience
John Rahn's distinction between theory of experience and theory of piece is probably clos-
est to my distinction, especially in how it categories theories and analytical approaches.71
While Rahn's distinction is at the level of theory, my distinction is about much more basic
musical concepts which I believe lead to these different theories. Rahn's theoretical distinc-
tion is the last of a quartet of dichotomies he sees between different types of musical discourse.
He distinguishes analyses as analog or digital, time-in or time-out, bottom-up or top-down,





Rahn's analog/digital distinction draws from Nelson Goodman's theory of notation pre-
sented in Languages of Art.72 These two descriptors are applied to the symbol schemes
that may be used in notation. Analog systems are semantically and syntactically dense, but
this density implies a problem. It is not possible, according to Goodman, to determine with
perfect accuracy whether a specific mark applies to a given object or vice versa. Digital sys-
tems, by contrast, are differentiated and laid out according to some compliance class, which
one might think of as the resolution of that system.73 As an example, consider two different
electronic tuners: one which displays pitch classes and another which displays cents. Both
tools are digital in that they have discrete units, but the latter has a higher resolution than
the former. Both are imperfect digital measures of something that is in actuality analog, the
frequency of the pitch. Goodman lays out the costs and benefits of each system as follows:
The real virtues of digital instruments are those of notational systems: defi-
niteness and repeatability of readings. Analog instruments may offer greater
sensitivity and flexibility. With an analog instrument we are not fettered by an
arbitrary lower boundary of discrimination; the only limit on the fineness of our
readings is the (varying) limit on our accuracy in determining, say, the position of
a pointer. However, once the maximum fineness of discrimination has been set-
tled, we can construct a digital instrument (if we can construct any instrument)
that will give readings that fine. Where the task is gauging or measuring, the
analog instrument is likely to play its chief role in the exploratory stages, before
units of measure have been fixed; then a suitably designed digital instrument
takes over.74
It turns out that, in fact, we actually perceive music digitally. Various psychological stud-





parameters.75 Generally, the JND's have a higher resolution than our notation systems do,
but they are not dense in the way that Goodman means it.
How does the analog/digital dichotomy apply, then, to my conceptual distinction? While
perhaps not actually analog vis-a-vis the real world, the deployment of phenomenal concepts
feels analog, while that of theoretical concepts seems digital. In phenomenology, we experi-
ence the world as analog, even though our perceptual systems cannot actually provide this
resolution.76 Since this is how our experiences actually go, what they are like, phenomenal
concepts are analog because they refer to these analog-seeming experiences. Theoretical
concepts tend to feel digital in their application, since they tend to be based on abstract
music-theoretical objects that have definite definition while phenomenal concepts feel analog
because their resolution exactly matches our experience.
While all four aspects of musical discourse identified by Rahn could, theoretically, be
combined in any way, they most often occur as sets (e.g., theories of piece are often also
digital, time-out, and top-down). This is made most manifest in Rahn's account of the last
binary. Theories of experience tend toward the analog, the time-in, and the bottom-up,
while theories of pieces tend toward the digital, the time-out, and the top-down.77 There are
thus a number of distinct practices of music theory which are contingently related. I might
reframe Rahn's distinctions as discursive tendencies that flow from conceptualizing music in
75Justin London discusses JND in meter extensively. See especially, London (2012), 3335. Lon-
don (2009) discusses aesthetic and artistic implications of JND's on other parameters.
76This is rather like how we experience film. While the actual frame rate is only 24 frames per
second we pass that threshold that the images appears to be contiguous with only a couple of
artifacts (like motion blur) to clue us into the illusion. Watching an object move across the screen
has the phenomenology of analog measurement.
77Rahn (1979), 218.
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certain ways. That is, when we think of music phenomenally, we are apt to reach for analog
discourse or describe our experience in a time-in fashion (as Rahn says, such explanation
is a chronicle or diary of the explainer's journey through the piece),78 while when we
conceptualize the music theoretically, we are apt to reach for digital description or describe
relationships as top-down. The important thing to point out, though, is that these discursive
habits, while wont to coalesce into unified methodologies (or at least we are wont to think
of it that way), can come apart and possibly recombined in interesting ways. While Rahn
discusses theory of experience and theory of piece as tending to be the output of the most
common combinations of discursive styles, each discursive habit tends to flow from a certain
conceptualization. Rahn's theory-distinction exists as the sort of aggregate distinction across
the discursive practices while the conceptual distinction between phenomenal concepts and
theoretical concepts is the ur -distinction which motivates the different tendencies and their
collection into distinct theoretical styles.
1.6 Other Preliminaries
Motivations of Each Conceptual Type
Different kinds of concepts are used for different reasons. Before starting an analysis, music
theorists have some implicit or explicit vision about the shape an analysis should take or
the sorts of claims that are appropriate, or, at least, what sorts of claims are proper for the
theoretical context of the analysis. As we will see in the following chapters, some analysts
78Ibid.
58
share their ideas about what constitutes proper music theory, while others leave it implicit.
I will organize these motivations as a set of analytical imperatives held by the analyst. Some
of the imperatives, presumably, will be satisfied only by the use of a particular kind of
conceptualization, while others could go either way, depending on the kind of analysis in
question.
The first of these imperatives is a desire to respect the phenomenology of the musical
experience. I will call this the phenomenological imperative. Analysts engage this imperative
when they see the goal of their work to be to communicate their experience of the piece.
This experience can be some kind of original experience that the analysts simply attempts to
translate into music-theoretical terms or it may be a newly minted experience, flowing from
the analytical process. Either way, this imperative primarily guides the use of phenomenal
concepts.
There are two imperatives which guide theoretical concepts. First, there is the desire to
create a valid formal system. It must be internally consistent, with propositions logically
flowing from its axioms. I will call this the validity imperative. Usually the systems that
theoretical concepts work in are expected to be internally consistent (this is especially true for
formal theoretical concepts). Analytical claims that rely on this imperative are concerned
with maintaining the logical coherence of the system. This imperative applies mainly to
formal theoretical concepts because the explicit definitions of this conceptual type permit
this rigorous approach. Finally, there is also often a desire for the formal system (or our
conception of that system) to have certain quasi-aesthetic qualities. The way that the system
develops must make some intuitive sense (in the everyday sense of the word intuitive)
with meta-formal analytical decisions following from previous ones. This imperative also
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motivates a desire for explanations that have a sense of elegance and symmetry in addition
to working correctly. While these features concern the formal aspects of the analysis, they
are essentially qualitative in nature and they are often sought because grasping them involves
a particular phenomenology. I will call this the formal-aesthetic imperative.79
Analytical Narrative
In my analyses of analytical methods that follow, I will sometimes make use of the phrase
analytical narrative to talk about the structure of the creation and reception of an analysis.
Analytical narrative might refer to a variety of things:
1. The process the analyst goes through to generate the analysis (e.g., doing an analysis).
2. The process by which the analyst tries to convince the reader of the analysis (e.g., the
argument given in an analytical article).
3. The process by which a reader comes to understand an analysis (e.g., reading an
analytical article).
Importantly, these are not narratives presented in the music but rather the story that the
analyst tells (or the reader recreates) when working through an analysis. Clearly these are
all processes of some kind: they will occur over time and the order is usually important
(especially in (2), not especially in (1)). These three processes are all similar in that they
79Invoking these imperatives creates an unmistakably ethical air. And, indeed, I think it is
appropriate to consider these imperatives as structurally analogous to ethical imperatives. Bryan
Parkhurst (2013) had argued that many music-analytical claims are analogous to expressionist
ethical claims and Scott Gleason (2013) has highlighted ethical aspects of the Princeton school. I
present my own perspective on this issue in the conclusion.
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they track the development of an understanding of a piece. The first is generative, the second
is pedagogical, the third is receptive. All three are active processes but active in different
ways.
In some instances, (1) and (2) collapse into a single narrative: when the analysis is
presented as a description of the process of generating the analysis. Lewin's essay on Stock-
hausen's Klavierstück III is one such example.80 Since the article is meant to serve an
example not just of transformational analysis but also the process by which one creates a
transformational analysis, the story that Lewin tells about how he came up with the analysis
mirrors the process by which he generated the analysis.
What would a maximally complicated case look like? I imagine an analytical methodology
that has a number of false starts (which, for me anyway, is typical). In this case, (1) and
(2) would come apart. As I do the analysis I might try different ways of thinking about
the music. I might start by just reading through the score and producing a roman numeral
analysis, formal analysis, or parts of a voice-leading reduction based just on the score alone. I
might start instead by listening or playing through the piece attending to the phenomenology
of listening or playing and start my analysis from the things I notice there. All of these are
ways of getting into the music for me at the start of an analysis.81 Sometimes I might only
80Lewin (2007), explored in depth in chapter four.
81Another possibility might be to read other theorists' analyses of the piece first. I, personally,
tend to save this phase of the analysis until after I have formed my initial impressions so that my
perspective is not narrowed to the concerns that they focus on. Of course, for many analysts the
feeling that some other analyst did not get it quite right motivates them to undertake their analysis
(this seems to be case for Lewin's analysis of Stockhausen, explored in depth in chapter four). One
suspects, though, that even in this case, there was some understanding of the piece that preceded
engaging with others' work, or else there would not have been a context under which to suspect
that they did not get it quite right.
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kind of hear something that upon closer inspection of the score turns out to be easier to
tease out non-phenomenally and then can be reconverted into phenomenology. The reverse
is also possible, that I may have a hearing and then generate a Schenkerian graph (say)
which highlights this hearing. Most often though, it is a combination of all of these things.
If I then turn to the second kind of narrative, I begin building an analysis out of the aspects
of my work with the piece that seem most productive. I certainly will not include everything
that occurred to me and I will put some thought into the way that I present my findings
and the order I present them in. What results is a new, probably more linear narrative in
the written analysis, organized to hopefully allow the reader to easily understand my claims.
The third kind of narrative happens when someone comes to read my analysis. As they
work through the article, if I have done my job well, an understanding of the piece (or an
understanding of my understanding of the piece) will develop for them.
At all of these phases, different types of concepts will come into play and influence the
development of this narrative. Understanding how the different types of concepts work in
these different analytical narratives and how different analytical approaches engage them is
the aim of the following chapters.
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Chapter 2




Music analysts use the conceptual categories described in chapter one in various ways. Some-
times they seem to reach for whatever tool best suits their style or suits the type of claim
that they want to make, paying little attention to concepts' structure, epistemological status,
or the methodological ramifications. At other times, the decision to use one conceptual type
or another is intentional, motivated by explicit, meta-theoretical concerns. The rest of this
dissertation examines how the conceptual types defined in chapter one are used in practice:
the sorts of strategies and techniques that suit each conceptual type, the motivations which
underlie their deployment, and their benefits and pitfalls.
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This chapter examines simple, theoretical approaches, which useor attempt to use
only theoretical concepts, eschewing phenomenology in their conceptual framework. Simple
here ought not to be taken as pejorative. Simple phenomenal and theoretical approaches are
simple in that they rely on only a single conceptual type. This conceptual monism is often the
result of serious engagement with fundamental meta-theoretical issues. Much of music theory
faces a dilemma: how can one be maximally precise and clear while also expressing what is
most musically important? Going all-in on one conceptual type or another involves accepting
this dilemma and embracing one horn over the other.1 Understanding these music-theoretical
approaches, therefore, begins with an understanding of the goals of a given approach: what
it clings to and what it lets go of.
Authors of phenomenal approaches are often quite clear about their methodological and
epistemological commitments. While their analyses can create a messy task for a reader,
they take pains to point out why this messiness is inevitable. Boretz is probably the most
explicit:
The ultimate act of musical creation is the auditory-mental activity by which
alone a musical identity is brought into being, in the only way in which, epis-
temically speaking, it has being: as a consciously experienced determinate feel;
that is, as an awareness-state of the perceptual consciousness of some experi-
encing person, an awareness-state which is cognized by that person as a dis-
tinct experienced-sound entity within a certain range of such entities, and which
is retrievable in principle and therefore in principlethough not necessarily in
practiceintersubjectively sharable.2
1Brown and Dempster make this point as well. Their aim is to heighten the contrast in order to
reveal the costs and benefits of each view while also proposing that their away from particularist
phenomenalism in favor what they take to be a more scientific approach not a painful a sacrifice as
is often supposed. Dempster and Brown (1989), 98-99.
2Boretz (1989) 107.
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For Boretz, music ultimately is phenomenal experience and any methodology that does not
deal in phenomenal consciousness does not have much to do with music. A merely abstract
or theoretical treatment of the score or sound events is at best a distraction. Boretz's belief
that music is or ought to be construed as entirely phenomenal indicates that the only way
to study this music as music is to use phenomenal concepts.
But this strong commitment to phenomenal ontology does not come for free. The ref-
erence of phenomenal concepts is phenomenal content, which is by its nature ineffable and
subjective. Since one has no access to others' conscious mental states, one can never really
know for sure if the analysis is properly understood. They are only retrievable in princi-
ple because one can retrieve one's own phenomenal experience from an earlier time. This
makes the phenomenal contents sharable in principle, because our past selves can share their
phenomenal experience with us, not in practice between two different people.
For phenomenal theorists, this is just the price of doing business, but for others this
situation is intolerable. Eugene Narmour presents a different image of music theory, one
that motivates him to rely instead on theoretical concepts.
[M]usical analysis is partly a rationalistic act, a paltry attempt to recover the
ephemeral. The recalcitrance of the temporal aesthetic to theoretical explana-
tionas created by the complexities of sound and synthesized in their perceptual
and cognitive mechanisms of the brainis well recognized. While being heard,
the transient parts of a musical composition recede in time, precluding ordinary
empirical introspection and the capture of unchanging empirical data. Having
been heard, the fleeting musical artwork lodges strangely in one's memory, as a
transcendental unity, defiantly resisting analysis.3
In this passage, we see Narmour describing a fundamental issue with studying music only
3Narmour (1990), 14.
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in terms of its phenomenology. There are two problems. First, it is reasonable to think
that any systematic analysis or study of this phenomenology will fundamentally alter it,
causing it to no longer be that experience one wanted to study in the first place. Second,
the short-lived nature of musical experience prevents us from approaching it in a slow and
deliberate manner. By the time we come to study music, it is already gone; we are barred
from using the exact experiential tools that permit our sciences to advance. The only way
forward, Narmour argues, is rational reconstruction: to try as best we can to model the
experience to provide some aphenomenal insights.
At the same time, one's choice of conceptual resources might also be influenced by the
discursive styles that best suit them. As we will see in the next chapter, the approaches that
rely on phenomenal concepts require some artistry to do well and put a great deal of faith
in the reader's capacity to understand the experience the author is trying to communicate
(if this is even their goal). By contrast, theoretical approaches place a higher premium
on precise discourse and clear communication. Since the references of theoretical concepts
are abstract objectswhich really are sharablethen there is at least the possibility of real
communication between interlocutors. We need not take it on faith that we are talking about
the same thing. Approaches built upon theoretical concepts permit logical analysis, clear
guidelines for their deployment, and even allow for non-human analysts (i.e., computers)
to do analytical work. Most theorists who use simple theoretical approaches are aware of
their challenges, but consider the cost of fully engaging music phenomenology, at least via
phenomenal concepts, too high.
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Theoretical Approaches
Theoretical approaches aim to rely only on sharable, definable theoretical concepts to do
their main analytical work. In general, they tend to be explicit about their motivations, and
any given analytical claim can be traced back to the primitives of the abstract system that
generated it.
Since these approaches reject overt reliance on experience, the aims that underlie them
will be limited to validity and theoretical-aesthetic motivations. Recall that validity moti-
vations are a desire for the given analytical system to be formally coherent, and the rules
must be constructed such that any analyst will generate the same reading given the same
input. Constructing a theory that meets these criteria opens up the possibility for properly
scientific theories, since it makes falsifiability plausible. And when this is the case, analytical
counterexamples can carry more weight. The validity imperative also provides an additional
benefit. If the system is internally coherent, then it is relatively easy to follow the devel-
opment of any given claim through the system. There is no black box of consciousness to
go through, and each step in the process can be scrutinized. This makes it easier to track
its claims and prevents analysts from arriving at an impasse simply by hearing a passage
differently.
While it is easy to determine whether a methodology is valid or not (assuming its terms
are well defined) it is much more difficult to determine whether a given feature of an approach
issues from formal-aesthetic motivations. Unlike the well-formedness rules of validity con-
ditions, formal-aesthetic motivations are more like preference rules. All things being equal,
prefer the theory or methodology that is simplest or most elegant. Defining elegance here can
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be quite difficult; it has a know-it-when-you-see-it kind of quality. While theorists probably
derive some satisfaction purely from building an elegant explanation or model of a feature,
elegance also has a rhetorical function. A simpler claim is often easier to communicate, and
easier to convince readers of, than a more complex one.
The least controversial version of a simple theoretical analytical methodology would be
one that uses computer instead of human analysts, as in the first stages of a corpus analysis.4
Consider, for example, David Huron's use of the Humdrum toolkit.5 This software system is a
means to encode a variety of musical data into representations suitable for computer-assisted
analysis. Users can define relationships or features that they wish to count, cross-reference, or
identify examining a vast collection of scores.6 The analytical work can be done mechanically
and automatically by the computer once the basic terms are defined.
One might encode, say, augmented 6th chords with a representation, and send the com-
puter off to find instances of this representation in given score.7 This is encoded as a UNIX
command, augmented with representations that tells the computer how to determine the
tonic (either from meta-data in the score representation or through a different program that
uses similarly well-defined terms to identify a key) and a representation of the augmented
4Cook (2004) surveys a number of these practices, including the Humdrum toolkit discussed
below.
5Huron (2002) provides a good introduction to the functionality of this software. The software
itself and tutorials are available at http://www.musiccog.ohio-state.edu/Humdrum/.
6A sample of recent studies which use this took includes London (2013), Huron and Ommen
(2006), and Jan (2004).
7This is one of the introductory examples on the Humdrum toolkit website.
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6th chord's relevant scale degrees.8
The concepts in this case are these well-defined representations. There are theoretical
concepts in the purest sense. This conceptualization of an augmented 6th chord requires no
phenomenal content whatsoever. This is not quite what we usually mean by an augmented
6th chord. For conscious analysts it is a mixed concept and would include a phenomenal
representation. It is only a formal definition, and it must be so if one is to conscript a
computer to search a database. The aims of this kind of approach are different than those
which seem to engage musical experience, of course. Software such as this has the utility of
being able to address a vast library of scores relatively quickly, and if the definitions are well-
wrought, then the relationships identified by the software will be free from analyst's biases
(at least those that do not figure into the programming) and more statistically meaningful.9
In the following sections I trace two, more complicated ways of invoking theoretical
concepts, highlighting the costs and benefits of conceptualizing music this way, while tracing
the analytical practices developed to use these concepts.
2.2 Formalized Systems: The Interval Angle
My first case study is Damon Scott and Eric Isaacson's interval angle, a similarity mea-
sure for set classes.10 The interval angle between two set classes is the angle made in six-
8In the syntax of Humdrum, this appears as solfa input | grep '6-.*4+'. This representation
can be further expanded by additional arguments for the scale degrees which determine the chord's
nationality.
9This is a rare example that actually follows what Cook referred to in section 1.5.1 as formal
theories, which only concern themselves with addressing the score.
10Scott and Isaacson (1998).
69
dimensional space between the interval class vectors of two set classes and the origin, [0 0
0 0 0 0]. A simplified, two-dimensional example is show in Figure 2.1.11 The interval angle
Figure 2.1: Scott and Isaacson's two-dimensional depiction of an interval angle.
presents a single abstract reference under a number of modes of presentation and it is defined
and explored using explicitly mathematical and quasi-mathematical rhetoric. However, it
also gains much of its appeal from a sort of conceptual and metaphorical elegance, while the
latter is a sort of aesthetic bonus, formal elegance is a result of the concept's structure and
plays an important role in its plausibility.
Defining and Proving the Interval Angle
Formally, the interval angle between two set classes is equivalent to the angle between the
vectors of unit length that point the same direction as the interval class vectors of those
set-classes and the ICV origin in six-dimensional space. In formal notation:12
11This figure is presented in Ibid., 109.
12I will be using a slightly different, but I think clearer, notation than Scott and Isaacson. For
the equations and definitions in their original notation, see Ibid., 110ff. The main difference is that
I will denote the interval class vector of a given set class x with the symbol ICVx while Scott and
Isaacson use x^.
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ANGLE(X, Y ) = 6 ICVx, ICVy
We can review the equations used to calculate the interval angle by working through an
example. Consider the angle between (0, 1, 3) and (0, 2, 3, 4, 6). The interval class vector
of (0, 1, 3) is <1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0> and the interval class vector of (0, 2, 3, 4, 6) is <2, 3, 2, 2,
0, 1>. The formula for determining the interval angle is
6 ICVx, ICVy = arccos(
ICVx·ICVy
mag(ICVx)×mag(ICVy))
To compute this angle we need two functions: one that defines the dot product of two vectors
(symbolized as · in the formula) and one that defines vector magnitude.13 The dot product
of two vectors is the sum of the products of corresponding arguments in each vector. Thus,
for (0, 1, 3,) and (0, 2, 3, 4, 6):
ICVx · ICVy = (1× 2 + 1× 3 + 1× 2 + 0× 2 + 0× 0 + 0× 1)
ICVx · ICVy = 7
The magnitude of the vectors, their geometric length, is the square root of the dot product
























We now have everything we need to determine the interval angle.
6 ICVx, ICVy = arccos( 71.732×4.690)
6 ICVx, ICVy = arccos( 78.123)
6 ICVx, ICVy = 0.862◦
The result is given in degrees. Set classes with identical interval-class vectors (e.g., Z-related
sets) and those with proportional vectors return a result of 0◦ and maximally different sets
return 90◦.
The authors also provide a second way to calculate the interval angle which involves
normalizing the ICV's. In this context, normalization means computing the unit length
vectors first with an additional normalizing equation. The interval angle is then between
these two unit length vectors, not the proper ICV's themselves. The unit length vectors are
calculated by dividing each component of an ICV by the previously calculated magnitude of
the ICV. We can therefore define an equivalent way to calculate the interval angle as
6 ICVx, ICVy = arccos(norm(ICVx) · norm(ICVy))
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These two equations are equivalent because in the first formulation the normalization of each
vector is baked into the equation. The difference between the two is a matter of order in
which you do the operations. Essentially, do you calculate the product of the magnitudes
and the dot product of the ICV's first, and then normalize the results through division;
or do you normalize first, dividing the ICV by the magnitude and then finding their dot
product? These two definitions give different modes of presentation for a single abstract
object. Unlike the difference between the different theoretical modes of presentation for the
dominant, these mathematically equivalent sense, they could be derived from each other.
They are not precisely the same, and therefore are different modes of presentation, but this
difference is not as stark as sense differences explored so far.
Scott and Isaacson follow their definition of the interval vector with a series of demon-
strations of its features. These demonstrations are quasi-formal in their organization. Each
begins with a statement about the features or qualities of interval angles (like a theorem in
mathematics or logic) that is then proved with either an informal discussion or explicit
mathematical demonstration of that feature. This organization borrows some institutional
legitimacy from mathematics and logic, andmore importantlyit provides a systematic
approach to discussing the interval angle.
Some demonstrations are informal comments about the measure.
Statement 2: ANGLE produces the kind of numbers one would expect if measur-
ing an actual physical object, such as length, mass, or electromotive potential.
The work involved in calculating ANGLE is similar in to that which goes into
measuring physical quantity.
This is not a deductively provable statement, or at least it is not meant to be here. Instead,
Statement 2 gives rhetorical reasons to adopt the interval angle from a rhetorical perspective.
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In particular, the authors take the opportunity here to point out that the interval angle can
sometimes produce an irrational number, just as if one was measuring a real object. This
accords a certain reality to interval anglesthey seem more likely to be of the music or
the real world than just a result of an analytical system. It makes it easier to think of the
interval angle as a realistic aspect of set-class relations.
Other statements are formally provable.
Statement 7: ANGLE (x, y) returns its maximal value, namely 90◦, exactly when
the pitch-class sets x and y have no intervallic contents in common
In this case, we could construct a mathematical proof showing that no common ICVs results
in a 90◦ or we could calculate the interval angles for all possible set-class combinations with
no common ICVs to find the same result.
The Interval Angle's Modes of Presentation
The interval angle demonstrates a theoretical concept that has multiple modes of presentation
that refer to a single abstract object. Understanding all the terms, one can determine one
equation from the other, the only difference is whether you determine the unit vector in the
same step as you calculate the angle (the first formulation) or if you do it in separate steps
(the second formulation). But these are still two different presentations of a single, abstract
object.
The interval angle closely approximates the results of other similarity measures with the
added benefit of being able to relate set classes of different cardinalites. And Scott and
Isaacson review a number of different similarity measures comparing how well the results of
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each system match and noting how efficient different systems are. They find that they are
able to achieve a high degree of correlation between their measure and others'. One ought
to, then, prefer their measure to other similarity measures because of its simplicity, that is,
for formal-aesthetic reasons. The measure is about as effective as others, but gives us the
answers in a more elegant package.
The authors also give a substantially different, non-mathematical conceptualization. In
recounting their conception of the interval angle, they present a metaphor for their measure
as analogous to the way distance between stars is measured by an earthbound observer:
Angle measures the difference in apparent sound of pitch-class sets in much the
same way that arclength in spherical trigonometry measures the difference in
apparent position of stars in the sky.14
This metaphor gives us a three-dimensional, embodied analogy that allows one to imagine the
same operation in a six-dimensional space. The metaphor helps conceptualize the measure
in a non-mathematical way, and, ironically perhaps, makes it seem more real. The abstract
object is the same, but the comparison allows us to think of measuring this angle as as
something that we can physically do. We can imagine actually turning our heads a certain
angle to look at different stars.15 Conceptualizing the interval angle this way makes it easier,
especially for non-mathematicians, to understand what it is and how it works.
This analogy to astronomy also activates a number of other associations that benefit
the interval angle. The star metaphor asks us to consider set classes as stars in the sky,
14Ibid., 112.
15This involves attaching in image schema to concept of interval angle. The importance of image
schemata in music theory is discussed more in the context of the transformational attitude below.
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as beautiful objects in their own right. It allows us theorists to consider ourselves as as-
tronomers, with all of the positive associations that implies. Astronomers are in awe of the
night sky, they cannot help but study it and the object of their study appears both beautiful
and profound. It takes them beyond the human realm toward some kind of transcendental,
universal understanding. This metaphor allows us to consider ourselves as participating in
the same kind of endeavor when we use the interval angle to study music.16,17 Importantly,
however, the metaphorical conceptualization does not help one use the interval angle. It is
only an analogy to wrap one's head around what the mathematics represent.18
The abstract reference of the interval angle is still difficult to grasp since it exists in a hard-
to-imagine six-dimensional space. The multiple conceptualizations of the interval angleits
different modes of presentationhelp us to approach it from a number of vantage points.
This, I think, is a prime benefit of theoretical concepts. We can reformulate the concept
but still refer to the same thing, giving us multiple paths through which to understand the
object.19
The interval angle also has a sort of formal elegance. Even despite the complexity of
16Looking even deeper into the metaphor, it allows us to view ourselves as carrying on the
tradition of ancient music theorists who drew a much closer connection to that secret knowledge.
This is an appeal via the aesthetic of agnosticism, of secret knowledge of the music that is unlockable
by we theorists because we have the secret music-theoretical training not available to others. See
Abbate (2004).
17All of this said, it is important to remember that while these analogies may be disposed to favor
the interval angle, they are all just cosmetic features, results of a contingent way of conceptualizing
the interval angle and not at all essential to it.
18This is unlike the multiple concepts of Dominant discussed in the previous chapter, where the
phenomenal concepts could actually be used in analysis.
19Recall that phenomenal concepts refer directly without a mode of presentation, so any alteration
of the concept entails altering the phenomenal contents it refers to.
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six-dimensional space, computing the interval angle is relatively simple way to understand
what this means derived from simpler scenarios. One can easily understand what it means
to find the angle between the vectors of defined points and an origin on a plane. And it
is relatively easy to understand how this scales up to three dimensions. To put it into a
six-dimensional space, one just adds more dimensions but the basic operation remains the
same.
As a theoretical concept the interval angle displays some of the most important benefits of
using theoretical concepts in analysis, namely, elegance and rigor. The rigorous nature of the
interval angle derives primarily from its mathematical nature. This angle is something that
can be measured using precise numbers, allowing us to relate set classes with finer detail than
our perceptual systems allow. Moreover, because the concept refers to an abstract object,
the meaning of this concept really is sharable. This allows us to have real communication in a
way that is much more difficultif not impossibleto obtain when working with phenomenal
concepts. Additionally, because it is simple relative to other similarity measures, we have
reasons to prefer it even if it is does not explain more properties.20
But the interval angle also introduces the problems with theoretical concepts in music
theory and analysis. It is difficult to argue that the most important aspects of music are
not the ways that it is experienced. Music is most fundamentally an aesthetic object, it is
something apprehended by the senses. But simply by virtue of dealing in objectively sharable,
abstract objects, the interval angle fails to actually grasp at this aesthetic phenomenology.
20Scott and Isaacson also argue that this measure gains a certain sort of plausibility from being
similar in presentation to other kinds of measuring tools. ANGLE looks and feels very much like
a measure taken from physics, particularly in physics Scott and Isaacson (1998), 108.
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If, like Boretz, one takes a strong position on music ontology then the interval angle is not
really about music at all.21 The best way to counter this critique is to realize that the interval
angle, and other similarly structured tools, are not meant to measure the music itself, but
to serve as a model for the workings of the perceptual system. In the following sections, we
see this sort of theoretical modeling of phenomenology become more explicit.
2.3 Theoretical Models: The Implication-Realization
Model
The interval angle derives some of its practical utility (though not formal validity) by serving
as a more extensive and precise stand-in for a perceptual ability. It produces the same
results as our perceptual judgments in basic scenarios; when we can phenomenally identify
sets as more or less similar, the interval angle makes the same judgments we do. Because its
predictions map onto our perceptual judgments at this level, we feel secure extending it to
situations where we cannot identify similarity with the same precision or accuracy.22 We use
all sorts of tools this way. I might perceive that one sound is louder than another, but use a
decibel meter to see exactly how much louder it is. Given this relationship to our perceptual
21As an alternative we might consider music to have features that are artistically valuable without
actually being perceptible. Justin London makes such a distinction between artistic and aesthetic
appreciation in London (2009). Scott and Isaacson are silent on what it's like to perceive the
similarity measured by the interval angle, though the scope of their project does not require them
to.
22This, as I stated above, is not unique to the interval angle. All valid similarity measures
will similarly extend this perceptual ability. What makes the interval angle special is how well its
structural simplicity fulfills formal-aesthetic criteria and the rhetorical power of its metaphorical
description.
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systems, we can understand the interval angle as a kind of model for that system. It is not a
model of how the system works, but a model that produces the sameor betterresults.23
It models the judgments we make when we are able to assess set-class similarity but goes
beyond those relationships that are easy to hear.
The interval angle is just one way of modeling one aspect of our perceptual system.
The aim of this type of model is to limit the subjectivity involved in music-theoretical
measurements, thereby allowing our analyses to be both more easily communicable and, in
some ways, more precise, even if the theoretical concepts involved in working the model
take us far afield from the phenomenal concepts that convinced us of its utility in the first
place. But besides modeling the judgments of our perceptual systems, we can also model the
workings of said systems. This is the domain of psychological models. Eugene Narmour's
implication-realization model of melodic expectancy (hereafter the I-R model) is one such
psychological model and serves as my second case study in theoretical approaches.
Narmour's theory is complex and dense, stretching over two volumes and hundreds of
short analytical examples.24 While Narmour posits that his approach is a testable scientific
theory of melody perception, I will be concerned primarily with the analytical tools it offers.
Some of the psychological criticisms leveled at his theory may not apply when it is considered
23We might call this a functional model, drawing from the functionalist theory of mind. The
interval angle, when given the same input generates the same output as our perceptual system,
even if the means by which it arrives at this judgment, its internal constitution, differs.
24Narmour (1990) and Narmour (1992). This theory was promised at the end of Narmour (1977)
and further groundwork was laid in Narmour (1983). Lawrence Zbikowski's review of The Analysis
and Cognition of Basic Melodic Structures provides a good summary of how Narmour's theory
developed from its inspirations in Meyer (1973) through to its final presentation. Zbikowski (1993),
177-179. A third volume, which was meant to show yet larger-scale structures, was planned but
never published.
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as an analytical tool, though other critiques may come to the fore.25
An Overview of the I-R Model
The following account of Narmour's theory is both condensed and abridged, focusing only
on the aspects required for a short analysis, but I cover all of the parts of the theory required
to understand how it works and the kinds of concepts it relies on.26 The largest omission
is the set of tools Narmour develops for his theory of transformational levels and musical
structure.27 I will also only briefly summarize Narmour's many critiques of style-based
analytical approaches.
Narmour's approach is motivated by a desire to create an analytical system that is testable
and does not fall prey to ad hoc generalizations. The lack of a properly scientific method-
ology is among Narmour's central critiques of Schenkerian theory, particularly the unfalisfi-
ablility of its analytical claims, and he lays out his I-R model as an alternative.28 Building
upon Leonard Meyer's work in Explaining Music, Narmour's model means to formalize the
sorts of implicative structures present in a melody.29 Under the I-R model, melodies consist
25The most robust of these experiments is conducted by E. Glenn Schellenberg, who, on the basis
of his experimentation, recommends a pared down version of the model. See Schellenberg (1996).
26Many reviewers have outlined and explicated Narmour's theory including Gjerdingen (1992)
and Zbikowski (1993), and Narmour himself provides a summary of the basic theory as the first
chapter of Narmour (1992).
27Explicating these tools forms the lion's share of the latter half of The Analysis and Cognition
of Melodic Complexity, the second volume of the the I-R model. Narmour (1992).
28Narmour's critique of Schenkerian theory are found primarily in Narmour (1977) and Narmour
(1990) is largely the positive contribution meant to serve as an alternative to Schenkerian theory.
29Meyer (1973).
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of style shapes, small, surface-level simplexes of only a few notes.30 The overall implica-
tions of any given melodic gesture are a combination of the bottom-up implications generated
by style shapes and the top-down implications generated by style structures. In practice,
style shapes are collections of usually three pitches (two intervals) in sequence that do not
include their metrical status or their rhythm. The interval between the first two pitches
produces some expectation and the third either confirms or denies this expectation. The I-R
model is concerned only with modeling the small style shapes, not the larger, stylistically
contingent structures.
The I-R model defines two types of expectation: process and reversal. In a process,
sameness or similarity implies further similarity; this is sometimes formalized as A+A→ A,
with the letters standing for some quality on a given musical parameter. Pitches are judged
to be similar if the interval between them is small. Thus, a small melodic interval, implies
another small interval and in the same direction. Reversal is the opposite; when the first
two elements of a style shape are different, they imply further difference: A+B → C. Since
large leaps feature very differentiated pitches (they cannot be easily perceived as a single line)
they imply continued difference, which Narmour defines as motion by a smaller interval in
the opposite direction.31 Narmour justifies these two implicative structures by appealing to
Gestalt principles, indicating that these expectations may be a kind of cognitive universal.32
Formally, the I-R model divides the realization of an expectation into two parameters:
the intervallic parameter (notated as I in analyses) and directional or registral parameter
30Narmour (1990), 9.
31The concept of melodic reversal owes much to Meyer's notion of gap-fill. Meyer (1973), 146ff.
32Narmour (1990), 66.
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(notated as V for vector). Any given implication can be realized on both, either, or
neither parameter.33 On the intervallic parameter, a process, implied by a small interval,
generates the implications of other, similarly small intervals while reversal, generated by a
large interval, implies intervals of a different magnitude, and since reversal is only implied
by large intervals the difference always means smaller.34
The strength of the implication depends on the size of the interval. Smaller intervals
have the weakest overall implication and large intervals have the strongest (excluding the
octave). However, as Figure 2.2, Narmour's intervallic parametric scale, shows, interval-
lic implications are complex.35 Any given interval will have two implications, here called
dominant and recessive implications. The relative strengths of the implications are in-
versely proportional. The minor second implies process much more strongly than reversal.
The major third still has a net implication of process, but this implication is weakened by a
slight contrary implication of reversal. Conversely, a major seventh strongly implies reversal
while a minor sixth does so less strongly and so on. Perfect fourth, tritone, and perfect fifths
are deemed threshold intervals where the two implications basically cancel each other out,
implying no particular realization very strongly.36
The other parameter is interval direction, called the registral parameter, and is simpler
than the intervallic. Sameness (A + A) is defined by lateral to lateral motion (i.e., repetition),
33The division of melodic features into the various parameters betrays the influence of a modular
theory of mind, see Fodor (1983).
34Ibid., 79.
35Narmour's Figure 5.1, Ibid., 80
36Ibid., 79.
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Figure 2.2: The intervallic scale, after Narmour.
similarity (A +A′) is motion in one direction followed by motion in that same direction (i.e.,
ascent to ascent or descent to descent), and difference is defined as any change in direction.
Notice that at the level of style shapes, the model generates no implications on the registral
parameter. Implications are generated by interval size alone since a single interval has
nothing to be similar to or different from. The similarity and difference measures are only
used in realization.
To summarize, implication is generated by the first interval of a style shape. If it is a
small interval then the similarity between the two pitches implies process, and realizing this
implication means another small interval in the same direction. A large interval, conversely,
due to the difference between the two pitches, implies reversal or a smaller interval in the
opposite direction. When these implications are realized, the system identifies three melodic
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archetypes, process, reversal, and duplication (i.e., repetition, just a special case of process)
notated as P, R and D respectively.
Real melodies, of course, are not limited to only these options and implications may be
realized on either parameter independently or denied altogether. A leap followed by a step
in the same direction realizes a reversal on the intervallic parameter but not the registral
parameter (this is called an intervallic reversal, or IR). Conversely a step followed by a leap
in the same direction realizes a process on the registral parameter but not on the intervallic
parameter (this is called a registral, or vector, process, or VP). The special case is duplication,
which cannot be realized only on the registral parameter. If the registral implication (lateral
motion) is realized, then the intervallic implication (repetition) must also be realized. Thus,
there are five additional archetypal derivatives when an implication is realized on only one
parameter.
In addition to these shapes, Narmour also identifies monads and dyads: cases where
one or two pitches produce no implications because their implication is interrupted by a
strong closure (discussed below).37 Performing an I-R analysis involves identifying these
different archetypes in a given melody, and such an analysis is meant to model the way that
our perceptual system process such a melody. Figure 2.3(a) shows all eight shapes: the
archetypes (P, D, and R), their archetypal derivatives (IP, VP, ID, IR, and VR), and the
non-implicative monad and dyad. Also featured in Figure 2.3 is the registral return, an
additional shape that Narmour defines for a-b-a and a-b-a' patterns that occur independently
37Another of Narmour's basic archetypes is registral return (notated aba) but it does not have
the same implicative profile as process and reversal and does not figure into the analysis below.
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Figure 2.3: The style shapes of the I-R model.
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from the archetypes.38
Narmour's notion of melodic archetypes is drawn directly from Meyer's work on what
he called archetypal schemata, which includes both archetypal patterns and traditional
schemata.39 These melodic patterns are not, as we might assume, the most typical versions
of their class, but abstractions that define a class. As Meyer describes them,
[P]articular events are invariably understood as members of some class. Archety-
pal patterns and traditional schemata are the classesthe rules of the game,
in Koestler's phrasein terms of which particular musical events are perceived
and comprehended.40
Meyer distinguishes archetypal patterns from traditional schemata based on how listeners
are meant to come to possess them. The former (like Narmour's style shapes) are innate to
human psychology while the latter are learned through exposure to a style.
The archetypes that form the basic vocabulary of Narmour's model, then, are meant to
be the total list of these abstract categories. They are not archetypes in the sense of being
typical examples. Instead, if the model is successful, they are the means by which we are
meant to categorize and understand melodies. The archetypes are not the specific gestures
shown in Figure 2.3, but the abstractions that classify melodic gestures in by their interval
size and direction and by how their implications are realized.
38Unfortunately, it is unclear why Narmour requires an additional symbol for registral return in
addition to the more specific archetypes and derivatives. If I had to guess, I would suppose that
this additional symbol allows him to make non-hierarchical claims by combining multiple symbols
for the same gesture. A commitment to non-hierarchical description underlies much of Narmour's
critique of Schenkerian theory. See Narmour (1977), ch. 8.




Melodic and derivative archetypes can occur discretely but more often they chain to-
gether, with the realizing interval of one shape forming the implying interval of the following
one. Style shapes are chained together whenever the gesture lacks closure.41 The I-R model
includes six conditions under which closure obtains. These conditions are (1) rests, rep-
etitions, or new structures which interrupt an implicative pattern, (2) a strong metrical
emphasis, (3) resolution of a harmonic dissonance, (4) a relatively long duration (twice as
long as the preceding note), (5) when interval size becomes smaller (a large interval followed
by a smaller interval) and (6) a melody changes direction.42 When one or more of these
conditions occur, the implicative group can become closed off. If some element of the music
interferes with closureusually by de-emphasizing an accented beatmultiple implications
chain into a complex structure.43 Notice that conditions (5) and (6) will obtain whenever
a reversal is realized, making reversals naturally closural while processes require other, non-
parametric conditions for closure.
41Ibid., 10.
42Ibid., 11. Avoidance of these condition, thus, creates the five low-level conditions that avoid
closure and cause chaining: (1) a dissonance on a metrical accent (denying the second condition
of closure), (2) the presence of an ongoing meter (which is most common in triple, this also denies
the second condition of closure by delaying metrical emphasis), (3) envelopment of metrical accents
by processes (the non-closural nature of the process negates the metrical emphasis) and counter-
cumulative rhythm (the inverse of closure condition four), (4) placing metrical accent within a
series of duplications, and (5) loss of metrical accent in a harmonic process.
43These complex structures are technically infinitely variable, Narmour's second volume (Narmour
1992) focuses exclusively on this sort of melodic complexity.
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Figure 2.4: Surface level I-R structures.
Example Analysis: Chopin, Prelude, op. 28, no. 6 (mm. 1-8)
The melody from the first phrase (mm. 1-8) of Chopin's Prelude Op. 28, no. 6 demonstrates
several features of the I-R model, showing how it works in practice while foregrounding some
analytical challenges. Figure 2.4 shows my completed analysis following the guidelines of
the I-R model. The opening gesture of the melody is a string of processes. Each melodic
interval is less than a tritone, and while the size of each interval increases slightly, so they
all imply similarly small intervals in the same direction, and both of these intervals are
realized in each case.44 These three processes chain together because the gesture lacks any
of the six closure conditions defined in the previous section. The group closes at the D of
beat two following condition (4); the quarter note is more than two times the duration of
the preceding sixteenth notes, and no chaining conditions interfere with this closure (e.g.,
harmonic dissonance). The next implicative structure is an archetypal derivative: intervallic
44While successive intervals are actually larger since the difference is less than a minor 3rd, the
difference is not considered great enough to break the tendency toward process. Ibid., 99.
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duplication. The small step downward from D to C] implies additional small, descending
intervals. We get an identical interval, realizing the intervallic implication, but the registral
implication is not realized since the direction of the step changes. This ID does not chain
with any other shapes because the C] is dissonant against the harmony in the right hand (a
B minor triad) and the resolution of dissonance effects closure, condition (3) (there is also
a change in direction condition (6)). The following dyad does not generate an implication
because the downbeat B closes the group by landing on a metrical accent, following condition
(2). Measure 2 ends with another chain of processes, this time descending, that close with
the metrical emphasis on the downbeat of m. 3.
Before continuing the analysis, let me pause to comment on the analytical process. All of
the claims made so far flow directly from the rules of the model. I have not needed to listen
to the passage or imagine what it sounds like. This analysis could have been (and basically
was) generated mechanically. The next measures complicate this story, but in situations like
these two measures, where there is no interference, the predictions flow directly from the
proposed features of our perceptual and cognitive processes. Here, the analytical approach
is cleanly theoretical.
In the next two measures, I assert a process whose implication structure is similar to
that found in m. 1 on the basis of interfering, top-down style considerations. The string of
sixteenth notes on beat 1 are labeled as a chain of three processes, but the first of these shapes
begins with a large leap, normally implying reversal. However, I read it as a process because
the piece's intra-opus style (denoted by the (os) symbol) interferes with this apparent
failure in realization. As the name implies, intra-opus style refers to the characteristic style
of the piece in question. In this prelude, an ascending arpeggiation figure on a downbeat
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becomes an important motive. Recognizing this as an instance of that motive results in
invoking the same implicative structure. If I think I am listening to the same motive, then
I ought to expect it to go in a similar way. Even with the large leap at the beginning, I am
meant to expect processes here and a continuation of the ascending motion. This kind of
style interference overrides the raw expectations defined by the model.
An alternative might be to consider the processes to be realized as form of extra-opus
style (the annotations would be the same except with a (xs) symbol replacing the (os)).
The rationale in this case comes from the phrase form of these eight measures. They are
a sentence, implying that the third and fourth measures will be similar or identical to the
first and second. By anticipating this formal structure, we expect the two presentations of
a basic idea, and we expect them to have approximately the same implicative structure.
Both of these interpretations invoke a maverick, top-down expectation disrupting the
even processing shown by the I-R model. This feature of the model is the least defined and,
it turns out, creates some serious problems for both the model itself and its status as a simple
theoretical approach. Top-down style interference in I-R analyses depends on the familiarity
the listener has with the styles in questions, both of the piece and of the surrounding musical
context. There is no hard and fast rule for when to invoke style-based conflicts. However,
the basic model can also provide an analysis of his measure as a retrospectively realized
process. Recall from the intervallic scale (Figure 2.2) that fifth's dominant implication is
toward reversal. Neither parameter realizes this reversal when the next note ascends by a
similarly sized leap, but the fifth also has a recessive implication that is realized. Any of the
melodic archetypes or archetypal derivatives may be realized retrospectively in situations
where a recessive implication is realized instead of a dominant implication. The entire
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Figure 2.5: Retrospectively realized archetypes and derivatives.
Figure 2.6: Alternative analysis for m. 3 with a retrospectively realized process.
collection of retrospective archetypes and derivatives is shown in Figure 2.5. In an analytical
overlay, retrospectively realized shapes are notated with parentheses as in the (P) in Figure
2.6.
Similar considerations underlie the processes shown in m. 5, though now the situation is
even more extreme. Again, my primary analysis has identified this as a series of processes
resulting from intra-opus style. While according to the basic version of the model, the reversal
implication for this lick should be even stronger, there has also been a second iteration of
the ascending arpeggio gesture that reinforces its motivic function. The bottom-up chain
of structures would read (P) IR VP: another retrospectively realized process is followed by
an intervallic reversal. The implication generated by the sixth for reversal is realized on
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Figure 2.7: Alternative analysis for m. 5.
the intervallic parameter, but not on the registral, which is then followed by a registral
process, the implication for process generated by the third between B and D is realized
in the directional parameter, but not in the intervallic parameter. This chain includes no
prospective processes at all. This alternative analysis is shown in Figure 2.7. The rest of
mm. 5-6 have the same implicative structure as mm. 1-2.
Whether one uses intra-opus style in mm. 3 and 6 depends on how familiar with the
piece one assume the listener to be. The first time through, a listener might simply take in
the bottom-up process as is, without top-down interference but once this ascending 16th-
note pattern is recognized as a motive in the piece, top-down interference begins to read it
as an arpeggio that implies continued ascent. Thus, if the analysis is meant to bear some
relationship to what an actual listener actually perceives or experience, the simplicity of the
approach begins to be sacrificed. I explore these issues in more detail in section 2.4 below.
As I completed this analysis, my decisions to invoke style considerations came from formal-
aesthetic motivations, outside the scope of the I-R model. In general, one prefers analyses
that read similar gestures similarly. Since it is easy to recognize mm. 1, 3, and 5 as instances
of the same motive, one generally prefers an analysis that shows this similarity.
Now, we might choose to use the phenomenal contents of our experience to make this
decision. We might identify the motivic similarity of intra-opus style by consulting our
experience of what the passage sounds like, and I think that this is also probably the easiest
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way to hunt for these kinds of similarities. But permitting this kind of analytical process
would be antithetical to Narmour's systematic aims. Unfortunately, he gives no alternative;
indeed he indicates that a similarly rigorous system of top-down, style implications might
be impossible to construct.45
Returning to the Chopin passage, m. 7 is another straightforward chain of processes,
again closed by the downbeat accent in m. 6. The final two measures create a single long
chain of implications. The chain opens with an intervallic process (a leap of a third that
implies a process only realized on the intervallic parameter). This is followed by a series of
descending processes which end with another IP. The A], B, and D that follow from another
retrospectively realized registral reversal. The dissonance on the downbeat of m. 8 overrides
the metical closure, preventing the chain from ending. It continues until the F] on beat 2.
Continuing this analysis would involve defining the structural features of the piece by
tracking the kinds of closure that occur, resulting in a number of transformational levels,
but we can leave the analysis here. As is, it demonstrates the analytical methodology of the
theory and the sorts of complications that arise when trying to incorporate style. With this
introduction to the basic terms of the theory and how they cash out in practice, let me turn
to a meta-analysis of its constituent concepts.
The I-R model brackets many salient aspects of melodic perception. Perhaps the most
conspicuous absences are the implicative elements of meter, rhythm, and especially harmony.
Narmour's theory does not consider how any of these features may themselves create impli-
45Among Narmour's first arguments in Basic Melodic Structures is an ad absurdum counterex-
ample. Narmour (1990), ch. 2. This ends up limiting the utility of Narmour's model qua theory of
perception; I discuss this more in the following section.
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cations limiting his inquiry to how these other parameters constrain the officially sanctioned
ones through chaining and closure. Narmour brackets these features as well as top-down
style considerations from the basic model for the sake of systematic precision. The variety of
styles and our failure to nail down exactly what a style is and what its implications might be
make a style-based implication-realization model (based on what Narmour calls style struc-
tures) very difficult to construct.46 More troubling is the fact that such implication claims
usually result in tautologies, with stylistic implications being hedged by so many exceptions
that the claims simply becomes a implies b, except in cases where a does not imply b.47
The lack of informativeness of this kind of claim makes a scientist-theorist like Narmour un-
comfortable. It would be a disservice, though, not to point out that Narmour is well aware of
the way that style influences our expectations in real music. Within his system, he permits
intra-opus and extra-opus style considerations only as interference with the basic model, as
in the Chopin example above. While the invocation of style structures ruins the systematic
nature of the basic model, it recognizes the possibility of contradictory expectations and
complex experience, depending on where and how an implication was generated.48
Psychological Models as Theoretical Approaches
Since its aim is to explain the psychology of melodic expectation, one might wonder if Nar-
mour's model should be considered a phenomenal theory instead of a theoretical one. After
46Narmour (1990), ch. 2.
47Ibid., 15ff.
48Creating a system that allows for this kind of complexity is one of the laudable reasons that
Narmour originally looked for alternative to Schenkerism. Narmour (1977).
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all, Narmour explicitly wants his theory to be predictive of listeners' experience, so might his
model also engage phenomenal concepts instead of only theoretical ones? Following Meyer,
he proposes the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of expectations to be at the heart of the
emotional content of musical experience.49 All this may be true, but while the aim of the
theory may be to be predictive of experience, the model itself deals only in theoretical con-
cepts. An approach is categorized as phenomenal or theoretical on the basis of the concepts
it uses, not on its ultimate aims. While the I-R model is meant to be a model of musical
experience, the way that it purports to get at this experience is with an abstract, theoretical
model. The vocabulary of the model itself is (mostly) limited to assuming certain abstract
objects (implications and realizations) and exploring their relations. The underlying as-
sumption is that this model, which consists wholly of theoretical concepts, maps onto our
cognitive processes thereby purporting to explain phenomenology. But it is never made clear
exactly what the experience of these realizations or their denial is like. Put another way, it
is difficult to know how to test the theory if it is about experience since it is not clear which
experiences would count as the phenomenal correlates of the theoretically defined concepts.
Several features of the I-R model further indicate its theoretical character. It is meant
to be a model of the way that our perceptual system parses and understands melodies from
the bottom up. But Narmour defines this system in opposition to the conscious, top-down
structuring provided by our knowledge or style. The I-R model is not a model of conscious
phenomenology but of unconscious processing. This makes it safe from the contingencies of
conscious thought, but it also makes it anti-phenomenal. By definition, features of an un-
49See also, Huron (2006).
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conscious cognitive process are not given in phenomenology; they are unconscious after all.
So, the references of the concepts that constitute Narmour's theory cannot be phenomenal
contents, and the concepts it uses, not phenomenal concepts. Moreover, these unconscious
cognitive processes, while their workings may influence the character of our phenomenol-
ogy, cannot be singled out phenomenally. That is, in experience we cannot separate out
the bottom-up influence predicted by the I-R model from top-down implication, much less
separate out implications into the various parameters that Narmour implies. We experience
an amalgam that is difficult to parse reliably.
Consider, for instance, the implications involved in the intervallic duplication in m. 1 of
the Chopin example above. According to the I-R model the descending semitone ought to
imply further descent, however, the tonal context clearly marks this as a lower chromatic
neighbor to the D, acting as a sort of applied leading tone. To my ear, this implication is
so strong that I fail to hear any implication of descent, yet, according to the model, that
implication is still there and its lack of realization is meant to somehow inform my experience.
Since this interaction is phenomenally opaque, I have no sense of what this influence might
be like.
The development of Narmour's theory also betrays its theoretical nature. Narmour sets
up the I-R model as building upon a set of axioms. Early in his treatise, he lays down three
hypotheses that serve as axioms to the theory. The first is the Gestalt principle that underlies
the process (A + A→ A), the second is the principle that underlies reversal (A + B → C),
and the third is that the first two hypotheses are subject to the parametric scales (i.e., the
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intervallic and registral scales discussed above).50 The model works out the consequences
of these axioms systematically, specifically not relying on what it is like to experience these
expectations. The different melodic archetypes result from the combination of these axioms
and their application is meant to be defined by the consequences of these hypotheses as well.
There may be phenomenal concepts for some of the implications that Narmour is talking
about (I think that there probably are), but this phenomenal content does not fall within
the scope of the model. Instead, the reference of the concepts used by the I-R model is the
abstract objects defined by these hypotheses and their consequents. These abstract objects
have different modes of presentation in the theory; sometimes they are cast as analytical
tools while at other times they are cast as psychological processes. However, the important
point is that whether a tool or a process, they are not meant to be immediately present in
phenomenology and their reference does not depend on phenomenal content.51
The analytical methodology of the I-R model also reinforces its theoretical nature. Anal-
ysis with the basic model does not invoke phenomenal experience at all; the Chopin analysis
above does not come from the sound or experience of the music, but from the rules of
the system. In fact, it is in the places where there rules are ambiguous, like the case of
style influence and retrospectively realized implications, that the analytical process becomes
problematic or ambiguous. Narmour's system gives us a relatively straightforward, if dense,
system of rules to apply to the melody that deliver a well formed analysis. In fact, it might
be preferable to do this sort of analysis without listening since it will prevent your analysis
50Narmour (1992), 1.
51Put a different way, it is possible for a philosophical zombie to still process music in the fashion
described by the I-R model, thereby demonstrating that phenomenal concepts are not a requirement
for the model. See Chalmers (1996) for discussion of philosophical zombies.
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from being contaminated by interference from top-down style structures.
In practice, however, we run into problems. Narmour's model formalizes only the bottom-
up implications because only these are thought to be general to all listeners. In theory, it
ought to be possible also to construct theoretical concepts that also define these style features,
perhaps using some kind of corpus analysis. But doing so would probably weaken the model's
predictive potential, since which style features are well grasped would vary from individual
to individual. Narmour himself sketches some of the problems with this in chapter two of
his first volume. In any given analysis, he leaves it up to the analyst to decide whether
a style feature is influencing one's experience of implication and realization. He does so,
presumably, as a kind of pressure release valve, which permits analyses to get back on track
if they stray too far from any given listener's actual perception by limiting their scope to
bottom-up implications. In practice, therefore, I-R model analyses do engage phenomenal
contents, because they ask analysts to consult their experience before finalizing the analysis,
partially undercutting its attempt for a scientifically rigorous demonstration.
The analyses that the I-R model produces are not meant to be all that there is to the
implications of a melody, but it does mean to lay out one of the factors that plays into the net
implications that we experience. And it is exactly because these implications are generated
by perceptual systems to which we have no conscious access that an approach consisting of
theoretical concepts is required.
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2.4 How Simple Are They?
Psychological models complicate the distinction between theoretical and phenomenal ap-
proaches because they often seem to be attempts to describe phenomenology using theoreti-
cal concepts. The approaches described in this chapter, and simple methodologies generally,
face a fundamental problem. It is difficult to both communicate cleanly and precisely while
also dealing in the aspects of music that make music compelling. For the simple phenomenal
approaches described in the next chapter, the problem becomes about how to communicate
phenomenally inspired analyses accurately without being restricted by theoretical language.
Since one cannot communicate phenomenology directly to others language is required, which
often ends up relying on abstract objects and compressing the richness of experience into
limited resources provided by language.52 In the following chapter, I discuss some strategies
around this dilemma.
A committed simple theoretical approach faces a different, more existential problem.
Without engaging what the music sounds like, how could such studies actually be about
music at all? How could these be music theories if they fail to engage with, as Boretz said,
the only way in which, epistemically speaking, [music] has being? Ultimately, I doubt
that any meaningful work could be done with a actually pure theoretical approach. A pure
mathematics of music would not really be about music at all, but about abstract relations.
Sometimes formalizing these abstract objects can give us a better understanding of the music,
but analysts who take this road still need to find a way to make their theories engaging for
52Raffman (1993) provides an account of the perceptible nuances that lie below the level of
conceptuality and, therefore, language.
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their audience, while preserving the formal criteria that motivated their inquiry in the first
place.
The approaches discussed here used two different strategies. Scott and Issacson are aware
of how little, formally speaking, the interval angle adds to discussions of set-class similarity.
They point out, after all, that the interval angle measures the same relationship as extant
measures with similar results. It is merely more conceptually elegant, i.e. more observant
of the formal-aesthetic criterion, and not necessarily more informative. But this elegance
allows them to make a compelling argument for the tool. Phenomenal concepts are used
metaphorically as a means of selling the interval angle to the reader. The comparison to
astronomy exalts the analytical act and provides a way to imagine what kind of action one is
engaged in when measuring the interval angle that makes it seem a more real and engaging
experience. But these concepts are not required at all for actually using the tool. They
are an extra feature, added on top of the formal tools to make them more palatable to the
user.53
The implication-realization model takes a different approach. Here, the attempt to en-
gage phenomenology takes the form of predictions that the theory is supposed to make. In
practice, this means bracketing the actual experience of the analyst in favor of the rules
laid out by the model, and deferring any engagement with experience to a later stage when
testing predictions. It is unfortunate, then, that Narmour undercuts this by invoking the
un-formalized notion of style interference in analyses. Permitting this kind of top-down in-
terference in the analyses produced by the theory certainly makes the analyses seem more
53These metaphors serve a similar function as the transformational attitude in transformational
theory, discussed in chapter four.
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intuitively plausible. Without any systematic way of relating the theoretical concepts of
the theory to the phenomenal concepts of experience, we still intuit what an experience of
process or reversal might be like, and look for the analyses produced by the system to match
these intuitions.54
If we excise style interference, however, the approach's relationship to theoretical and
phenomenal concepts is clarified. The model, such as it is, uses only theoretical concepts.
Ideas like process and reversal do not refer to actually experiencing these gestalt qualities,
but to abstract objects defined by the model. To use these ideas as if they were also
experiencewithin the scope of the modelis to misuse them.
We might get a better sense of this by imagining that the primitives of model had no
associated phenomenal concept, or that our experience of the music was not at all well
described by the claims of the model. If this were the case, the model would still work. It
would still be internally coherent and could still analyze a melody following its own rules
without engaging experience at all. Since the structure and formal validity of the model is
preserved in such a case, we can realize that the fact that it sometimes does seem to describe
our experience is outside of the scope of the model per se.
In both cases, though, eventually these theories will want to engage experience. Perhaps
not as a part of their actual methodology, but this experience, presumably (and certainly
in Narmour's case) is what the they are crafted to explain. One way to do this is to invoke
phenomenology either as the sources of the primitives of the theory, another is to take
the goal of the analysis to be to create new experiences. While not within the scope of
54I find Narmour's permitting top-down interference to be basically devastating for his theory,
contaminating the experiment, if you will, with listener bias and undercutting its original aims.
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the theories I presented here, chapter four examines how the systematic nature of simple
theoretical approaches might inform and be informed by phenomenology more explicitly.
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Chapter 3
Simple Theories II: Phenomenal
Approaches
3.1 Introduction
While theoretical approaches had the benefit of clearly defined terms, they often had to
compromise on phenomenal engagement. These theories and analytical methods tended
to have explicitly defined terms, formal or quasi-formal logical arguments, and shied away
from overt appeals to subjective phenomenal experiences. I argued that plausibility of these
analyses rested on exactly these sorts of features, sometimes exploiting a desire for rigorous
scientistism that some find appealing (if not epistemologically then at least institutionally).
While working with these approaches, one has the sense that the progression of ideas is easy
to track, one can follow exactly why a given claim is made, but many of the vital experiences
that draw us to the music seemed left out.
This chapter explores methodologies directly opposed to those in chapter two, what I
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call phenomenal approaches. Instead of theoretical concepts, they feature phenomenal
concepts; they are concerned less with explaining the action of abstract, theoretical objects,
but derive their plausibility from engaging phenomenal, subjective experience using concepts
that refer to just these phenomenal contents.
Phenomenal approaches flow from different motivations than theoretical ones and use
language differently (when they use language at all).1 Consider the following description of
the prelude to act III of Parsifal given by Benjamin Boretz:
What does it mean to draw deeper into a self-multidimensionalizing weavery of
snakeslithery slithers, slithering on no ground with no snakes but leading on,
sliding into further denseentagled nevertouching unmaterial multidimensioned
slimy ooze with no slime no ooze.2
It is difficult to say exactly which measures of the prelude this description refers to, some-
where after the beginning and before the statement of the Grail motive in m. 20, but locking
down some specific analytical references for this passage is not really the point. Further,
the style here is quite different from the theoretical approaches. Instead of using music-
analytical concepts to clarify ideas with rigorously defined terms, Boretz's language is much
more slippery. His description seems at first self-contradictory (e.g., both denseentangled
and nevertouching; I will come back to this in section 3.3.3.1 below) and features various
level of figurative language to describe his experience. But despite this, and probably because
of it, I find this description more compelling than a putatively clearer one of the same pas-
sage. The vagueness of the figurative language and compound words seems to capture the
1I hesitate to call these approaches theories. While one might still consider them theories in
the sense that they are some of the things that music theorists do, they lack many of the features
required for scientific theories.
2Boretz (1992), 278.
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richness of musical phenomenology in a way that eludes clear and self-consistent theoretical
analyses.
Phenomenal Concepts and Motivations
Recall from chapter one that phenomenal concepts refer to phenomenal experiences and do
so directly without an intervening sense or mode of presentation. Recall also that phenomenal
concepts are distinct from representational, perceptual concepts. The latter refer outward
toward the object of perception, while the former refer inward to subjective, phenomenal
experience.3
I argued in chapter one for a demonstrative theory of phenomenal concepts, where one
might consider the structure of the concept to be that (experience) meaning that the
concept simply points toward the experience without couching it in a certain sense (this
is what I mean when I say that phenomenal concepts refer directly). Part of the fallout
of this is that in order to use a phenomenal concept we must actually have (or have had)
the experience.4 Thus, any approach that explore experience taken as experience relies on
phenomenal concepts which in turn necessarily engages their phenomenology. And since
these concepts refer directlywithout an intervening mode of presentationthey cannot be
altered at the level of sense while preserving their reference (as is the case for theoretical
3The origin and use of these concepts in philosophy is recounted in sec. 1.2.3 above.
4Of course, large chunks of this chapter are devoted to phenomenal concepts as an idea, without
the expectation that the reader imagine them at every turn. This is possible because not only
do we have phenomenal concepts themselves, but we have the concept of phenomenal concepts,
both as a general type of concept and instantiated in particular tokens. That is, we have both
the phenomenal concept of the particular pressure of a leading tone, and also a non-phenomenal
meta-concept which takes the phenomenal concept as its reference. This makes it possible to talk
and think about phenomenal concepts without necessarily deploying them in each instance.
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concepts like the interval angle or mixed concepts like dominant).
Phenomenal approaches invoke different kinds of concepts and use different kinds of
language than other approaches because they have quite different motivations. In general,
phenomenal concepts attempt to grasp, capture, or create musical experience (instead of,
say, creating discourse about music or developing a theoretical understanding of a piece),
but specific reasons to lean on phenomenal concepts are as diverse as the musicians who use
them. I see at least three main motivations underlying phenomenal approaches all of which
fall under the broader phenomenological imperative discussed in chapter one.
1. Sharing the author's phenomenal musical experience with the reader.
2. Creating a new phenomenal, musical experience for the reader.
3. Creating a new, non-musical, phenomenal experience in some other aesthetic domain.
These motivations need not be distinct or singly applied; it is quite possible for an author to
attempt all of them at once, or for a reader to, at any given time, engage their phenomenology
toward different ends.
If these are an analyst's aims, then phenomenal concepts permit her to conceptualize the
experience that she wishes to communicate. In order to write such analyses, the author must
introspect her own phenomenal experiences, which will be rife with phenomenal concepts of
various sorts. Likewise, readers must deploy their own phenomenal concepts in order to
truly understand such an analysis. In lieu of recreating their own experience for the reader,
an analyst might also write poems about a piece or draw pictures depicting it to create a
new experience for the reader. The author might have a sense of the sort of experience such
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alternative discursive styles are meant to create, but the ability of the reader to create this
experience for themselves will be limited by the stock of phenomenal concepts at her disposal.
Under both of these motivations, the reader walks away with a new musical, phenomenal
experience, but in the first case the author was trying to describe an experience she already
had with the music.
The second and third motivations have no analogous success conditions. The only goal is
to give the reader a new way of experiencing the music, whether or not any specific experience
was intended by the author. Both of these motivations usually treat the analytical text (be
it prose, poems, or images) as a commentary on the musical experience, but one might also
conceive of these texts as free-standing aesthetic objects (the third motivation), with artistic,
aesthetic, or phenomenal content only accidentally related to the musical experience they
are associated with. The analysis is successful under these terms if such a new experience
was created, regardless of whether it was the experience intended by the author.
The common thread that runs through all of these motivations is that they are con-
cerned with creating some kind of phenomenal experience for the reader, either recreating
the author's or creating a new one altogether, and not merely with the transmission of
statements about music or music theory or the preservation of (contextual) truth-claims.
The Challenge of Ineffability
For phenomenal approaches, language is an imperfect medium. We usually think of lan-
guage as a means to communicate ideas, to transfer idea or meanings from the mind of the
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author to that of the reader.5 When talking about phenomenology, however, we run into a
particularly tenacious challenge: the phenomenal content of our experiences is descriptively
ineffable. Experience is just too fine-grained to be fully captured by language. When dealing
in phenomenal experience, eventually one has to assume that shared language refer to the
same sorts of private experiences.6 In order for ideas to really be transferableand for us
to know that such a transfer has taken placethey must be in some sense public. In order
to share an idea, interlocutors must at least have access to that same idea. But this is not
the case for subjective, phenomenal experience; phenomenal contents are not susceptible to
this kind of objective definition.
Theoretical approaches, like those discussed in chapter two, refer not to experiences, but
rather to abstract objects. Abstract objects are sharable; if they are not objective things,
then they are at least intersubjective. Abstract objects have exhaustive definitions, and if
one understands these definitions then one can use the concepts that refer to them. But this
is not the case for phenomenal concepts, which are understood by acquaintance instead of by
definition. As a result, the way we communicate about abstract objects must be substantially
different from the way we talk about phenomenal states. This does not mean that regular old
language is useless for communicating about phenomenal states, is just cannot do the same
kind of work as directly. We can, for instance, communicate about phenomenal states, in
which case what I rely on is an intersubjective concept the phenomenal concept red. We can
5Indeed, one of the conceptual metaphors (discussed in greater depth below) which shapes the
structure of our concept of language is as a conduit for meaning. This is true in general, as in Lakoff
and Johnson (1980) and in music theory in particular, Hasty (2010).
6This is why, for instance, inverted spectrum thought experiments present such a pernicious
problem. See, for instance, Shoemaker (1982). One can never know for sure that one's language to
describe an experience describes the exact same experience for others.
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communicate theoretically about phenomenal states but only on the second order (we have to
do so via phenomenal concepts). The approaches I investigate is this chapter, however, take
a different path, circumventing language in order to do first-order work with phenomenal
experience.7
Any approach that means to grasp or communicate phenomenal concepts faces this chal-
lenge of ineffability. One might frame this challenge as follows: given the discursive habits
of music theorists, how can we best communicate an experience with the same level of detail
that we have when we experience it? I understand the approaches discussed in this chapter
as strategies to answer the challenge of ineffability. While not communicating experiences
directly (an impossibility that we still wait for science-fictional mind-melds to solve), these
approaches create contexts for us to create certain phenomenal experiences for ourselves.
The rest of this chapter explores two possible reactions to the challenge of ineffability.
The first eschews language altogether and relies on pictorial representations of music (or
experiences of music) to create a context for musical or meta-musical experience. The second
approach, instead of electing not to use language at all, uses poetic metaphors, which I
construe as deliberate misuses of the referring potential of language in order to cause a
reader to have a particular kind of experience, thereby activating phenomenal concepts.
7One way of doing this, perhaps the par excellence way, is through performance itself. In
performance we create a space to experience a piece of music for our audience, allowing them to
experience directly what we wish to or are capable of doing in a performance.
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3.2 The Anti-linguistic Strategy: Barkin's Igor's
Goriest Tune
One way around the challenges posed by phenomenal ineffability is to avoid language alto-
gether. If something can not be expressed in words, why not turn to some other medium to
try to express it?8 This section examines the ways that particular types of images, what I
call score-like pictures, engage phenomenal concepts making these pictures a viable solution
to the challenge of ineffability.
Score-like pictures take advantage of the habits of conceptualization developed for in-
terpreting musical scores qua instructions for music making. Most observers who encounter
these pictures come into the exchange with some kind of previous training in music notation.
At the very least, this may mean that they know how to read musical scores, but simply
having reading knowledge of the music is not sufficient to activate phenomenal concepts.
Observers of score-like pictures must also be used to making music from these scores, they
must have some idea what it would mean, upon encountering that score, to convert it into a
musical experience, both aurally and bodily. To the degree that scores can serve as an oppor-
tunity for phenomenal experience, manipulation of these score can serve as a manipulation
of phenomenal experience.9
Score-like pictures can engage multiple different types of phenomenal concepts as well:
8Of course, one could turn to alternative analytical strategies anyway, even if an analytical claim
was clearly expressible with normal language.
9At this juncture, I am primarily concerned with what engaging with score-like picture is like
from the first-personal perspective and the ways that this kind of engagement is used to communicate
phenomenal concepts. I am less concerned here with the cognitive processes that might permit
score-like pictures to fulfill this role.
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concepts that refer to heard experiences, concepts that refer to bodily sensation, and concepts
that invoke the phenomenology of certain emotions, and so on. As long as these concepts
refer to subjective, phenomenal experiences, then they are still phenomenal concepts, even
if they extend beyond the concepts involved in musical experience as such.
Elaine Barkin's Igor's Goriest Tune, gives a series of score-like pictures that are all inter-
pretations of and/or commentaries on (and/or whimsical musings about) the second instance
of the famous bassoon solo from Stravinsky's Rite of Spring.10 Each of these pictures casts
the music slightly differently, activating different phenomenal concepts. In the following sec-
tions, I reflect on the pictures I find most compelling and describe the phenomenal concepts
that bubble up when I try to interpret them. As noted above, there is usually no single
right interpretation for phenomenal approaches, since so much of what any given analysis
means is dependent on the proclivities of the interpreter (this is especially true for the picture
entitled Bound discussed below).
Notation
The first of Barkin's images is simply the notation for the solo bassoon line clipped from
the score (Figure 3.1). This score-like picture gains special significance by being the first in
the series. It does not so much engage with musical phenomenology for me (at least not by
itself) but rather serves a guide for how I might understand the rest of the pictures.
I can imagine (at least) two ways to read this image. The first, and probably most
obvious, is as analogous to a theme at the beginning of a variations movement: Notation is
10Barkin (1982 [2013]).
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Figure 3.1: Notation from Igor's Goriest Tune.
just an uninterpreted score and functions as the baseline upon which all of the other images
are developments. Of course, the notion of an uninterpreted score is problematic on its
own (particularly in a context as rich as this), and when read this way the entire exercise
is simply a matter of visual manipulationways of manipulating only the score instead of
manipulating experience.
But by singling this out as one of the score-like pictures and not just the score itself,
though, Notation points to a second, more compelling interpretation. The image's title,
Notation, foregrounds, for me, the general distinction between music and score. Notation
is merely notation, its appearance is not meant to be a phenomenal experience, but draws
my attention to the fact that the real subject of the collection, the tune, is not notation, but
the music. Under this reading, Notation is not just a theme for the rest of the pictures, but
already a commentary in its own right. Musical experiences bear an important relationship
to their notation, of course, but notation itself is not the music. Notation relates (and
distinguishes) the notation to (and from) my phenomenal recreation of the actual music, of
an experience of the Rite's bassoon solo. While not functioning as a theme per se, this
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Figure 3.2: før H. S. from Igor's Goriest Tune
first image lays the groundwork for how to view the rest of the images: they are not just
mutations of the notation of the music (which we certainly might think, given the nature
of the rest of these images) but rather commentary on the phenomenal experience of the
music.11
før H. S.
The fifth image presents a three-level, Schenkerian reduction of the tune, labeled før H. S.
(Figure 3.2). Whether a Schenkerian reduction counts as a phenomenal analysis depends on
11I have left open another possibility, that the something else that relates to the notation is not
some phenomenal musical experience, but a more obscure metaphysical object: The Music Itself.
But since I am not sure what sort of object this might be, I am ignoring that possibility here. In
any case, Barkin's images can be read as relating to phenomenal experience, and that is enough for
now.
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the attitude with which the reader approaches the graph. Are the slurs, say, meant to just
represent the theoretical concepts of passing motion or arpeggiation, or do they represent
some richer phenomenal experience? I will discuss these issues further in chapter five. As
a preview, my hypothesis is this: one might indeed read the graphs from a theoretical
perspective, as representing theoretical concepts laid out in some textbook of Schenkerian
analysis (the appendix to Cadwallader and Gagné's textbook, which gives explanations for
every symbol, comes to mind),12 or one might read the graphs more intuitively, letting
experiential knowledge of scores and music-notational symbols, and how to play them, guide
one's understanding of the analyses. When I see a slur in a performance score, I have a
certain phenomenal experience of connecting two endpoints across intervening notes, making
them seem like a single gesture and I know what it is like to experience and perform this
connective phenomenology. If I use this interpretive frame, phenomenal concepts become the
vocabulary of Schenkerian graphs. Modern Schenkerian practice, as we will see in chapter
five, can include both possibilities.
Barkin's picture takes the underlying structure of the tune to be a 3-line prolonged with
two motions to inner-voices in the middleground. The content of the graph that engages
phenomenology most is in the foreground. Consider the relatively large slur that wraps the
descending arpeggio of the E[ minor triad into a prolongation of B[, 2ˆ of the first descending
third. The slur has an official meaning in Schenkerian notation. The neophyte Schenkerian
finds in Cadwallader and Gagné's textbook that slurs group related tones...slurs correspond
to either intervals belonging to a chord of the imaginary continuointervals horizontalized
12Cadwallader and Gagné (2007), 351368.
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through arpeggiations and passing tonesor to step-wise (and often nonadjacent) connec-
tions between chords.13 This is all well and good, but I suspect that most musicians do not
need this definition in order to get a sense of what the slur is doing. We are quite used to
seeing slurs and thinking, I need to play these notes as connected somehow, and then cre-
ating a performancea phenomenal experiencethat features this kind of connection. We
are primed to experience things slurred together as eventually belonging to the same unit in
the phenomenal experience and the Schenkerian notation uses this habit of conceptualization
to make its analytical notation more intuitive.
Full Score
The image entitled Full Score (Figure 3.3) while still using traditional notation, communi-
cates a quite different phenomenology than the first. Unlike Notation, which is typesetas
if it were clipped from the actual scoreFull Score is handwritten. This allows one to see
the entire array of instruments surrounding the solo bassoon (since most printed scores cut
back the number of instruments at reh. 12).14 Seeing the score for a full orchestra arrayed
around the single bassoon line gives it a context that is absent in Notation. For me, it
creates feelings of loneliness and empty space. The melody is played in a large orchestra hall,
its smallness in a pregnant and expansive space, especially compared to the complex and
huge layers of sound that have just been withdrawn, still echoing. I recognize these feelings
13Ibid., 352355.
14The Dover Edition of the Rite only features staves for clarinet, bassoon, first violin, and bass
here. A dramatic drop form the entire orchestra with multiple divisi on the facing page leading up
to reh. 12.
115
Figure 3.3: Full Score from Igor's Goriest Tune.
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by the phenomenal concepts they employ.
The way the image is constructed borrows bodily and emotional phenomenal concepts
from other experiences: from the phenomenology of feeling aloneand the emotions that
go with itand that of spatial phenomenal concepts that refer to what it is like to be
surrounded by a great, empty space. The empty staves which surround the bassoon line
involve these phenomenal concepts in my mental recreations of the tune, I hear difficult-to-
describe nuances in the way the timbre, as I imaginatively experience it, is affected by the
echoes in this fictional space.
Long Stemmed
Long Stemmed is the least score-like of the pictures I examine here, but the inclusion of
these fanciful examples in the midst of the more score-like representations encourages me to
read it as some kind of score.15 In this image the tune is represented as a series of flowers
(shown as asterisks) with very long stems, punning, no doubt, on the stems of noteheads.
In the midst of the orchestrational and structural imagery explored so far, Long Stemmed
foregrounds the programmatic elements of the tune. The melody heralds the arrival of spring,
here represented by flowers. Of course, this kind of spring, one from pagan Russia, involves
human sacrifice and is quite divorced from the paschal associations I have with the season.
But using flowers to stand for the melody encourages me to make this connection and put
some of this experience onto my phenomenal image of the tune.
The stems of the flowers, highlighted by the title of the image, also give me a sense of the
15Barkin uses pictures and words elsewhere in actual scores meant to be played. See play it AS
it lays, Barkin (1979 [1997]), 4552.
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Figure 3.4: Long Stemmed from Igor's Goriest Tune.
tune as being deeply grounded. If the asterisk-noteheads were placed on the actual score,
the stems of the flowers would sink down well below the bassoon line, rooted several staves
below. The floral imagery, particularly with reference to stems, give me a sense that the
melody carries something deep and profound earthiness with it that reaches down into the
root system, enhancing the brutality later in the ballet as part of a natural expression.
Bound
The image I find most compelling is entitled Bound (Figure 3.5). This image presents the
tune transcribed into a variant of 4-line chant notation. The clef indicates that the second-
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Figure 3.5: Bound from Igor's Goriest Tune.
to-top line is the pitch C, and I suspect that the decorated initial is meant to be just a part
of the clef (there is no text, of course). This picture, shows the original version of the tune
(instead of the one that returns at reh. 12, referenced above). This is one of several pictures
in the series that seem to equivocate about which instance of the tune the series of score-like
pictures is about. I do not take this to carry much of a deep meaning about how I take the
image in this case, though the absence of the loud, orchestral sections preceding the original
statement of the tune, does color the context somewhat. In this case, I suspect that we get
the first version so that the music would not be full of ficta, ruining its look as an imitation
of Gregorian chant.
More than any other image in this set, my previous performance training, specifically
in chant music at a Catholic monastery, influences my reaction to this image. Dressing the
tune up this way places the melody into the context of sung music, and I have developed
an extensive array of phenomenal concepts triggered by the notation alone. Seeing the tune
arrayed in this waymeant just for singingI can not help but start singing it, or at least
begin to imagine (phenomenally) how it would go. This score-like picture, thereby, enforces
an even stronger phenomenological engagement with the tune. The chant notation creates a
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context in which the tune is meant specifically to be sung and allows me to take ownership
over it in a way I could not when conceived as only for bassoon. Traditional notation can
be used for any instrument (like that in Notation though even that line was labeled for
bassoon), but chant notation is only for voices. Bound claims the tune for the human voice,
formy voice, in some ways taking it away from the instrument with which it is associated.16,17
Of course, none of this is the or even the best way to understand these pictures, and
Bound in particular is informed by my own performing history. But the image, by using
chant notation, gets me to summon up the phenomenal concepts that are associated with
singing chant myself giving me a context to deploy them in creating a new understanding of
the Rite's tune.
The different score-like pictures that make up Igor's Goriest Tune, all cause me to address
myself toward the tune differently and expand the kinds of experiences I can have with it.
Each of them causes a shift in my relationship to the music. Sometimes this draws on my
history as a performer (as in Bound), sometimes on my general understanding of musical
scores (as in full score), sometimes on my experience as an analysis (as in før H. S.), and
16If I were a bassoonist, I might balk at this. How dare some singer take the most famous bassoon
solo for themselves. A valid pointer perhaps, but for me, a singer, this makes it more real.
17So, what ought I to take Bound to mean? My immediate reaction is that it invokes a certain
image of church music and monasticism as restrained or even repressed. The abandon that the Rite
is famous for is meant to be bound in this image to a strict code of Christian monasticism, running
exactly counter to the original context of the tune. Donning our phenomenal attitude there are
phenomenal concepts that we can use when considering the tune in either way.
While this is not at all my experience, either of monasticism or chant music. This gives us
moment to realize the importance of the observer's eye (or the thinker's mind) in constructing the
phenomenal reality of the mental recreation of the music and the meanings that inhere in the image
on the page. It is specifically my own musical history which causes me to read the chant version
in this way, as more real and without the connotations of it being bound, even though it is called
such. In fact, I find the title Bound to be a little offensive, advancing on a caricature of what
monasticism is and of what chant music can do.
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sometimes on more general associations (as in Long Stemmed). Each picture colors the
way that I understand the tune, and because none of these pictures make explicit claims,
the phenomenology of interpreting them is personal and invovles phenomenal concepts. One
imagines that Barkin intends to engage some of these concepts, while others come out of my
own history with this tune, with music notation, and with music in general. Importantly,
the kind of experiences I gain are not theoretical ones, they do not refer to specific abstract
objects and my descriptions of them here are imperfect.
3.3 The Poetic Metaphor Strategy
A second response to the challenge of ineffability is to ignore the clarificatory function of lan-
guage and speak figuratively. In the following sections, I explore the use of poetic metaphors
in music analysis and description. The metaphors I am concerned with here are those in
descriptive discourse about music (usually analysis) and not situations where the music itself
is considered to be metaphorical; that is, I am interested in descriptions that use metaphors
to describe the music, and not descriptions of music that take the music to be a metaphor
for something else.
Moreover, for reasons detailed below, I am concerned only with poetic metaphor and
not the much more commonly cited cognitive metaphor. Poetic metaphors have a variety
of features and functions but the most crucial is that they are still alive; they have not
(yet) entered into the everyday meaning of words, at least not in the context of musical
discourse. Living metaphors have a distinctive phenomenology and this phenomenology is
what allows them to function as a vehicle to engage phenomenal concepts. This metaphorical
121
phenomenology includes a sense that the thrust of the metaphor is not immediately clear,
you have to figure it out. This action on the part of the interpreter makes the specific
meaning that they carry or the sense that they communicate more personal because it relies
on the conceptual arrays that the interpreter already possesses. Finally, because the meaning
is unclear and personal, poetic metaphors remain semantically replete, they are experienced
as being open to interpretation and having an unstable, changeable meaning.
In this context, I do not enforce a distinction between proper metaphors and other com-
parative (though usually considered semantically distinct) linguistic structures, like simi-
les. There mere insertion of like or as, (while it has superficial effects on the theory of
metaphor I eventually adopt), often result in the same sort of phenomenology and can deploy
phenomenal concepts just as effectively.
A Critique of Cognitive-linguistic Theories of Metaphor
Most recent music-theoretical work that employs the notion of metaphor relies on the the-
ory of cognitive metaphor developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We
Live By.18 Lakoff and Johnson's account comes out of a branch of cognitive science referred
to as cognitive linguistics and posits that analysis of linguistic structures, supplemented by
psychological experimentation, provide the best insight into how the mind works. Looking
ahead, we can already predict some ways that this theory will clash with phenomenal con-
cepts, since phenomenal concepts are concerned with phenomenal content that is not easily
expressed with language, and does not accord much importance to the psychologically real
18Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
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but phenomenally absent processes that are said to underlie them. Nevertheless, it is prudent
to examine how this useful theory of conceptual metaphor is structured and how it differs
from the account I argue for in the next section.
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors are not primar-
ily linguistic, but conceptual; any use of metaphorical language presupposes an underlying
metaphorical concept. The essence of metaphor, according to Lakoff and Johnson, is un-
derstanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another thing.19 For example,
one metaphor that serves as an early example is Time is Money, which structure locu-
tions like I've invested a lot of time in her and You need to budget your time.20 In this
metaphorical structure, we conceptualize time as a valuable commodity, as something we can
invest or save. Obviously we cannot save time in a piggy bank, but the conceptual metaphor
structures how we think about time in our lives, as a valuable commodity.
These metaphorical structures, moreover, are said to be systematic, meaning that a basic
metaphor can spawn a broad set of locutions that engage that metaphor somehow.21 Time
is Money is the basic metaphor, but we can invoke different aspects of the way we relate





22Lakoff and Johnson go on to argue that most of the metaphors we use fall into certain categories
like orientation metaphors (more is up), ontological metaphors (abstract concepts are entities), or
personification (inanimate objects or animals are people). (Ibid., chapters 4, 6 and 7 respectively.)
Lakoff and Johnson continue their analysis, breaking the ways that we think about the world as
being metaphorically shaped down to what they consider to be the most basic concepts: those
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The most prominent music theory influenced by Lakoff and Johnson is the work of
Lawrence Zbikowski.23 In his Conceptualizing Music, Zbikowski provides a number of an-
alytical and theoretical tools based on research in cognitive linguistics. One of the central
analytical tools developed in the text is the notion of conceptual blending and cross-domain
mapping, whereby the aspects of two different domains become blended such that the way
we understand how each other domain influences the other. Zbikowski develops these basic
psychological ideas into a method for song analysis which systematizes the relationship be-
tween features of the poem and features of the music to create a blended meaning for their
combination.24
In a similar fashion, Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor underlies Steve Larson's
theory of musical forces.25 While Zbikowski's theory of cross-domain mapping in music is
quite broad, though it is most extensively worked out as tool for song analysis, Larson is
concerned primarily with the ways that we conceptualize music as an object in Newtonian
space, adopting the conceptual framework we have for understanding physical motion and
energy to our conceptualization of music.26
which rely on how our bodies are related to the world. These ecological concept arrays, called
image schemata, provide our primitive conceptual frameworks with other concepts almost entirely
structured according to these basic metaphors. This emphasis on the embodied origin of basic
frameworks, and by extension the entirety of our concept systems serves as one of the primary




26Similar work exploring the ways that musical features can be conceptualized in physical terms
is found in Malin (2008).
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Despite the amount of traction that Lakoff and Johnson's theory has gained in the music-
theoretical community (and its popularity in general), this way of understanding poetic
metaphors does not encourage any greater understanding of how or why metaphorical lan-
guage might be better at grasping non-bodily phenomenal concepts. In fact, relying too
heavily on the structural emphasis of Lakoff and Johnson's theory can take our focus away
from what I consider to be a crucial part of the experience of metaphor.
Since, under this theory, the primary action of metaphors occurs at the level of concepts,
one's theory of concepts will have a profound influence on how the theory of metaphors as
concepts works. Unsurprisingly, as cognitive linguists, Lakoff and Johnson assume that our
habits in communication reflect underlying structures in how we think.27 This involves a
tremendous assumption: that the lion's share of what goes on in our mindsthe conceptual
systems and experience we have in our day to day livesis translated and translatable into
linguistic structures. But the challenge of ineffability, and the reality of ineffable mental
states, throws a wrench into the gears. Ineffable mental states are exactly those states which
do not permit translation into linguistic terms placing examination of descriptively ineffable
phenomenal content beyond the reach of cognitive linguistics.
A second problem I find in Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor is that its primary
examples deal in dead metaphors. Indeed, they seem not to make any distinction between
live and dead metaphors; their very first example, and one they return to throughout the
27Put another way, they are committed to using language to find insights into how our cognitive
processes work. See, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), 3. It is important to recognize that this does not
imply that an animal needs to have linguistic faculties in order to possess concepts or to structure
them metaphorically. Rather, the presence of such a system is implied by using language in that
way while such linguistic abilities are not required for its use. While at one point a controversial
decision in cognitive science, most literature from most facets of the field have converged on the
opinion that language is not required for concept possession.
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book, is just one of these dead metaphors: Argument is War. Lakoff and Johnson see this
conceptual metaphor as manifest in the following locutions:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I've never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot !
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.28
While all of these sentences seem plausible to me, none of them activate the rich sort of
experience associated with a poetic metaphor. This is because the Argument is War
metaphor is long dead. Perhaps there was a time when one did not literally win an
argument, but these days I utter sentences like these all the time without meaning them
metaphorically. One really can literally win an argument and that such arguments really do
have weak points which are susceptible to being actually attacked by one's interlocutor. The
phenomenology is one of literal use, and in this sense the words meaning expands to include
these (formerly) metaphorical meanings.
A similar, pervasive, and very dead metaphor in musical discourse is the metaphor that
maps our understanding of vertical space onto pitch. We speak of some pitches being higher
or lower than others; a scale can ascend or descend. But this metaphor, because of its




How do we distinguish a live metaphor from a dead one? By and large it is by whether
or not understanding the locution in question has the right phenomenology, that distinctive
experience that we have when we confront a living metaphor. I consider this metaphori-
cal phenomenology, which requires that metaphors be alive, to be an essential feature of
metaphors whose goal is to communicate or encourage phenomenal experience. Thus, a dif-
ferent theory of metaphor, one which examines the particular features of live metaphors, is
required to understand how poetic metaphors might engage phenomenal concepts.
In general, it is exactly the explicitness with which Lakoff and Johnson's theory tries to
treat metaphors that causes it to fail to be useful in the deployment of phenomenal concepts.
Working in this explicit fashion brings out relationships between concepts that arise from
dead metaphors, but trying to break down living metaphors in the same waytrying to
pin down what they really meanends up destroying the sense that they are metaphors.
If we can paraphrase the explicit things that a metaphor means to say, then why use a
metaphor at all? Once we think we have pinned down a single meaning for a metaphor,
and that metaphor becomes merely a code for the real thing we want to say, the effect of
the metaphor is diminished. It no longer has that feel that is distinctive to metaphorical
phenomenology. While the cognitive-linguistic conceptual metaphor theory is extremely
valuable in helping us to understand how we conceptualize certain things, it fails to give us
an account of what makes overt metaphors appealing and why such metaphors can prime us
to deploy phenomenal concepts.
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An Alternative: Davidson's Theory of Metaphorical Meaning
While Lakoff and Johnson's theory primarily regards metaphorical structure and ways to
understand conceptual metaphors, other approaches to metaphor concern themselves with
metaphor semantics, that is, how and why metaphors can mean what they do.
These approaches, however, suffer some philosophical problems. Donald Davidson, in his
tremendously influential What Metaphors Mean, details the difficulties of any semantic
theory of metaphor that proposes a specialized meaning for the metaphors.29 Specifically,
any theory which attempts to provide a paraphrase of a metaphor, i.e., contrast metaphorical
meaning with literal meaning, seems inevitably to leave something in the metaphor unsaid
while at the same time losing the force of the metaphorical assertion.
The alternative that Davidson proposes is that metaphors do not mean anything beyond
their literal meanings. So when I say, music is the food of love, all I really mean is literally
the false assertions that music is food and love eats it. The point of this understanding
of metaphor is just to say that their importance lies not in what they mean, but rather
in the effect they have on readers. Metaphors, according to Davidson, exactly by meaning
something preposterous, cue us to make a comparison between the two things ourselves.
Thus, the specific meaning of any given metaphor, by which I mean, what thoughts that
metaphorical statement create in the mind of the reader, is partially constructed by the read-
ers themselves. This accounts for the fact that any actual paraphrase always seems lacking.
No finite number of non-metaphorical sentences can draw all of the possible connections that
a well-wrought metaphor could cause us to notice.
29Davidson (1978).
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This theory of metaphor predicts the features that I have attributed to the phenomenol-
ogy of metaphors, namely the sense that they seem to be semantically repletethere is no
end to the possible things they could express or cause a listener to notice or how finely they
could cut. And, because one has to figure it out, one gains a sense of ownership over the
meaning and a sense of satisfaction at having come to understand something that was at
first confusing.
When poetic metaphors are used to describe with experience, it allows for phenomenal
concepts to come into play in a way that is simply not part of Lakoff and Johnson's theory of
metaphor. Since we must create the comparison for ourselves, using metaphors that involve
phenomenal experience must also involve recreating those experienced for ourselves, both of
the music and of the source domain of the metaphor. Since we the readers are an active
party in the creation of metaphorical meaning (not a meaning inherent in the words, but
one that we assume to be there on the basis of our thinking) we have an opportunity to use
phenomenal concepts.
Poetic Metaphors in Musical Description: Two Examples
The latter work of J. K. Randall and Benjamin Boretz provide good examples of poetic
metaphors that engage phenomenal concepts in diverse ways. Poetic language can be used
to describe the effect of an entire passage or piece, with the metaphorical imagery reflecting
general impressions of the entire experience, or metaphorical language can be used to describe
very fine details. Both authors create new metaphors invoking novel phenomenal concepts
and resurrect dead metaphors by using them in novel contexts, allowing them to again trigger
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phenomenal concepts as they regain the characteristic metaphorical phenomenology.
In the course of my discussions of the poetic descriptions of Randall and Boretz, I will
do some paraphrasing of their metaphorical language, trying to be clear about some of the
things that these metaphors allow me to experience. But this is not meant to exhaust all
the ways that the metaphor might change one's phenomenology; these analyses below are
meant to provide some specific examples of phenomenal concepts that are triggered for me
by these metaphors.
Boretz's Metamusical Description of Parsifal, Act III Prelude
In Boretz's article Experiences with no Names,30 he reflects on the role of discourse in the
construction of musical experience. He is concerned that the way analysts describe music
is often not descriptive but attributive, creating a new musical idea or experience instead
of describing an extant one. In particular, Boretz is concerned about instances in which
the experiences created are formal or structural ones, ones that ascribe only theoretical
concepts, causing their reader to no longer experience the music as music but as a kind of
abstract structure.31
As an alternative, he follows Randall's metamusical writing, which have a certain aes-
thetic appeal of their own.32 Boretz's own metamusical writing in this article, a description
of the prelude to the third act of Parsifal, is packed with poetic metaphors (first mentioned
30Boretz (1992).
31Ibid., 274.
32In particular, Boretz refers to Radndall's description of Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony. Ibid.,
276-277.
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in the introduction to this chapter). Boretz marks his shift from meta-analytical discussion
to metamusical writing by changing the typographical style. Several of Boretz's metaphors
are especially juicy and rely on the deployment of phenomenal concepts for their effect.
Boretz begins his poem-description with the following lines:
what does it mean, Wagner's Act III Parsifal Prelude beginning with spindly
stringlines in fakecanonic pseudoserialist mode spreading out bighollow widespace
with thinedged boundwalls, & only a shadowy soundtrickle exhaling within?33
In the previous section, I complained about music theorists' discussion of metaphors tending
to focus on the Pitch is Vertical Space metaphor, despite it being mostly dead. Usually,
saying that a melody ascends does not seem metaphorical at all; I do not experience it as
a metaphor because it lacks the phenomenology of a metaphor and presents itself just as a
literal description. The fact that one can be reminded that this language is metaphorical
(or at least can be construed as metaphor) is a sure sign that the formerly metaphorical
meaning has become a literal one. Boretz's novel compound words that brings this metaphor
back to life, specifically bighollow and widespace. Since these words are not part of our
everyday language, upon first seeing them they take a moment to decode as if encountering a
neologism. By causing us to focus our attention on these words we re-experience the relevant
concepts as metaphorical.34 When the metaphor is revivified by these words, it primes us to
reengage phenomenal concepts as we search for the relevant associations between the music
33Ibid., 227.
34In fact, this is often just the sort of experience one can have when looking over Lakoff and
Johnson's examples of metaphors. Things that may not have seemed metaphor until you think
about them reveal a metaphorical origin that can cause you to, for a moment, experience the
locution as a metaphor, even if they often regress back into the background of literal (or seemingly
literal) language.
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and the idea of a bighollow widespace.
Like Barkin's score-like picture Full Score, an imagined empty space (and a phenomenol-
ogy of being in this space) develops around the sounding music. Listening to the prelude
again, the things I hear that bighollow widespace alerts me to are in part pitch-based (the
contrary leaps to a wide, empty span between the F of the first violin and the low G[ of the
cello with not much in between) but it also causes me to attend (again, like Full Score)
to the relatively light orchestration at the very beginning.35 Unlike, Full Score there is no
sense of immediate orchestrational disjunction: hearing this prelude I would be coming from
an intermission, this is a new beginning and while there is potential for a large, loud sound,
it is not realized yet in this act.
The pitch-is-space metaphor becomes further reactivated by phrases like thinedged
boundwalls, which cause me to feel as though the melodic lines are ready to leap farther
than they actually do; the boundwalls are also bindingwalls. But the lines do not ricochet off
sharply, instead the feeling I get is a sort of elastic tension as if the walls, being thinedged,
are prone to bending and absorbing some of the blow. Thinking of boundaries also causes
me to attend to the lack of easy formal divisions in the prelude. The spinlystring lines flow
into the slithers that begin around m. 12 without a thickedged boundary between them. The
boundwall are present but also not, their thinedges are there but can also be traversed. This
creates a sort of permeability across the movement, with phenomenal associations attributed
to some of the gestures bleeding into others.
One can conceptualize all of these ideas in theoretical terms and I have used language
35Contrary motion become something of a structuring principle at the beginning of the prelude,
making the all ascending, all similar motion at the arrival of the Grail motive so striking.
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to try to describe them, but in these sorts of musical descriptions, language is meant to
help communicate some of the, in this case embodied, phenomenal concepts that inherefor
mein this passage. The experience is of the tightness of anticipation, retroactively included
in the melodic lines before they leap and the deceleration and change of momentum felt when
hitting something rubber or jumping on a trampoline; while also engaging multiple musical
parameters at the same time.
Compound words do more work for Boretz a little bit later in the description:
what does it mean to draw deeper into a self-multidimensionalizing weavery of
snakeslithry slithers, slithering on no ground with no snakes but leading on,
sliding into further denseentagled nevertouching unmaterial multidimensioned
slimy ooze with no slime no ooze.36
This pile of quasi-contradicting descriptions is fascinating. What sort of thing could a
snakeslithery slither without the snake be? What is slithering then? What does slimy ooze
with no slime no ooze refer to? When encountering this passage, I am at first confused.
Everything seems contradictory because the language is not meant to be taken referentially.
Davidson's theory of metaphor is particularly useful in sussing this out. Remember that, for
Davidson, metaphors mean only what they literally said, nearly always a blatant falsehood,
but by fostering obvious falsity they achieve their function, to make their reader draw the
connections themselves. Boretz passage achieves a similar effect. I count at least four
contradictions:




3. slimy...with no slime
4. ooze with...no ooze
By creating a number of apparent contradictions Boretz means nothing in particular, indeed
there is no way for these phrases to have any referential meaning. But they do have an
effect, they draw the reader into placing certain concepts in proximity to the music, and
challenge us to hunt for connections between the phenomenology of the music and the sorts
of concepts that accompany our experiences of snakes, dense tangles, slime, and ooze. High-
lighting the absence of the snake or slime, foregrounds the metaphorical phenomenology of
the descriptions (they mean something false, but point toward something more interesting).
These ideas are specifically not to be located in the score, and Boretz gives us very few
clues about what gestures in particular (if any) these descriptions are meant to apply to.
Instead we have to introspect our experience of the music ourselves. Hunting for things that
could be described this way, I notice the repeated descending lines in the cello, perhaps self-
multidimensionalized by the contrary motion in the violins and knit together by the viola's
zig-zaging line. I also find that my introspection engages additional phenomenal concepts
not only of the the phenomenal contents of music but also of slime and ooze and snakes and
slithering, not least of which is an experience of dread at the thought, made more horrifying
perhaps by the image of them being denseenganged. Boretz's description causes me to start
drawing comparisons between these phenomenal concepts and the phenomenal concepts I
deploy when listening to the prelude.
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Randall's depth of surface in Beethoven op. 22, III
Boretz's description of the prelude from Parsifal was purposely designed to be noncommittal
about which musical gestures each descriptor refereed to, though one can hazard a guess and,
definitely, I pointed to specific gestures that resonated with the metaphors for me. J. K. Ran-
dall takes a different strategy in his analysis-poem of the first phrase of the Menuetto from
Beethoven's Piano Sonata, op. 22.37 Randall's analysis is not written in prose but as a poem.
In his introduction to the poem he discusses that the underlying theme of the analysis: the
concept of elision, which he chooses to interpret as when the last note of one musical unit
serves as the first note of the next.38 This concept is extended in a couple of ways in the
analysis of the music and presented in the poem. The very first work is Graceflesh, a
compound (or elision) of two of the primary metaphors of which develop over the course of
the poem.
The introductory stanza of the poem, lays out how we ought to interpret the claims
Randall makes, and is among the best outright statements of a phenomenal attitude.
Herein, the expression ...is...
may be profitably construed as
...may, from the point of view herein emerging,
be profitably construed as....39
37Randall (1971).
38Randall points out that this is not technically correct, though the common parlance in music
discourse. In the traditional sense of the word, the space between the words is elided to make the
compound, whereas in Randall's usage the musical gestures themselves are elided. Randall points
out that while this usage is incorrect, its meaning is still clear. Ibid., 240.
39Ibid., 242.
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Randall is preparing us to adopt a state of mind where we allow his claims to be momentary
interpretations instead of truth-claims. This allows him to go over some passages or ideas
more than once, saying different, and possibly contradictory, things each time.40
By teasing out multiple ways to relate notes to each other, Randall's poem, even when
read with a more traditional, theoretical attitudei.e., the poetic descriptions are just regu-
lar analytical description in fancy clothesby exploring measures over and over again, piling
relationship upon relationship, my representation of the music begins to thicken, approaching
the analog nature of actual musical experience.
The analysis/poem has three large parts, the first two consist mostly of poetic description
in verse while the last consists exclusively of snippets of scores and musical examples. The
third section, argued only with musical examples with little to no explanation, is quite
revealing and may very well be the best solution to the challenge of ineffability, but my
study of Randall's text will focus on the first part and specifically on two metaphors which
permeate it: flesh and ladder. Like the earlier analyses in this chapter, I will unpack
some ways that these metaphors work for me and explore the sorts of phenomenal concepts
(both musical and otherwise) that they activate. Again, following Davidson, my analyses of
Randall's metaphors should not be construed as presenting the meanings or paraphrases of
these metaphors, but just part of some of the things that the metaphors get me to notice.
Randall's poem is presented without a score, but the specificity of his claims is sometimes
difficult to track, a difficulty compounded by the poetic language of the analysis-poem. I
hope that the effect is not entirely ruined by presenting the score for the relevant passage
40Near the end of part two of the poem Randall even makes note of this: SCHENKER SAYS
NO, Ibid., 247.
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Figure 3.6: Beethoven, op. 22, III, mm. 14.
in Figure 3.6. Whenever possible, I encourage the reader to play through the passage, or
listen to it, or at least imagine listening to it when reading either Randall's poem or my
interpretation of it, as it is only in approaching the music this way, that is, with a phenomenal
attitude, that phenomenal concepts themselves are deployed.
The first poetic metaphor we run into involves the notion of flesh.
IB. From and opening dotted figure which ascends scalarly
through the 3rd from D to F
is derived a turning figure, whose rhythmic and melodic contour
fleshes a dotted figure which ascends scalarly
through the 3rd from G to Bb41
The theoretical claim that I take Randall to make is that by following up a dotted, ascending
third figure with this turning figure, the rhythmic gap between the first and second note
are filled infleshed outwith a lower neighbor. Randall even provides a little musical
example showing this (reproduced here as Figure 3.7) though he does not say that this is
what the figure is meant for.42
Randall could have just as easily said, as I did just now, that the turning figure fleshes




Figure 3.7: Randall's fleshed (out) figure.
were fleshed out instead of just fleshed I would not have taken notice of this metaphor
at all; it would have joined the dead spatial metaphors used to describe the passage. But,
as it is, the strange usage attunes me to the metaphor, makes me take notice and feel it as
a metaphor in a similar fashion to words like bighollow and thinedged. As in Boretz's
writing an unusual usage revivifies the metaphor and allows it to inform the phenomenal
concepts I bring to the interpretation of the poem and, by extension, to the music. As I
continue to read the poem, I am aware of fleshy metaphors and associations primed by the
first statement about the two gestures' rhythmic relationship.
The next two stanzas develop this idea of fleshing.
IC. To this derivative turning figure
is appended an F,
whose accompaniment
restores the configuration
in which the F of the opening figure ended.
ID. Such a peeling off of F
from the opening figure
is prefigured in the configuration
in which the tune's turning figure's fleshing F
concurred with the accompaniment's D-Eb-D neighbor note unit;
which was prefigured in the succession,
within the opening figure,
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from D-Eb unaccompanied to F accompanied43
There are three different F's Randall refers to: the half note in m. 1 (the F of the opening
figure), the 16th note lower neighbor (the fleshing F), and the quarter note on beat 2 of
m. 2 (the F appended the the turning figure, peeled off). However, Randall takes pains to
draw ontological connections between the three: each is prefigured in the ones that preceded
it. The quarter-note F in m 2 is a return to the half-note F in m. 1, and you can tell because
the accompaniment on the second beat of each is the same, D then B[. This return to F at
the end of the figure is prefigured by the lower neighbor, turning figure (the fleshing F).
And this F is in turn connected to the first F because it is accompanied by an upper neighbor
figure D-E[-D, the same pitches that preceded the F of the (skeletal?) opening figure.
This theoretical analysis could be read as an argument for motivic coherence, with a
number of motivic ideas meshed together in a dense framework. But then the last F is called
peeled off. Such close proximity to the fleshing metaphor has a painful connotation to
me. The F is first fleshed to the skeletal passage, and then peeled off. This charges the
passage with phenomenal concepts associated with this kind of experience. For me it is not
the feeling of the flesh but rather a sense of disgust at it that ends up becoming a part of
my experience of the passage.
I am willing to admit that this may be taking it too far, that my reading of metaphors into
metaphors has carried me to associations that do not really fit the music, and perhaps was not
intended by the poet-analyst. Unlike Boretz's description of the Parsifal prelude, Randall's
metaphors do not reflect an experience I seemed to already kind of have, but they create a
43Ibid., 243244
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new and quite distinctive experience, one which I never would have come up with without
the metaphorical language and that also seem dissonant with my actual experience. In
some ways, this showcases a downside of this analytical approach, the phenomenal concepts
associated with the metaphors, particularly when they comes in a series like this, playing off
of each other, can overshadow claims about the music.
A second important metaphor for the poem is a ladder metaphor.
While the accompaniment repeats this simultaneous three-figure elision,
the tune starts to climb a 7th-spanning ladder of conjunct 3rds
whose bottom 3rd is the derivative figure's G-Bb
and whose to 3rd is the opening figures D-F
up one octave,44
Why call this a ladder? Why not say it simply ascends (using the dead metaphor) a 7th?
There are certain phenomenal concepts that I deploy when I imagine myself climbing a
ladder. The most prevalent have to do with balance, what it is like to be placed precariously
up on an unsteady ladder, becoming hyper-attuned to your higher than average height and
the possibility, unlike being much closer to the ground, that you might lean too far in one
direction or another and cause grave injury. The rhythm also participates in this metaphor,
with each third serving as one of the rungs of the later, which the music rests upon before
climbing higher. The dotted rhythm reinforces this, each dotted-8th is a (relatively) stable
step on the ladder where your foot comes to rest with the 16th-note as the quick step as you
move to the next rung.
44Ibid., 244.
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The analytical approaches explored here in this chapter all use novel presentations to
get me to reactivate phenomenal concepts, without requiring reference to theoretical mod-
els. Every step along the way required experiential engagement, i.e., required me to deploy
phenomenal concepts. This is a strength of this kind of approach; we must engage phe-
nomenology if we are to take this work seriously and cannot simply bracket this, maybe
most important, way of engaging music. But as we also saw, this approach requires a lot of
interpretive work from the reader, which makes communication both more difficult and less
consistent. The next two chapters explore strategies which try to coordinate both kinds of
concepts into a single analytical methodology.
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Chapter 4




Relying only on a single conceptual typeeither phenomenal or theoreticalallows for the
scope of the theory to be relatively straightforward. The kinds of claims a simplified approach
is interested in making and the sorts of evidence it accepts are usually clear. And since the
motivation for using only one conceptual type often arises directly from epistemological,
ontological, or discursive commitments, these motivations tend to be coherent. But the
simple theories discussed in the preceding chapters are mostly special cases. Most of music
theories and analytical procedures rely on both phenomenal and theoretical resources and
are motivated by combinations of the the concerns explored for phenomenal and theoretical
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Figure 4.1: Measures 1-5 of Beethoven's Appassionata Sonata, Op. 57, ii.
approaches.
An example of this sort of conceptual complexity in analysis is found in Lewin's analysis of
the opening measures of the second movement of Beethoven's Appassionata sonata, presented
in his Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations (GMIT ). The score for this passage
is shown in Figure 4.1. In his analysis, Lewin pushes back against the intuition that
an analytical model ought to mirror a passage's temporal sequence, instead presenting a
model that foregrounds certain transformational relationships instead of their chronological
sequence. He argues for a temporally abstract representation of the passage (shown in
Figure 4.2b) that reveals a conception of precedence different than just chronological order.1
Because the model turns away from the basic phenomenological conception of temporal
precedence, one must understand it theoretically. The resulting graph is as a geometrically
elegant description of the passage through not necessarily directly traceable back to the
passage's phenomenology.
1This conception of precedence is defined in section 9.7.3 and proved as ordered in theorem
9.7.4. Lewin is explicit that this ordering may, but need not, conform to our quotidian sense of
chronology A precedence-ordered system is at least potentially compatible with our naive sense of
chronology. When used for analytic purposes, that system will not have to assert that one musical
event both `precedes' and `follows' another...There is nothing intrinsically correct or good about
avoiding such assertions, but it is useful to have at hand a formal criterion that characterizes those
particular node/arrow systems which enable us to avoid them. Lewin (1987 [2007]), 210-211.
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Figure 4.2: Lewin's transformational network.
Notation Meaning
DOM Becomes the dominant of
SUBD Becomes the subdominant of
PAR Becomes the parallel major/minor of
REL Becomes the relative major/minor of
Table 4.1: Transformations in Lewin's analysis of Beethoven's Appassionata.
Transformational analyses of harmonic function (like those in Figure 4.2) usually show
a single Klang-node for each triad. And these Klangs transform into each other using a
number of different operations modeled by the arrows. In this case, four transformations
are in play here as well as an identity (IDENT) operation (the notation for these operations
and their meaning is shown in Table 4.1). The analysis models one possible way of under-
standing the progression of the passage, and further, this understanding is supposed to be
experientially graspable.
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Mostly, the analysis assigns only one Klang to each sounding harmony. There is a D[
node for the downbeat of m. 1, followed by a G[ node for beat 2, etc. But there are two
ways in which the model diverges from this straightforward assignment of sounded chords
to nodes in the upbeat of m. 2. Lewin provides the following explanation:
The E[-major Klang is bracketed to indicate that the Klang is not actually
sounded but is theoretically understood. The fourth sonority heard in the music is
modeled by two Klangs. It is first understood as a G[-major Klang (with added
sixth); then it is understood as an e[-minor Klang (with minor seventh, inverted).
This is Rameau's double emploi. The arrow goes only one way, from G[ to e[ but
not back. The operation REL takes a Klang into its relative minor/major.2
The first departure is the bracketed E[-major Klang. Lewin inserts this Klang into the
analysis of measure 2 for the sake of theoretical coherence. There is no E[ major triad
in the passage and no single operation transforms e[ into A[. But since the system does
not allow a succession of unrelated Klangs, Lewin places on two operations in sequence:
DOM(PAR(e[))=A[. This model is well-formed, but it is not clear what kind of phenomenol-
ogy (if any) is meant to be implied by the complex transformation. In the graph, the E[-
major Klang gets its own node, elevating this theoretically understood entity to the same
graphical status as those triads that are actually sounded while our actual experience of
the passagethat is, our immediately phenomenology of the passage's harmonyleapfrogs
this node.3 However, while it is easy to elevate a node on paper, that is to treat all the
2Ibid., 213, emphasis added. By Klang here, Lewin refers to a formal object that models a
harmonic object with [a given pitch] p as a root or tonic, an object whose modality is determined
by the sign (Ibid., 176). The formal notation for a Klang (p, sign) is equivalent to the words major
and minor following the name p or simply writing the note p in upper or lower case. This conception
of Klang differs markedly from Riemann's.
3We can imagine that Lewin might have had a single arrow could have been given a complex
label (i.e. PAR · DOM) which would have followed more closely our experience of the passage.
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Klangs only in their theoretical aspects, it is not exactly clear what effect this elevation is
meant to have on the experience of the passage. Are we meant to experience E[ major triad
somehow in this progression, or is it merely a tool to make the transformational model work
out correctly? Given what follows, I expect that by including formal elements on the graph
and saying that it ought to have a certain relatinship to musical experience encourages one
to hear that chord, or some kind of residue of that experience, in the passage.
Just before this theoretically understood Klang, we find the other departure from the 1-
to-1 mapping of chords to nodes. Here, we are meant to hear a single harmony (the E[-minor
seventh chord, marked with an asterisk in Figure 4.1) as two Klangs with an internal REL
transforming a G[ into the e[. Just like the E[ Klang, this transformation is necessitated
by the demands of the formal system and pushes the graph further from its most obvious
phenomenological description. This transformation provides the formal connection between
the G[ and the implied E[ via harmonic reinterpretation. Technically, both triads are there,
all four required notes are present, so if Klang here just means notated triad or some other
theoretically conceptualized understanding, then there is no problem. But if one is meant
to understand the network not just theoretically but phenomenally, as I think Lewin does,
there there is also a kind of phenomenology implied. One is meant, I suppose to engage
something like Rings's pivot interval, whereby the phenomenal status of each note shifts to
change the harmony during this eighth note.
All this fuss over the upbeat of measure 2 is required to make the analysis logically
valid in the transformational system, but it is not clear what would constitute hearing these
transformations. I am not sure what to do to conceptualize them phenomenally instead
of theoretically. One might be tempted to just read this analysis as concerning only those
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theoretical concepts. But despite the apparently distant relation to the music as heard, Lewin
asserts that the transformational analysis is meant to engage our musical experience. We
can observe, he argues, that figure 9.14 [Figure 4.2 here], incomplete as it is for analytic
purposes, still does represent a foreground configuration of Klangs that engages a valid part
of our musical experience.4 So what can be made of this? What kind of engagement might
be in play? How can one make phenomenal sense of elements of the analysis that seem to
be only theoretically conceived? These are the sorts of questions explored in the next two
chapters.5
In the previous two chapters, I discussed theoretical methodologies whichmore or less
went all in on one type of concept or another. In Lewin's analysis of the Beethoven
passage, both theoretical and phenomenal concepts are, apparently, meant to be in play. I
call theories or analytical approaches that properly invoke both kinds of concepts complex.
The following chapters explore specific ways that music theorists combine both theoretical
and phenomenal concepts into a single analytical framework. The present chapter treats
segregated approaches, and chapter five treats mixed approaches. Briefly, in a segregated
approach both theoretical and phenomenal concepts play essential roles in the analytical
narrative, but each conceptual type is limited to particular phases of the analysis. The overall
goal is often to phenomenalize an analysis developed primarily with theoretical concepts. In
a mixed approach, on the other hand, the central theoretical concepts are themselves
4Ibid., 214. Emphasis added.
5In this case in particular, Lewin says that the network reveals something like a carriage return
on a typewriter, when the music departs from the tonic and returns to the G[ triads, restarting the
harmonic motion. Ibid., 214215.
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complex, consisting of both theoretical and phenomenal elements.6
The Segregated Approach
This chapter explores two segregated approaches: transformational theory and neo-Riemannian
theory. These theories deploy the logical and conceptual resources of both conceptual types,
but do so at distinct points in the analytical narrative. The motivations that underlie each
kind of concept (as shown in the previous chapters) have strong intuitive draws. On one
hand, the richness and power of musical experience motivates music theorists to investigate
it. On the other, the premium on consistency and methodological cleanliness in theoretical
approaches makes reliable communication easier. Segregated approaches attempt to do both
in a systematic way.
The idea of an analytical narrative is central to segregated analysis since each conceptual
type comes into play only in specific parts of the narrative. Recall that analytical narrative
may denote the story that an analyst tells of their analysis's creation or the stream of ideas
that support the analytical claims or the way that a reader comes to understand the logic
of the analysis. The analytical narrative is the flow of ideas that, taken sequentially, create
the meaning of the analysis.7 The steps of an analytical narrative can be confusing when
aspects of that narrative are omitted from a published analysis. To minimize this, I focus on
6These two possible relationships do not, of course, exhaust the ways that different types of
concepts can interact but are just two common options.
7One must be cautious, however, not to assume that flow of argument in the finished product is
the same as that which generated the analysis. Musical analysis rarely happens in the orderly way
that appears in print; in actuality it consists of various dead-ends, trial and error, and intuitive leaps.
Dressing up the analytical notes and giving them a teleological drive can facilitate communication
between analysts, but in organizing the stream-of-consciousness nature of the analytical process we
lose some insight into the commitments of the author.
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methodologically self-conscious analyses. By curating my examples this way, I hope to find
moments when analysts are transparent about how they are thinking about their analyses.
This rest of this chapter consists of three parts. The next section deals with the way that
transformational analysis is segregated, and presents a commentary on Lewin's analysis of
Stockhausen's Klavierstück III. I then turn my attention to neo-Riemannian theoryin many
ways conceptually consequent to transformational theoryand consider it as segregated in
a similar fashion. Finally, I present my own neo-Riemannian analysis of the recitative that
starts act II of Verdi's Macbeth, tracking the types of concepts used over the course of the
analysis.
4.2 Transformational Analysis as Segregated
In Theory and Practice
Transformational theory was developed by David Lewin over the course of his oeuvre with the
most influential work appearing in the 1980s.8 It is formalized in the second part of GMIT
and serves as the prototypical example of a segregated approach. The theory is usually pre-
sented as a counterpoint to interval-based analysis (e.g. Lewin's GIS) and considers musical
transformations as elements of mathematical groups. Two features of transformational
theoryits meta-theoretical conception of analysis, sometimes called the transformational
attitude, and its group-theoretical analytical methodologyare worth especially close at-
8Transformational theories first appeared in Lewin (1982) which were extended in GMIT (Lewin
(1987 [2007])). The seed of the transformational attitude is found in Lewin (1977) and the analyses
presented in Lewin (1993 [2007]), including the analysis of Stockhausen below, act as a sort of
handbook for the practical application of the formal concepts laid out in GMIT.
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tention here. While neither of these ideas is bound to the other necessarily, they become
associated in practice. And while neither idea necessarily categorizes transformational anal-
ysis as segregated, what makes the approach segregated is how these two ideas are used.
Transformational theory (and by extension neo-Riemannian theory) is not segregated by
necessity but by contingent practices.9
The transformational attitude is a stance vis-à-vis the object of analysis. Under this
attitude, transformational analysis downplays conceiving of musical objects (pitches, har-
monies, or rhythms) as related in terms of distance and focuses on the characteristic actions
that transform one musical object into another. Most accounts of the transformational
attitude invoke the following statement from GMIT regarding his often-cited Figure 0.1:
[I]nstead of regarding the i-arrow on figure 0.1 [Figure 1.3 below] as a measurement of ex-
tension between points s and t observed passively `out there' in a Cartesian res extensa, one
can regard the situation actively, like a singer, player, or composer, thinking: `I am at s;
what characteristic transformation do I perform in order to arrive at t? '10
Figure 4.3: Lewin's figure 0.1 from Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations.
9I have taken this approach throughout this dissertation, because I have found that theorists
are sometimes unclear about their motivations or how to communicate the theoretical beliefs that
underlie them. In order not to get mucked up at this level of theorizing I come down to the level of
analysis where actual claims on music and experience are made.
10Lewin (1987), xxxi
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It is important to be clear about what the transformational attitude is and what exactly
follows from it. It is a meta-analytical position that conceptualizes analytical tools in a
particular way. It is not clear what is Cartesian or passive about non-transformational
attitudes or why transformations themselves are necessarily anti-Cartesian (or at least non-
Cartesian) or active, but at least when invoking the transformational attitude we are meant
to take transformations in this way, as characteristic actions, imagined as embodied.11 The
kinds of concepts that flow from the transformational attitude, as things you do, express
a certain phenomenology and we are thereby meant to relate to the analytical concepts
phenomenally.12
The primary analytical technology of transformational theory is the group-theoretical
transformation, which Lewin (formally) defines as A function from a family S into S it-
self.13 Usually a transformation maps something into something else of the same type
(defined within the same family) and most often this amounts to rhythmic sets transforming
to rhythmic sets, pentachords transforming into pentachords, members of a set-class trans-
forming into other members of that set-class, and so on. Such transformations are usually
11Lewin's usage of the idea of Cartesianism is a little mysterious, despite seeming to be at the
heart of his conception of the transformational attitude. Henry Klumpenhower argues that Lewin's
ideas about Cartesianism stem from his father's psychoanalytic work (Klumpenhouwer (2006)).
Klumpenhower's argument, while appealing and extremely virtuosic, is slightly more subtextual
than I am comfortable with, particularly in the sense of Cartesianism that it takes to inform
Lewin's perspective. The fact is, Lewin is unclear about what Cartesian means in this case and by
my reading it is just as likely to refer to a Cartesian plane rather than anything having to do with
Cartesian dualism.
12This claim is not based on anything that is stated explicitly about the transformational attitude,
but rather about the ways that it is talked about (metaphors about singing and playing) and what
it is defined against (static, Cartesian, or observer-based methodologies).
13Lewin (1987), 3.
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also contextual, meaning that they are defined anew in each analysis based on the features
of the given piece.
Much is made of the idea of a transformational theory being action-focused and anti-
spatialthat is, invoking the transformational attitudebut this is not a necessary feature
of Lewin's invocation of group theory and, as Julian Hook points out, is a bizarre assumption
to make from a mathematical perspective. For a mathematician there is nothing particu-
larly active about transformations and speculating on what it means to call something a
transformation does not really make sense.14 They are simply mathematical devices whose
meaning does not extend beyond their definition. Even in GMIT, Lewin's definitions of
transformations are in terms of ordered pairs.15 Transformations and the arrow-node graphs
aremost essentiallyjust these sets of ordered pairs. This is a quite different conception
from that usually proffered by the phenomenologically focused transformational theorist.
Reading group transformations as somehow active sets up a new mode of presentation, but
one not essential to the formal definition. There is nothing wrong or incoherent with enforc-
ing this conceptualization of transformations, but it is important to remember that this is
something extrait does not come along for free with mathematical group theory.
It turns out that this separability of the meta-theoretical attitude of transformational
theory and its analytical technologies is what permits this theory to be segregated. Choosing
when and how to invoke different aspects of transformational theory permits the unique
sorts of claims segregated theories can make. But the phenomenologies brought along by
14Hook (2007).
15Lewin (1987), ch. 9.
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the transformational attitude are often imposed on the very idea of doing transformational
analysis at the level of theory, quite apart from what goes on in actual analyses. What
results is confusion about what is implied by using these analytical devices. Should we
always conceive every transformation under this phenomenological lens? This might seem
to be what the transformational attitude implies, but it also runs contrary to the formal
definitions of transformations and the practice of transformational theory.
Since the transformational attitude is supplemental to transformations themselves, it is
likewise possible to create a transformational analysis without a phenomenal aspect, that is,
without relying on the transformational attitude to make phenomenal sense of the analyti-
cal claims. A self-conscious transformational analyst should ask, when are the phenomenal
resources of the transformational attitude invoked and when am I working with only formal
concepts? By only insisting on the transformational attitude (and its phenomenal concepts)
at particular points in the analytical narrative, it becomes possible to invent purely theoret-
ical analyses that are only phenomenalized after the fact.
Lewin tends to do this in three distinct steps. One can trace the deployment of the phe-
nomenalizing transformational attitude by considering transformational analysis to consist
of a three-phase narrative.
1. First the analyst introspects their phenomenal experience looking for things which
catch his ear. These are taken as the analytical primitives and translated into formal
terms.
2. The formal terms are then worked-out algebraically (or using whatever method is
appropriate).
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3. The results of the formal analysis are then re-translated back into some kind of
phenomenal experience.
In this narrative, only phases 1 and 3 invoke phenomenal experience. The act of translat-
ing the phenomenal experience into more rigorously defined terms insulates phase 2 from
the phenomenology, and phase 2 is done mostly without referring to the experience it draws
from allowing it to develop the theoretical concepts in unheard or even unhearable ways. The
transformational attitude is then activated upon the resulting theoretical analysis, translat-
ing its theoretical concepts to phenomenal ones.
This three-phase analytical methodology has been noted and theorized by several other
commentators on Lewin's work. Scott Gleason argues that Lewin's general approach takes
experience and formal considerations to exist in a dialectical relationship. When under-
stood as a Hegelian dialectic, this also implies a similarly structured three-phase analytical
methodology. The approach, he says, acts as a kind of pendulum swinging gently between
mathematical speculation and analytical experience. In this sense the two mediate and trans-
form each other.16 Gleason provides an historical context for this dialectic as a part of a
larger problematic about how Princeton theorists relate to experience. His reading and mine
share many broad strokes, but to understand the what I take to be happening in the third
phase, the re-translation of theoretically determined analytical structures into phenome-
nal contents, does not seem quite like a proper synthesis, conceptually speaking. The final
product is (or ought to be) fully phenomenal, not a synthesis between the two conceptual
16Gleason (2013), 140. I am indebted to Gleason for clarifying and confirming many of my
intuitions in particular about the structure of the Stockhausen analysis discussed below.
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types.17
Joshua Banks Mailman's notion of cybernetic phenomenology is closer to what I am
describing for Lewin. Mailman describes this analytical methodology as involving com-
putational analytic procedures prompted by [one's] hearing, procedures whose output in
turn enhanced [one's] experience as a listener.18 Mailman's concept of cybernetic phe-
nomenology follows more or less the three-phase analytical methodology described above
and, importantly, he foregrounds the creative potential of such a methodology as part of the
performative turn in music analysis.19 I am basically in agreement with Mailman's theory
here. He also foreground the use of this methodology in Lewin's work, especially for relation-
ships in nontonal music.20 The analysis of Lewin's work and later neo-Riemannian theory
below both extends this work by seeing this process as flowing from shift in conceptualization
and extends it to neo-Riemannina approaches.
In the three-phase model, we find three all three imperatives discussed in chapter one
motivating Lewin's analytical decisions: the phenomenological prefers to respect the phe-
nomenology of the musical experience (in Lewin's terms, the intuitively present aspects
17We do, however, find this kind of conceptual synthesis in mixed approaches, like Schenkerian
theory, discussed in the following chapter. But these approaches lack the convenient three-phase
structure.
18Mailman (2016), 6. The notion of this cybernetic phenomenology as underlying analytical
practice is common theme in Mailman's work. The definition given here refers to his essay on
Carter's Scrivi in vento (Mailman (2009)) and another, briefer description of the analytical process
that engages cybernetic phenomenology may be found in Mailman (2012).
19Mailman (2016), 9-10. Mailman draws on the work of Cook (2002) for his account of this
performative turn.
20Ibid., 24ff. Specifically, Mailman refers to Lewin's work on a running vector. See Lewin (1981)
and (1987).
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of the experience); the validity imperative prefers to create a formally valid system; and
the formal-aesthetic imperative prefers the system to have certain quasi-aesthetic features,
namely symmetry and elegance.21
Lewin's Analysis of Klavierstück III
Lewin's analysis of Stockhausen's Klavierstück III is exceptionally self-conscious about its
methodology and provides a good example of the entire three-phase process. Lewin's first
step is to go through the score...hunting for pentachord [(0, 1, 2, 3, 6)] forms by ear.22 This
is this first phase. Lewin is staking out the basic terms of the analysis by appealing to the
phenomenology of the piece. The outline's idealized nature, however, is already on display.
While this first analytical act is introspective, Lewin is also already invoking theoretical
ideas in the pentachord forms. Moreover, Lewin may have a very un-phenomenological
reason to choose pentachord-class (0, 1, 2, 3, 6) as his primary analytical element, providing
a counterpoint to Jonathan Harvey's analysis (cited in his first paragraph) that also features
this pentachord-class.23 This motivation combines, I suspect, with elements of Lewin's own
experience (including the initiation of the piece with the pentachord's prime and inverted-
prime forms) and results in a pentachord-based analysis. These motivations are split between
the formal-aesthetic and phenomenological imperatives.
Whatever his motivation, Lewin's accounting of the various pentachord forms by ear
21These imperatives are discussed in more detail in section 1.6.2.
22Lewin (1993), 20. Emphasis added.
23Harvey (1975).
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Figure 4.4: Lewin's pentachord catalog.
indicates that he is able to grasp them phenomenally (i.e., hear them).24 With this catalog of
phenomenally-defined pentachords in hand (which included all but two notes), Lewin begins
to turn away from pure phenomenology: Intellectually, I decided I should assert pentachord
forms to embed those pitch classes [not included in the phenomenal accounting].25 Lewin's
final catalog includes two intellectually determined pentachords (the P1 spanning mm. 9-
11, and the p2 spanning mm. 13-16, boxed in Figure 4.4) along with the phenomenally
determined ones.
24One wonders exactly what type of task Lewin did to identify the chords by ear. I suspect
that he probably played the piece a number of times (he refers to playing it later in the analysis),
so it is conceivable that Lewin is being generous in saying that he identified pentachord forms by




This is the seam between phases 1 and 2. Lewin's motivation for including these pen-
tachords is no longer only phenomenological but comes from additional formal-aesthetic
considerations. He apparently does not hear these forms as clearly as the others, but he
includes them so that his account of the piece is exhaustive. This is a formal-aesthetic move
because there is nothing about the musical experience which require that a single analyti-
cal device encompass the entire piece and there is as yet no formal system to conform to.
Instead, I suspect that Lewin is motivated by a meta-theoretical belief that a good analysis
should exhaustively account for every note of a piece and rely on as few analytical primitives
as possible (e.g., a single pentachord-class). This premium on efficiency of explanation flows
from the formal-aesthetic imperative.
Lewin then checks his phenomenal reckoning of the piece with a formal metric that
measures how tightly packed instances of the pentachord are; that is, how close the occur-
rence of each element is to being strictly consecutive. He discovers (ex post facto) that all of
the pentachords he identified phenomenally have a deficiency of 0 or 1 on this metric (lower
is tighter, no extraneous notes intervene in the presentation of pentachord or there is only
one). The two chord forms he added intellectually rate deficiency 2.26 The formal-aesthetic
imperative likewise underlies Lewin's desire to find a logic (his word) to justify his phe-
nomenal identifications. As much as possible, one ought to have a systematic (theoretically
conceptualized) way of determining what we are looking at, and while the phenomenal intu-
itions created the conditions for defining this metric, it is the metric that formally justifies




With his collection of pentachords completed, Lewin turns his attention to the collection's
formal interrelationships, bringing us fully into phase 2 of the analysis. Figure 4.4 now
functions as the new score. The elements on this figurenot the music or the notation
are the subject of the analysis. Anything in the music that did not make it onto this list
(duration, dynamics, registers, other pitch relations) does not figure into the rest of the
analysis.28
Lewin starts with an informal look at the relationships present on the list. He finds him-
self immediately taken in by the compactness of what he calls the 0/6 complex consisting of
P, I7(P), T6(P), and I7(T6(P)), shortened to P, p, P6, and p6, respectively. The relationships
between these elements form the model which organizes the remaining pentachord types into
a transformational network. Lewin makes the network symmetrical by defining a transforma-
tion J as that inversion of the pentachord that preserves its chromatic tetrachord (since the
transformation is 1-to-1 and onto, it is also an operation). This transformation/operation
and the rules for its use are then formally defined following the rhetorical paradigm of a
mathematics or logic text, with theorems worked out formally.
What motivates Lewin to define a new operation? If we are asking why Lewin defines
a new transformation instead of using the already established group of inversions all with
different index numbers (i.e., Why define a new operation?), we might look again to formal-
27From another perspective, if we were embarking on a fully formal analysis, this metric might
have been one of the axioms, along with the pentachord-class, assumed at the outset.
28Later Lewin says as much: In general, my pentachord-analysis is dissatisfying. . . with regard
to all other aspects of the piece that it does not address. (Ibid., 55). And the fact that it does not
address these other features is not a problem from the theoretical perspective, since these features
are beyond the scope defined at its outset.
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aesthetic considerations. If he were a less creative analyst, Lewin might have chosen to simply
refer to an ad hoc group of transformations that preserve the chromatic tetrachord, or even
just note that a given series of transformations preserves the tetrachord without formalizing
it with a label. But by defining a new operation instead of using extant ones, he keeps
the elements of his group as small as possible relying on only J instead of a battery of
different inversion operations. If we take the question to mean, why does Lewin define it
with definitions and theorems (i.e.,Why define a new operation?), then we are considering
validity imperatives. The formal definitions allow him to work with the new transformation
in a way consistent with the rest of the system and following a predictable logic. Notice too,
at this phase in the analysis there is not (and need not be) anything that it is like to hear a
J transformation, it is just a formal technology insulated from phenomenology.
With the space of his transformational network and the groups of transformations settled,
Lewin undertakes a long discussion to determine a suitable arrow-node graph to map the
pentachords and transformations. At this stage, all decisions are made using only theoreti-
cal concepts, and mostly following formal-aesthetic motivations (he has left phenomenology
behind for now and the system is already formally valid). Decisions are not between theoret-
ical and phenomenal conceptualizations of the piece. They are between different theoretical
conceptualizations, between different modes of presentation for the same, newly defined, ab-
stract objects. Note also that decisions about the structure of a transformational graph are
not made on only formal grounds. Formal relationships do not care how they are arranged
on the page, just as long as the same relationships obtain. But because arrangement on the
page is apparently a live issue here, we must be engaging formal-aesthetic considerations.
Lewin considers both a chronological arrow-node graph and a spatial one, the latter or-
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Figure 4.5: Lewin's Example 2.4, the chronological network.
ganized by the 0/6 complex. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 (Lewin's Examples 2.4 and 2.5) show both
of these options, respectively. These conceptualizations cut different ways, and he eventu-
ally settles on the spatial graph, arguing that the chronological graph fails to represent the
considerations and procedures which led to its creation, i.e., theoretical conceptualizations
instead of phenomenal ones.29 The structure of the graph (visually, apparently) does not
highlight the importance of the 0/6 complexes of which Lewin was so enamored a few pages
earlier.
Lewin expresses his preference for Figure 4.6 in the following passage:
Precisely because of the strongly narrative temporality, each arrow on the ex-
ample [Figure 4.5] has to bear enormous weight in asserting some sort of phe-
nomenological presence. . . Furthermore, the structure of [the example] does not
bring out well the proportional relations involving pentachord forms that led to
our developing the T-and-J group in the first place. . . [T]he structure of of the
29Ibid., 33.
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Figure 4.6: Lewin's Example 2.5, a spatial network.
example does not draw our attention specifically to these proportions. To focus
such attention, while we are telling the story of the example, we must interrupt
the narrative drive. In this respect the example does not reflect well the consider-
ations and procedures that led to its own creation. The group structure theorem
is not a list of immediate aural intuitions or intentions; rather it arose from our
pondering the logic of global proportionings that emerged from careful reflection
upon our overview. To be sure, we can ultimately try to refer these proportion-
ings to presences, or at least observables in the music. . . However, this sort of
a posteriori ear-training is not at all the sort of immediate aural intuition we
were discussing above. Rather than trying to make out transformations denote
phenomenological presences in a blow-by-blow narrative we can more comfort-
ably regard them as a way of structuring an abstract space of P-forms through
which the piece moves.30
There is a lot to unpack here. First, continuing the thread that brought us to this rich
passage, Lewin's reasons for preferring the proportional network to the chronological one
is clarified. Yet another formal-aesthetic consideration: latter analytical decisions should
reflect the same values that motivated earlier ones. In this case, the relationships that
30Ibid., 32-34.
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generated the T-and-J group of transformations were draw from the proportioning of the
pentachords. When placing them in a network, this reasoning goes, we ought to follow the
same values, to stick with the same relationships (the proportionings) that got us to where
we are now. It is inappropriateat this phase of the analysisto shift from caring primarily
about proportion to caring about chronology. The chronology of the pentachords played
little to no role in our defining our group of transformations so it should likewise play no role
in organizing them into a network. Lewin admits that Figure 4.5 shows better promise to
reflect the chronology of the piece, but this is not the sort of thing we are after.31 Immediate
aural intuitions are in the domain of phase onethe pre-algebraic preliminariesthose
considerations do not belong in this phase of the analysis.32
Second, it is not clear exactly why a temporally inflected model must bear the weight
of asserting phenomenological presence, that it must some how directly and easily model
our phenomenology. Lewin's decision not to follow the piece's chronology may have more
31Ibid., 31.
32Another implicit reason that under-girds Lewin's preference for Figure 4.6 is its tidiness. It
shows certain symmetries not shown in Figure 4.3, and realizing that these formal symmetries exist
(a formal-aesthetic claim) is an important part of the analysis. An interesting counterpoint to this
is given in Lewin's later remarks about where to cut off the space given in Figure 4.6. The only
complex explored fully is the 0/6 complex, whose prevalence in part determines the basic features of
the group. We could, Lewin admits, expand the example further giving us a space of `potentialities'
rather than `presences,'  (Ibid., 35) showing that we could imagine the complete spaces of the 3/9
complex, the 5/e complex, and the 2/8 complex to just be unexplored. Lewin's sudden concern for
only showing presences rubs against his reasoning for selecting Figure 4.6 over Figure 4.5. But, it
turns out, it is mostly practical matters which dictate his decision. For, he ask, if we were to fill
out those complexes, shouldn't we also fill out the complexes which neighbor them? And so on, ad
infinitum? To prevent this, Lewin decides to cut off the arrows and chord forms shown to those
which fall within the T-and-J group and are present in the piece. Given some of Lewin's other
analytical commitments, it may be that had he asserted these elements as being part of the space
the would exert a pressure on analysis for that completion, and since the piece doesn't go there,
and Lewin probably doesn't want to think of the piece as unfulfilled, he leaves the graph as it is.
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Figure 4.7: Lewin's ear-training exercise.
to do with providing a mind- (or ear-) expanding exercise, getting readers to accept a more
abstract structure of the piece that demonstrates desirable formal-aesthetic properties rather
than one that sticks so closely to its phenomenology.
Lewin follows his transformational graph with an ear-training exercise meant to get the
reader to hear the analysis, and this constitutes the third phase of the three-phase process.
In this phase, Lewin turns his attention away from generating an analysis which is formally
164
well-defined and whose form flows from the idea which generated itthe main preoccupation
explored aboveto question how the network staked out by the analysis can be heard. Lewin
takes the question Can you hear it? to mean do you find it possible to focus your aural
attention upon aspects of the acoustic signal that seem to engage the signifiers of that
analysis?33 It is unclear exactly what constitutes the engagement of these signifiers by an
acoustical signal. Put another way, it is difficult to check whether one is in fact hearing the
analysis when one is unclear what it would be like to hear the analysis.
As I reflect on the analysis and play through the ear training exercise, comparing it to the
piece, it highlights certain relationships in the music, presumably those that are are meant
to flow from the analysis. I gain from it a new array of phenomenal concepts existing in
relationships analogous to those present in the formal model. These phenomenal concepts
gain analytical relevance when I attach them to the theoretical framework developed over
phase 2 of the analysis. The result is a new phenomenal conceptualization of the piece
informed by phase 2 of the analysis consisting, in my case, of newly created phenomenal
concepts. In future hearings, I can nowbut still with some efforthear these relationships
and begin to hear the meta-relationship with is modeled by the transformational graph. In
this sense, the three-phase process of segregated analyses is hearing-generating. Instead of
accounting for a spontaneous hearing of a piece, the three-phase process generates novel
hearings, by developing the basic features of a hearing using theoretical concepts. The
phenomenal experiences during the first phase arise spontaneously, given in an immediate
fashion, while the phenomenology of section three has to be cultivated consciously.34 And,
33Ibid., 44.
34Obviously, what we hear spontaneously is determined by what we are primed to hear, both
165
it turns out, exactly thisthe development of novel hearingsis Lewin's explicit goal.
4.3 Neo-Riemannian Theory
Operators and Maps
In his analysis of Klavierstück III, and in transformational theory in general, Lewin is rela-
tively explicit about his goals and methodology. But this clarity of motivation and execution
is not always present in analyses. More often convincing analyses are less clear about exactly
what types of concepts generate them or what kinds of concepts one is meant to deploy to
properly understand them. Such is often the case in neo-Riemannian theory. In this sec-
tion I argue that we can interpret neo-Riemannian analyses as following a similar analytical
process that serves to phenomenalize certain theoretical concepts, allowing neo-Riemannian
theory to have some relationship to phenomenology while not limiting use of rich spatial
networks.
Neo-Riemannian theory grew out of Lewin's general theory of musical transformation
applied to harmonic language of the heavily chromatic but triadic music of the late nine-
teenth century. Analysts found that where tonal harmonic descriptions began to fail, neo-
Riemannian theory provided a more convincingor at least more normativeaccount of
these passages. Neo-Riemannian theory, according to Richard Cohn in his introduction to a
special issues of the Journal of Music Theory, provides a different account of the music that
by the short term context, and larger aspect of our cultural and musical training. But the music
isn't given to us in this waythe input these aspects have on the experience are phenomenologically
transparent.
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allows it to still be read as coherent.35
The theory, of course, is named for nineteenth-century German theorist Hugo Riemann,
and found an early development in the contextual transformations in GMIT.36 Lewin in-
troduces Riemannian functions not as chord labels, but as kinds of transformation such
that, for instance, the DOM (for dominant) function means that the chord becomes the
dominant of the argument triad.37 In addition to the DOM and SUBD functions, which
preserve only a single chord tone, Lewin also defined three other transformations, each of
which leave two pitch classes invariant: parallel (PAR), relative (REL), and Leittonweschel
(LT) transformations. These labels are likewise borrowed from Riemann's harmonic theory
and these transformations in particular are the primary analytical technologies of modern
neo-Riemannian theory.
The Lewinian reading of these latter three operators conceptualizes them as inversions
about two notes of the input triad. These transformations map these two pitches into each
other and the third note into a pitch class not present in the input triad. Figure 4.8 shows
35Cohn (1998), 169. While falling out of fashion nowadays, that an analysis should provide an
account of a piece that explains is coherenceexplains how it is possible for the passage to exist
given certain harmonic rulesis still an implicit motivation for many analysts, neo-Riemannians
included.
36Lewin (1987 [2007]), 175 ff.
37See the Beethoven example at the start of this chapter. Brian Hyer (2011) discusses many
of the possible interpretations of function for Riemann, settling on a mostly mathematical
conceptualizationfollowing the influence of Fregefor historical Riemann. While a similar story
might be told about modern harmonic functions, the neo-Riemannian ones in particular, I think
the tonal functions in particular have a sort of complex conceptualization, being read as either a
mathematical function or in the sense of what the chord is meant to do depending on how it suits
the analysis.
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Figure 4.8: Inversional conceptualization of R operator. (Siciliano's example 4a)
Figure 4.9: Parsimonious voice-leading conceptualization of R operator. (Siciliano's example
5a)
this mapping for the R (for REL) function.38 Other writings, notably those of Richard Cohn,
operate under a different conceptualization of neo-Riemannian operators. Cohn conceptu-
alizes these as labels for the smallest units of voice-leading work in a progression. The
voice-leading work of a progression is the total number of semitone displacements from one
chord to another.39 Neo-Riemannian operators are conceptualized as two held pitch-classes
with a single triad member moving the shortest possible distance. Figure 4.9 shows this
conceptualization of the same R function. So a P (for PAR) operator which turns C major
into C minor as only a single unit of voice leading work, E to E[. The R operator, conversely,
requires two units of voice-leading work, shifting the fifth of the input triad up two semitones
to become the root of the output triad. Progressions which do small amounts of voice-leading
38Figure 4.8 and 4.9 are drawn from Siciliano (2005).
39Cohn (2012), 6.
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work are called parsimonious and are privileged in Cohn's and others' analyses.40
While the different conceptualizations of these functions provide identical labels to iden-
tical passages, this difference in conceptualization concerns how one pitch is conceived as
moving to another. The parsimony conceptualization is closer to traditional voice-leading
rules (preserve common tones, move voices by step), while inversional conception usually in-
volves all voices moving. We might prefer one conceptualization to another when the voices
move to the ones which they map to in actual music. This gives us a way to hear what was
otherwise only theoretically conceptualized; i.e., points toward a particular phenomenaliza-
tion of the theoretical concept.41 Lewin's and Cohn's contrasting interpretations also serve
as another example of different modes of presentation for the same reference. These concepts
of P, say, are distinct, but are distinct at the level of sense, not at the level of reference.
Under either conceptualization of its primary operators, neo-Riemannian practice is
marked by a concern with mapping musical space. These maps amount to Cayley graphs
showing which elements of the given space are connected by defined operators. These maps
show a space of possibilities for harmonic motion. We saw similar maps developed in trans-
formational theory in both of Lewin's analyses above (of Beethoven and Stockhausen), but
these graphs were contextual, mapping only those pieces. In neo-Riemannian theory, maps
usually mean to show general connections between triads and are meant to apply to a variety
of pieces.
The most prevalent of these maps comes from Riemann himself. His Tonnetz of functional
40Siciliano (2005) also offers an especially cogent description of these different conceptualizations.
41Most often, theorists tend to approach neo-Riemannian theory from one perspective or the
other. Ibid., 8892.
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Figure 4.10: Riemann's Tonnetz
Figure 4.11: Hyer's realization of the neo-Riemannian Tonnetz.
relations is shown in Figure 4.10. Contemporary neo-Riemannians more often refer to a
reformulation of this figure created by Brian Hyer.42 While functionally identical, the modern
Tonnetz is a tessellation of equilateral triangles instead of diamonds which clarifies how
triads, the triangles, move through this space. The Tonnetz maps musical space by perfect
fifth/perfect fourth relations on the horizontal axis, major third/minor sixth relations on the




Neo-Riemannian Theory and Phenomenology
Despite its origin in transformational theory, the persistent concern for mapping promotes a
conception of analysis in neo-Riemannian theory which runs exactly counter to the transfor-
mational attitude. Mapping harmonies in one of the various neo-Riemannian spaces fosters
hearing chords as being certain distances from each other and not necessarily as connected
by enacted gestures. The connections are supposed to be transformations, but often it seems
that there is more concern with charting these spaces than with understanding what it means
to move through them, and a wide variety of maps generated not from the specific elements
of a particular piece but from the abstract properties of a set or transformation.43
This concern with mapping and symmetry foregrounds the theoretically conceptualized
aspects of neo-Riemannian theories, compounded by the relatively few analyses that reach
beyond but a few measures.44 All this leads some critics of neo-Riemannian theory to
question the degree to which it invokes musical experience. An entire section of The Oxford
Handbook of Neo-Riemannian Music Theories is devoted to these issues. In his contribution
to this volume Steven Rings argues that
Surely a prime reason for the success of neo-Riemannian theory is that it al-
43This seems to be the case, in part, because the maps are usually defined with reference to these
abstract properties instead of distilled from the harmonic progressions of a particular piece, though
this does not mean that the maps were not sought after because of the features of a particular
piece and justified by abstract properties after the fact. See, for instance Douthett and Steinbach's
(1998) chicken-wire torus, cube dance, torus towers, and power towers; Cohn's (2012) water bugs,
Weitzmann regions, and Boretz spiders; and Siciliano's (2005) LPR map. The presentation of each
of these maps is given with a handful of short examples, but only the Tonnez seems to have found
wide use as a general analytical tool.
44Siciliano points out that at the time of his writing that Richard Cohn's analysis of Schubert's
B[ Sonata is the only other example of an entire piece analyzed with neo-Riemannian tools (Cohn
1999)).
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lows analysts to dwell on the most remarkable sounding passages in a chromatic
work...But it is not the remarkable sound of those passages which is analyzed, it
is their coherence. One thus begins to wonder what the relationship is between
the sound and the analysis. Is the coherence that the method detects respon-
sible for what makes these disorienting passages so aurally captivating? Or are
the two unrelated? In other words, do we value the analysis for the same reasons
we value the music?45
In the same collection, Daniel Harrison is concerned also with the phenomenological status
of neo-Riemannian theory,
Neo-Riemannian theory seems happiest operating in an apparently tonic-free,
zero-gravity state, as its analytic products are transformational labels that have
no sensuous-functional significance.46
By sensuous-functional significance I take Harrison to be talking about some kind of phe-
nomenal conceptionthat neo-Riemannian theories often skirt what it is like to hear the
motions through the spaces that they propose, in particular disregarding aspects of a pas-
sage's tonal phenomenology.
And yet, neo-Riemannians, in the midst of their algebraic and geometric models, insist
that the theory is, at its heart, experiential. Taking neo-Riemannians seriously, how does one
respond to the claims of absent phenomenology from Rings and Harrison? Reinterpreting
neo-Riemannian analyses as following a three-phase rubric similar to the one outlined for
Lewin's transformational theory and considering neo-Riemannian theory as conceptually
segregated, one can make use of the rich formal concepts in neo-Riemannian theory while




In neo-Riemannian theory, the influence of the three-phase process is more difficult to
track since the first and final phases are often absent from the published analysis. In Lewin's
Stockhausen analysis, the reader is present for the crafting of all of the pertinent analytical
technologies, most notably, the J transformation. The motivation for creating this transfor-
mation flows form the original reckoning of the piece into pentachords, which was done by
relying mostly on phenomenology. In neo-Riemannian theory the pertinent transformations
are a given before the analysis gets going. Instead of developing new contextual transforma-
tions for each piece of music, standard transformations are baked into the analytical system.
The reader is then left to speculate on how the operators relate to experience. Likewise,
the final phase of the three-phase process is also absent. This is also often the case for
transformational analyses as well. Lewin's analysis of Stockhausen is unique in that he gives
an ear-training exercise to help re-translate the results of the formal analysis into a phe-
nomenal experience. Much more often, however, this phase is left for readers to do on their
own. The fallout from omitting these two phases is that the phenomenally-insulated second
phaseworking out the formal analysisis often all that a reader sees. For those without
a preexisting phenomenal image of the neo-Riemannian operations, or who do not take the
time to learn to hear them, the analysis becomes only about the formalities of the second
phase.47
47Before we look at a neo-Riemannian analysis, it is worth taking a moment to discuss the
influence of history on neo-Riemannian theory. Like Schenkerian theory (and unlike, say, roman
numeral analysis) the fact that the theory and analytical approach bears the name of an historical
theorist often leads those theory's students to study the work of that theorist for insight into how
the theory and analysis work, despite changes in context, epistemology, etc. This is especially true
in the work of Cohn, who often appeals to historical precedent to justify his models (see Cohn
(2012)). Tied in with this appeal to history is a more general analytical concern with sensitivity to
historical context in analysis. Sometimes this anxiety leads theorists and musicologist to insist that
contemporaneous analytical modes are best for any given music. Thus, because of neo-Riemannian
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Siciliano's Analysis of Schubert's Der Jüngling und der Tod
To get a feel for how we might interpret a neo-Riemannian analysis under the three-phase
framework, I examine Michael Siciliano's analysis of Schubert's Der Jüngling und der Tod.48
Siciliano's analysis is given as a kind of pedagogical example (like the Stockhausen analysis)
and is clearer than usual about exactly what kinds of concepts are being deployed when.
The analysis turns on a fully theoretical concept, the idea of chord orientation in the space
of abstract voice-leading parsimony. My commentary focuses on how Siciliano first presents
a fully theoretical sense of this concept and then coaches readers on how to listen for this
feature. While Siciliano's analysis is not as methodologically self-conscious as Lewin's, I
interpret this analysis under the same three-phase process. This shows one way that we
might take neo-Riemannian analyses to engage our experience, relying the same sort of
conceptual shifts as in transformational analyses.
Siciliano's analysis starts with an old-fashioned question: what makes this piece co-
here?49 It is is particularly pressing in this Lied since it begins and ends in different keys
theory's originhowever far removedin the work of a nineteenth-century theorist, his work is
often cast as having some extra insight into nineteenth-century music. I tend to think that the
domain of music theory is the experience of theorists today (whenever that happens to be) and that
any charge of conceptual anachronism relies on an assumption that any interaction with historical
music is necessarily limited to the concepts available at that moment in history, and this assumption
is one that we by not means are required to take (though, of course, we may want to). However, I
take discussion of such historically-informed concepts as beyond the scope of this investigation. I am
concerned only with the motivations for theroetical concepts and phenomenal concepts in modern
theorists' reaction to music.
48Siciliano (2005).
49I do not mean this to have a negative connotation, just to say that it is a common concern for
earlier theorists whichfor better or worsehas fallen out of analytic vogue. Recall that providing
an alternate account of harmonic coherence beyond only tonal grammars was one of the mandates
of neo-Riemannian theory (Cohn (1998), 169). Of course, these days we tend not to insist on
coherence as a necessary condition for aesthetic value.
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Figure 4.12: Siciliano's Example 9: Reduction of Der Jüngling und der Tod.
(C] minor and B[ major), nullifying a traditional criterion for tonal coherence. Siciliano's
primary argument is that the structural harmonies of the piece follow a chain of PR trans-
formations connecting the opening sonority, C] minor, to the closing one, B[ major, (spelled
out: RPRPR). Coherence is obtained through the predictability of this single gesture in
the structural middleground. Instead of leaving the piece seeming random, meaningless, or
unexplanable adopting a neo-Riemannian framework allows it to cohere as a single con-
ceptual entity guided by a specific rule. Siciliano's reading is summarized in his Figure 4.12
(his Example 9).
The second large claim of the analysis is that despite never returning to a home key, the
piece obtains a specifically neo-Riemannian type of closure by regaining the orientation of
the opening harmony. Orientation here denotes the structure of the harmonies, idealized in
a graph showing parsimonious voice-leading, roughly analogous to the inversion or position
of a chord. The first structural harmony of the piece is spelled with the root, C] sounding in
the highest voice, and the next time we hear this orientation in a structural harmony is at
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the end with a B[ in the highest voice. The return to the starting orientation is supposed to
act like a return to a tonic key in a tonal composition, releasing tension created by moving
away from this orientation that allows the piece to end.50
The theoretical concept of orientation is introduced on an abstract, theoretical level,
but Siciliano devotes half of his analysis (two of the four total pages of text) to showing
how the displacements, each middleground gesture, are audible. This usually means that
in each instance of a participating chord the right-hand position of the piano matches the
orientation in Figure 4.12. The implicit ear-training exercise here is to hold in our mind's
ear the previous triads in the PR cycle, retaining not just their content, but their exact
intervallic profile.51 The shifts themselves are sometimes highlighted by the voice, but it is
always the piano that realizes the abstract structure.
However, just as we can clarify the PR cycle in our hearing by focusing on these elements,
we must also aurally bracket the elements of the music which could distract us. Consider,
for instance, what should be the most easily audible shift (that is the shift closest to the
surface of the actual music), the R from E minor to G major in m. 19. On this displacement,
Siciliano says:
As mentioned above, e- moves to immediately by R to G+, a move accomplished
50 Siciliano defines neo-Riemannian orientation for the sake of this analysis, but its use is not
limited to this piece.
51The attentive reader is no doubt aware of the large number of Schenkerian concepts which have
slipped into the analysis, chief among them being this idea of holding in the mind's ear (pro-
longation) and the idea of a structural middleground. While both ideas are originally Schenkerian
concepts, they have become so pervasive in modern analysis (tonal and non-tonal) that they no
marked seem particularly Schenkerian. Moreover, neither is tied to other essentially tonal features
of Schenkerian analysis (specifically the Ursatz ) which make the theory problematic for this sort of
music.
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Figure 4.13: Schubert, Der Jüngling und der Tod, mm. 1927
by the displacement of E to D. This occurs between the third and fourth beats
of measure 19, and is doubled for emphasis as cover tones in the melody. The
correct orientation of the G+ triad is presented in the piano right hand on beat
4. As in the E+ section, the voice returns to B (m. 22) and the piano echoes it
(m. 26). The B in m. 26 reminds us of the correct orientation (original registers)
of the voices, in preparation for the confirming cadence in measure 27.52
So, what kind of hearing are we presuming here? Figure 4.13 shows the measures in question
(mm. 19-27). In m. 19, we need to bracket both the melodic and bass motion to hear the
correct orientation of the inner voices and grasp the appropriate step in our PR cycle. The
doubling of the E-to-D motion might highlight the R in pitch-class space, but it does so at
the cost of obscuring the orientation of the triad. While the voice does in fact settle on a B
in m. 22, perhaps viewed as a delay of the appropriate upper voice, the bass doesn't give us
a confirming D until the end of the phrase (in preparation for the cadence).53
52Ibid., 98.
53These might be read as weaknesses of the analysisthat the bits it highlights are cherry picked
for the analysis without respect to their spontaneous saliencebut its important to realize also
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While not as obvious as Lewin's analysis of Klavierstück III, aspects of the three-phase
narrative are still in play. Siciliano's attention to the occurrence of triads of the appropriate
structure in the right hand of the piano can function like a phase 3 ear-training exercise,
phenomenalizing the abstract analysis in Figure 4.12. By learning to attend to these mo-
ments and learning to hear the theoretically defined middleground in this way, we develop a
phenomenal image of the theoretical concepts that shape the analysis. This is particularly
true for the idea of orientation. Returning to our starting orientation is supposed to give
a kind of closure, or at the very least, provide a kind of off-ramp from the PR cycle. This
idea exists at first only in theoretical terms as the position of an idealized triad but by fo-
cusing our attention in the way Siciliano helps us make the abstract, theoretical progression
phenomenal.
Absent from Siciliano's analysis, and neo-Riemannian analyses more generally, is the first
phase of the narrative: introspecting the spontaneous phenomenology of the piece to define
the formal transformations used in phase 2. For a neo-Riemannian analysis, this work is
already done; the analytical system comes pre-loaded with the P, L, and R parsimonious
transformations and there is rarely a need to define new contextual transformations in an
analysis, and when one does, they are almost always conceptualized as a combination of P,
L, and R.54
that this critical reading is itself full of analytical commitments. Specifically the idea that the most
important relationship to understand at any given time is that between the outer voices. These
voices may well be the most salient when listening, but if we follow the commitments highlighted
in Lewin's analysis, the point of neo-Riemannian analyses is not to account for what is heard
spontaneously (e.g. immediately intuited) but create a hearing of the piece as coherent under the
neo-Riemannian system that creates closure by returning to a specific orientation.
54See, for instance, Krumhansl (1998).
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4.4 A Segregated Analysis of Verdi's Macbeth, Act II,
scene 1
We can trace the three-phase methodology in the development of a neo-Riemannian analysis
of the recitative that opens the second act of Verdi's Macbeth, taking note of when and how
phenomenal and theoretical concepts are used.
I was drawn to this piece as a possible example of neo-Riemannian principles when at-
tending the opera. I noticed what seemed like a surprising relationship between the tonal
grammar of the introduction and the D[ major and G[ minor triads in m. 22-24. I do not
have perfect pitch, I did not have the score in front of me, and I was not listening especially
closely for harmonic relationships. I am not even sure why I did not write this off immedi-
ately as a run-of-the-mill deceptive cadence. I might not have been able to articulate this
at the moment, but something about the major third relationship between the anticipated
tonic resolution from the dominant C chord and this D[ triad surprised me and this was com-
pounded by the G[ minor triad. Whatever the specific relationship, I heard something that
activated a phenomenal concept, something that sounded like a neo-Riemannian operation,
even if I did not have an explicit neo-Riemannian concept to label it with just yet. Hearing
this relationship primed me to listen for more neo-Riemannian-sounding things relationships
and I also took note of the passage that follows the F] minor sequence (which ended up
being mm. 50-54).
To hunt down and formalize these progressions, I turned to the score to tabulate their
relationships. Like most longer passages, not every relationship from chord to chord is
best read in a neo-Riemannian context. Instead, it is more beneficial here to trace neo-
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Figure 4.14: Harmonic Reduction, Verdi, Macbeth, Act II, scene 1.
Riemannian operatorsand the recit's motion through the Tonnetzon the middleground.
Measures 19-38 unfold a descending major third cycle starting with the introduction in F
minor, a prolongation of D[ major in mm. 22-24, and a tonicizaion of A major in mm. 28-
35.55 The Leittonwechsel relationship provides the theoretical concept for the phenomenal
relationship heard between the F minor of the prelude and the D[ in mm. 22-24, which is
then prolonged by its minor subdominant. This then moves to a tonicization of A major,
another major third down the cycle in m. 29.
But before completing the cycle with a return to F minor, the cycle reverses in m. 37 to
D[, now written C], where it gains a chordal 7th leading it to tonicize F] minor, breaking
the neo-Riemannian major third cycle, in favor of more traditional tonal relationships. The
following progression is more-or-less a tonal sequence ending on the subdominant of F],
B minor in m. 50. The triad B is then transformed through roughly parsimonious voice-
leading (excepting the parallel progression from B major to C major) ending in F minor.
This moment effects a major articulation in the recit. Now the cycle is complete, returning
to the F minor it started on.
55Not just this recitative, but much of the opera is built around this F-D[-A cycle. See Budden
(1973).
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Figure 4.15: Path through the Tonnetz. Verdi, Macbeth, Act II, scene 1.
But the following measures imply a different interpretation. As Lord and Lady Macbeth
prolong the C major triad, assumed to be the dominant of F minor, in m. 58 the E of Lady
Macbeth's line becomes not the third of a C major triad, but the fifth of A minor, which then
functions as the minor subdominant to E major, which is further tonicized in the following
measures. This suggests a different analysis for the preceding F minor and C major triad
pair. Instead of analyzing them as a return to F minor with a tonic-to-dominant gesture,
one could conceptualize them as a minor-subdominant-to-tonic in C, mirroring the following
progression and prepared for by the minor subdominant prolongation of D[ way back in
m. 23. This reading allows the C major and E major to also participate in a major third
cycle, though moving in the opposite direction in the cycle in a different alley of the Tonnetz,
shown in Figure 4.15.
When looking at the recitative as a whole, there are some dramatic possibilities in this
reading. The first progression through the major third cycle occurs while Lady Macbeth tries
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to get the attention of her husband, demanding an explanation for his pensiveness, since he
is now King, as foretold by the three witches. As Macbeth takes over in m. 35 and following,
explaining that his concern is the second half of the prophecy, which foretells his eventual
downfall at the hands of Banquo and Fleance, we enter into the F] sequence, breaking the
cycle of descending thirds and returning to tonal grammar. As the tonal sequence ascends,
Lord and Lady Macbeth realize that they must also slay Banquo and his son. Yet, Lady
Macbeth is concerned that her husband may not have the intestinal fortitude to go through
with it and in mm. 54-55, at the return of F minor, she presses Macbeth for details, Where?
When? As Macbeth's resolve solidifies, the pattern of the major third cycle returns, but
shifts direction and becomes transposed, as if responding to the apprehension with which
the characters came to the scene with resolve.
The charts and reductions show all these relationships. Notice that after the original
motivation to look at the piece from a neo-Riemannian perspective, where I was led by
phenomenal concepts, this analysis has been done without reference to what the music or
relationships sound like. My decisions have been made on the basis of theoretical consistency,
mostly concerning the structure of chords and their abstract relationships without relying
at all on what the progression sounds like. With phase two complete, what can we do to
phenomenalize this reading?
In Lewin's analysis, the network was phenomenalized with an ear training exercise. In the
case of this recitative, I suggest something similar. Listen or imagine the first few minutes
of the recitative, from the introduction through the arrival of F] minor: one can focus aural
attention on the middleground of my harmonic reduction (shown with open noteheads).
We might prime our awareness of the appropriate phenomenal relationships, by playing the
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Figure 4.16: Harmonic background mm. 1-35, played before second listening.
chords themselves so that their phenomenal contentwhat they sound likeis clear from
the outset (shown in Figure 4.16). When turning back to the piece, one should keep the
sound of this middleground in mindretaining the phenomenal concepts involved in hearing
it. This allows us to begin to phenomenalize the neo-Riemannian aspects of the analysis.
In order to do this, we will need to deploy some Schenkerian training to hear the prolonged
harmonies as persisting over tonal interjections.
It is difficult, for me anyway, to describe what these relationships sound like without
reverting back the theoretical concepts I am trying to distance myself from, but I do think
I hear a difference. Perhaps it is best described as if all of the harmonies in this first bit of
the recitative participating in a single gesture, all a part of a descending thirds cycle instead
of the more unstructured progression we might expect from a recitative. I hear this with a
new phenomenal concept which maps onto the theoretical concepts that guided the analysis.
This brings us to the end of the entire three-phase process. The analysis given here
developed from a phenomenological kernel into a broad narrative for the entire recitative
with little reference to the sound of the music once the analysis got going. Following the
theoretically based neo-Riemannian analysis, I gave some guidance on how I thought one
might develop the phenomenal concepts to hear the new formal relationships. I tried to be
clear both about what sorts of concepts I was using and when and where I was concerned
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with experience or formal relationships. We do not usually get this explicitness when we read
analyses, but we can choose to interpret them as if they followed this three-phase model.
This permits us to make use of the rich and independently elegant formal apparatus of neo-
Riemannian analysis while giving a way for those apparatuses to engage phenomenology.
While exactly how the three-phase process is implemented has varied in each analysis,
the core idea is the shift from phase 2 to phase 3. Through analysis a theoretical concept
comes to have phenomenal meaning. In Lewin's analysis, the ear-training exercise allows
us to hear the important relationships which made the transformational analysis possible,
giving us the ability to trace the different passes through the transformational space. In
Siciliano's analysis, focusing on the concept of abstract orientation gave us new way to hear
phenomenal closure in a which which does not participate in the tonal methods of achieving
closure. Finally, in my own analysis of the Macbeth recitative, we have seen that abstract
theoretical concepts can also be phenomenalized again by invoking a kind of ear-training
exercise that sensitizes us to phenomenal aspects of the middleground.
4.5 Toward Mixed Approaches
The three-phase conception of transformational and neo-Riemannian analysis that I have ar-
gued for over the course of this chapter is not the only way to understand the neo-Riemannian
analytical process or the analyses they beget. While, for me anyway, a three-phase narrative
is the best way to understand the broad relationships between phenomenal and theoretical
concepts in these theories, when considering well-worn concepts (like the neo-Riemannian
functions), things are hazier. Indeed, my motivation for making a neo-Riemannian analysis
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of the Verdi recitative was my hearing something that sounded like a neo-Riemannian op-
eration. That is, relying on a phenomenal conceptualization of those operations. For some
theorists neo-Riemannian analysis may not fall under the rubric of segregated approaches,
but rather mixed approaches, the subject of the next chapter. Mixed approaches rely on
both types of conceptsphenomenal and theoreticalbut their admixture is much messier.
The most important difference of the mixed-variant, neo-Riemannian analysis is that it
is motivated by different goals. While the segregated approach is aimed at creating new
hearings by phenomenalizing theoretical concepts, mixed approaches are usually concerned
with communicating extant phenomenologies in the theoretical terms under consideration.
I suspect that this motivation seems much more natural to most analysts. Again, we are in
the business of analysis to understand our own experience and communicate the experiences
we have with others. But, as we will see in the following chapter, we must make certain
methodological accommodations in order to pull this off. How theories which rely on such
mixed concepts and the strengths and weaknesses thereof is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Complex Theories II: Mixed Concepts
5.1 Understanding Mixed Concepts
The previous chapter examined one way to coordinate phenomenal and theoretical concepts
into a complex analytical methodology. The primary aim for those segregated approaches
was to create a system that could invoke both kinds of concept while maintaining the va-
lidity of each type of engagement. Such systems did so by limiting the interaction between
conceptual types to the phase changes of the analysis. This allowed for the shift from one
way of thinking to another to be tightly controlled, heading off accidental conceptual cross-
pollination. But segregated approaches to analysis are perhaps even rarer than the so-called
simple approaches of chapters two and three. By far the most common ways of doing analysis
neither focus on a single conceptual type nor have a rigorous, consistent system for coordi-
nating different types. Instead, the majority of analytical approachesparticularly for tonal
musicinvoke both kinds of engagement by relying on concepts which have phenomenal and
theoretical elements. I call these mixed concepts. As we will see, these concepts' looseness
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Figure 5.1: Analysis of Dominant.
of reference creates new analytical problems while also permitting more flexible analytical
systems.
In this chapter, my primary example of a mixed approach will be Schenkerian analysis,
but by no means is this the only analytical system which uses mixed concepts. Indeed, early
in chapter one I provided a conceptual analysis of the common mixed concept dominant.
There my aim was to show that the word dominant can stand for multiple concepts, differ-
entiated at levels of sense and reference.1 Here I will focus on the complex concept denoted
by the word dominant, which includes both phenomenal and theoretical conceptualizations.
As we turn toward a more detailed account of mixed concepts, two important complications
come to the fore. First, there is a methodological danger built into using mixed concepts.
One might apply a mixed concept based on one's experience and then draw analytical con-
clusions from its theoretical aspect, or vice versa. We employ mixed concepts using different
1If you are in need of a refresher, Dominant may stand for a concept which refers to what it is
like to hear a dominant (a phenomenal concept) or it might stand for one of a number of concepts
that refer to an abstract object. These latter, theoretical concepts are in turn differentiated by their
modes of presentation, which include the triad built on 5ˆ and the triad that usually leads to the tonic
(both theoretical concepts). We may even wish to go so far as to say that in these cases dominant
does not actually stand for a single thing at all, but is instead is a sort of homonym with itself.
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types of criteria leading to different implicationsquite aside from the different discursive
styles that befit each type of concept. Treating a single music-theoretical idea as a mixture of
these two concepts permits a kind of slippage between the two ways of engaging with music.
Without a methodological system like transformational theory in place, there is nothing pre-
venting me from, for example, asserting that a given chord is a dominant on the basis of pitch
structure, then going on to argue that the phenomenal profile of the dominant influences
the passage in some way. Believing that a chord is a dominant on theoretical grounds does
not imply that one will hear it, nor does hearing some phenomenal content necessarily imply
that the right theoretical elements are present. Mixed concepts obscure this. In a mixed
approach, both aspects of the concept are used freely; we constantly pivot back-and-forth
between the two, with fewer explicit or universal goals to guide our conceptual usage.
Given that mixed approaches are so easy to misuse if the analyst is not especially careful,
why not avoid this epistemological mess altogether, working either in a conceptually pure
environment or insisting on a strict methodology for preventing conceptual contamination?
The fact is that the messiness of the analytical process rarely follows such strictures. Using
mixed concepts can generate new or different ways of thinking about and hearing the music
precisely from the bridge they form between theory and experience. This permits a variety
of important analytical strategies, and opens up many opportunities for creative analyses.
But the flexibility that mixed concepts provide analysts is paid for by their readers. Because
the narratives of mixed analyses are so complicated, readers rarely see precisely how analysts
come to use a given concept. This makes the conceptual resources of a mixed analysis difficult
to parse, thereby making these analyses more difficult to clearly understand and critique.
The second thing to consider when looking closely at mixed concepts is more technical.
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In chapter one and throughout this dissertation, I have invoked the conceptual structure
described by Peacocke, according to which concepts conceptual structure is analogous to the
structure of words' meaning in Frege's theory of language.2 This theory of concepts is useful
because it allows us to conceptualize the same thing, or reference, differently by taking it
under different modes of presentation. But this is not quite the way that we use mixed
concepts like dominant. Usually, when talking about a mixed concept, we act as if the level
of conceptualization were the lexical level, not the level of sense. This tendency is why many
theories of concepts take lexical concepts to be the most basic and simple examples.3 If
one adopts the concepts-as-sense hypothesis, however, then one finds that there might be
multiple distinct phenomenal and theoretical concepts that are all denoted by the same word.
This confuses what the conceptual units are. Dominant is not itself a concept but a kind of
complex superconcept, a set of concepts, with each subconcept having a sense and reference
but all called by the same word. Put another way, our language has a lower resolution
than our thinking, there are many different things that we can identifyintellectually and
experientiallyall of which we call dominants. This can tempt us into thinking that all
of these concepts are in fact a single concept, and that all of the different concepts denoted
by that word are invoked whenever that word is uttered. While being extra precise about
our conceptual usage might make for a more careful claim, this fails to match the habits of
thought and discourse that surround mixed concepts in music theory. Instead our analyses
tend to treat these as simple lexical concepts, defined any way you please. This might seem
2See Section 1.2 above.
3This is the case, for example with Ray Jackendoff's so called neoclassical theory of concepts
(Jackendoff (1999)), seeing words as signs of basic concepts also underlies theories like Lakoff and
Johnson (1980).
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like a sloppy methodology, but, as we will see, it is often precisely this tension, revealed
in theory, analysis, and analytical disagreement, that provide some of the most important
insights of mixed approaches.4
Half Cadence as a Mixed Concept
We can develop our understanding of mixed conceptsand especially of the challenges that
come with using themby seeing them deployed in analysis. The concept half-cadence is
an extension of the mixed concept dominant, invoking a number of additional sub-concepts,
but it remains among the most basic concepts in tonal theory. L. Poundie Burstein's recent
work exploring the complexities of half-cadential identification serves as a good case study
for the complexity of half-cadence-concept attribution in practice.5 Despite their ubiquity
and seeming simplicity, half cadences resist a simple definition and Burstein finds a number
of counterexamples that undercut any given theoretical conceptualization.
Burstein's article provides a large array of musical examples (nearly forty). Figure 5.2
reproduces two of them to highlight some specific complications we might run into in identi-
fying half cadences. Figure 5.2(a) shows Burstein's analysis of the opening measures of the
second movement of Mozart's Sonata for Piano in G, K. 283. As his analytical commentary
shows, the hypermeter, harmonic rhythm, and thematic content are all consistent with a
half cadence at the end of m. 2, but the accelerated surface rhythm makes it difficult to hear
4I want to be very clear that it is not my aim to propose a radically altered or more formally valid
analytical methodology aimed at preventing conceptual cross-pollination. Carrying the botanical
analogy one step too far, it is exactly through cross-pollination that plants produce fitter offspring.




(a) Mozart, Sonata for Piano in G, K. 283, II, mm. 1-4. After Burstein
(b) Beethoven, Sonata for Piano in C, Op. 1, No. 3, I, mm. 1-2. After Burstein.
Figure 5.2: Two of Burstein's slippery, half-cadential(-esque) events.
this as a moment of closure befitting a cadential arrival.6 Example 5.2(b) shows a different
kind of problem: the harmony is right and the textural break would normally imply a half
cadence, but because there has not been a real phrase before this point, it does not seem
to make sense to consider this as a cadence. We usually think of cadences as being ends of
phrases, and there is not really a phrase here to end. In both of these examples some theoret-
ical definition is satisfied, but we are hesitant to actually call these moments half cadences.
The cadential arrival is complicated by conflict between different musical parameters, which
in turn causes conflict in concept attribution. A general definition is undercut either by
formal elements or by phenomenology. We think of half cadences as obtaining under specific
circumstances that are not just harmonic but also thematic, metrical, rhetorical, etc. etc.
We may recognize that the sufficient conditions of some definition for half cadence are met,
6Notice that in Burstein's analytical commentary, all of the terms used for and against the
half-cadential hypothesis are mixedthey can refer to an abstract, theoretical idea or to a certain
experience.
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but the moment in question just does not sound like a half cadence. Moreover, because we
assume that such a basic concept could not cause so much analytical trouble, we may be
unprepared to judge situations where some features of the mixed concept are present while
others are not.
Burstein's numerous analyses show that the half-cadence concept we use in analysis is
not as simple as just a cadence on V. We might break this down into two different points.
First there is unclarity about what kind of V counts as supporting a half cadence. Second, it
is also unclear what we mean when we call something a cadence.7 William Caplin has tried
to make some headway on this latter point, differentiating the various parameters which
might participate in a cadential function. He defines a cadential arrival, the moment when
we have the actual end of a structural unit, as distinct from the cadential idea, the span
of the music leading up to the cadence which causes us to anticipate the cadential arrival,
from the cadential progression, the actual harmony at the cadential arrival that confirms a
tonality.8
Both Burstein's analysis and Caplin's terminology offer fixes for the inconsistencies in our
theoretical conceptualization of half cadences. Caplin sees analysts fusing several theoretical
concepts into a single term, creating confusion between analysts when the definition of that
term is assumed. Burstein's numerous examples point to places where our concept of half-
cadence breaks down but his explanations (both of the problem and of the reasons behind
7On the former point, Burstein points out that some theorists nowadays have a very small, but
well-defined scope of what kind of V can support a half cadence: a root position triad. Contra this
position, Burstein argues that this definition of the half cadence conforms neither to the history of
the term nor to several moments which seem, otherwise, to be half cadential. Burstein (2014).
8Caplin (1998), 42-43.
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each conceptualization) rely on theoretical concepts and tend to be ad hoc, addressing each
complexity as it arises and not trying to provide a new general definition. Addressing these
complications and offering a more nuanced or specific way to think about these analytical
bugaboos is important work, and more detail is rarely detrimental to analytical clarity. But
while clarifying these terms can make our analytical claims more precise, ultimately it does
little to differentiate phenomenally attributed cadential arrivals, ideas, or progressions from
theoretically attributed versions of the same.
In practice, we do not just identify cadences on the basis of their formal properties; more
often than not we use our earsthat is, we deploy phenomenal concepts. Indeed, Burstein
points out that when the features determined by the score are ambiguous, recordings can
sometimes provide some insight into how we might identify one cadential gesture or another,
or, at least, identify how that particular performer understood it.9
We might imagine that this involves two steps. Upon hearing the excerpt we think some-
thing like, I heard the performer pause a little bit more there, so I deduce that this moment
was a half cadence. That is, first we pick up on the performer's interpretation of the music,
as they use unnotated nuances to push our perception toward one hearing or another.10 Then
we quickly convert these heard nuances into some theoretically conceptualized category or
linguistic terms. Under this reading, the concept of half cadence need only be theoretically
conceptualized; it need not have any phenomenal image since the phenomenology is trans-
lated into formal properties before the concept is applied. But this seems likely not the
9Burstein makes this argument in reference to, for instance, the second movement of Mozart's
Sonata for Piano in G, K. 283, mm. 1-4, citing recordings by Gabor Antalffy and Sharona Joshua
and making them available online. Burstein (2014).
10Raffmann (1993) provides a sound theory of the experience and ineffability of musical nuance.
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case. It is much more common, I think, that we simply allow our phenomenology to guide
our analytical judgments without always passing through a theoretical conceptualization.
Instead, we identify the cadence based on what the music sounds like and then find things
in the notation or explicate things in the recording which support our reading ex post facto.
This makes the process of identification more streamlined (there is just one step now),
but it makes the half-cadenceconcept more complex. Over the course of his study, Burstein
makes few explicit references to cadences identified on the basis of their phenomenology, but
he does mention the sense or impression of a half cadence or authentic cadence a number
of times, and I take these as references to the phenomenal contents associated with half
cadences.11
The conference presentation version of this research supports this reading. During the
talk, Burstein makes extensive use of recordings, often asking the audience to judge the
cadence based on hearing alone before showing the score or detailing the ways that the
elements presented in the scores push back against a traditional, theoretical conceptualization
of the half cadence.12
Understanding the complexity of mixed concepts, both in their structure and attribution,
is crucial for understanding how they behave in analysis. Continuing with Burstein's study,
he comments on the importance of seemingly low-level interpretations like cadence identifi-
cation for broader analytical claims. Cadences often play an important role in determining
11Ibid.
12Indeed, the fact that in presentations and teaching we often use recordings to illustrate theoret-
ical points is indicative of the mixed nature of these concepts, of our belief that to really understand
whatever the point happens to be, we must grasp it not just theoretically but phenomenally also.
Burstein (2010).
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Figure 5.3: Haydn, String Quart in G minor, op. 20, no 3, I, mm. 1-7
the bounds and shape of deeper structures. As Burstein points out in reference to one of
his examples, [D]etermining the background voice-leading structure of this movement may
well depend on the fragile decision of whether [a] V...really ends its phrase and is only sort
of attached to the tonic [that follows it], or whether this V really resolves to the tonic...from
which it is only kind of separated on the musical surface.13 In the context of Schenkerian
analysis, the differences in structure can be quite extreme, as often half cadences imply
interrupted structures, whereas authentic cadences would just continue a tonic prolongation.
Not only do the complicated theoretical aspects of cadence type attribution discussed by
Burstein complicate analysis, but, because mixed concepts can be attributed on the basis
of theoretical or phenomenal criteria, our analyses may slide from one to the other, as a
result, sometimes attempting to support phenomenal assertions with theoretical evidence
or vice versa. Another example presented in Burstein's article, though one not discussed
in depth, is the opening of Haydn's string quartet, op. 20, no. 3.14 The curious moment is
the downbeat of m. 4. Is this a half cadence, implying a period structure for the phrase, or




or, at least, difficult to affix a single label to. During the cadential idea and arrival in m. 4,
I experience it as a half cadence (that is, I deploy my half-cadence concept on the basis
of its phenomenal aspects). Immediately following from this V chord, though, my sense of
the half cadence begins to evaporate. A consequence of my half-cadence attribution is a
belief that these measures are the antecedent of a period, but then m. 5 does not go as I
expect. The prolonged D in the cello weakens my sense of the half cadence. As the note is
held, the short articulation that I expected seems stretched out, losing its cadential identity
and becoming folded into the following progression to the tonic. This kind of experience,
prospecting a moment to be one thing but retrospectively hearing it as another, is notated
by Janet Schmalfeldt with a becoming sign (⇒) indicating that the one musical element
becomes transformed into another, and that neither label alone describes what is going on.15
Approaching m. 7 I deploy my phenomenal half-cadence concept, but then this moment
becomes a mid-phrase progression: HC⇒mid-phrase V.
Keeping all this in mind, let me turn to the implications for a broader structural read-
ing of the phrase. Figure 5.4 shows the two voice-leading analyses implied by the different
readings of m. 4. The theoretical implications of each attribution are particularly important
in a Schenkerian context. Typically, structural half-cadences in Schenkerian theory imply
interruptions at some level, usually construed as 2ˆV. Given these implications of the theo-
retical concept, the half-cadential reading seems much less plausible. The upper voice leaps
down to an inner voice and there are few valid readings that convincingly give an A, 2ˆ, in
the upper voice. The implied A over the half-cadence is here asserted entirely on a (theo-
15Schmalfeldt (2011), 9.
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(a) Voice-leading graph showing asserting an imperfect authentic cadential reading.
(b) Voice-leading graph asserting a half cadential reading.
Figure 5.4: Consequent structure of two cadential readings in Haydn, String Quart in G
minor, op. 20, no 3, I, mm. 1-7
retical) belief that it ought to be thereparticularly with the leap up to the B[, rejoining
the fundamental register. Moreover, a half-cadential reading implies restarting the phrase
model and the fundamental line, with the best candidate being the I chord over a dominant
pedal on the upbeat before m. 5. This is technically possible (the analysis is well formed),
but it seems like an implausible reading.
We see from these different analyses that the half-cadence concept can be deployed
through either phenomenal or theoretical means. The reasons for attributing the concept
differs depending on which aspect of that concept is active at that moment. Multiple ways
to attribute this complex concept may lead to chimerical analyses that assert a half-cadence,
perhaps on the basis of the phenomenology described above, but then fail to follow through
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on the theoretical expectations and consequences of that attribution. Notice that not only
is there a major articulation at the half cadence interruption, but the Kopfton changes as
well, a result of the formal criteria of a grammatical voice-leading graph. These are the sorts
of decisions Burstein refers to when citing the importance of these relatively low-level and
presumably unambiguous decisions.
With all this in hand we can work though a conceptual analysis of half cadence, shown
in Figure 5.5. Like the dominant, the conceptualization has a fundamental split between
phenomenal and theoretical aspects at the mode of presentation. While half cadence is
a significantly more complicated concept than dominant (indeed, it must be by definition
because it usually includes the dominant), this complexity only really arises on the theoretical
side of things. This is because it is difficult to break down phenomenal contents into simpler
contents while maintaining their identity. Analyzing phenomenal content in this way would
involve changing what that content is, and it is unclear how what that content is like could
be preserved through this process. We may know that having two experiences at the same
time might lead to a mixed phenomenal experience, or that the feature that causes a certain
phenomenology is technically reducible to component features, but the phenomenology of
that experience is not merely the combination of those two constituent experiences.16
This is not the case for theoretical conceptualization of the half cadence, where the half
cadences is usually defined as that cadence which ends on a dominant. While, as Burstein
16We can see a straightforward example in considering colors: while of course a mixture of
blue and yellow will yield green, our phenomenal experience of green is not merely a sum of our
experiences of blue and yelloweven if we know that what we are observing is in fact just a very
fine mixturesay the pigments in a paint. In the same fashion, our phenomenal experience of a half
cadence is not merely reducible to an experience of a cadence plus a dominant. Their combination
produces an experience which while it may have some resemblances to those simpler experiences,
does not consist only of those resemblances.
198
Figure 5.5: Conceptual Analysis of Half Cadence
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shows, the complicated nature of each argument of this definition does not necessarily make
half-cadence attribution an easy task, issues tend to arise either with the attribution of a
dominant or the attribution of the cadence. If we agree that both obtain, then we usually
do think we have an instance of a half cadence.
5.2 Methodological Challenges Posed by Schenkerian
Theory
The complications implicit in parsing any mixed approach are complicated by the history
of Schenkerian analytical practice. Schenkerian analysis is, perhaps uniquely, both broad
and diverse in its application and probably the most successful theory for advanced tonal
analysis. Different theorists approach Schenkerian theory differently and expect different
sorts of things from it, and all these complications are compounded by the structure and
content of the theory itself.
Schenkerian analysis draws on multiple traditions each of which carries its own mo-
tivations and conceptual structures. The complexity and ubiquity of the theory is well
summarized by Drabkin:
That which is called Schenkerian theory is a complex set of regulatory principles
that was initially intended to explain the tonal music of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries; it is at the same time a synthesis of many traditions, embracing
Fuxian counterpoint, the thorough-bass traditions of Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach
and late nineteenth-century harmonic theory. It is at once a sophisticated expla-
nation of tonality, but also an analytical system of immense empirical power.17
17Drabkin (2002), 812.
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Beyond harmonic and contrapuntal theory, many modern formal theorists invoke Schenkerian
concepts in their theories of form, analysts take different positions on the relationship between
Schenkerian theory and perception, and the exact practices of graphing are nearly as diverse
as the theorists who create them.18 This diversity and the relative lack of a unifying approach
make it all the more difficult to understand the epistemology and methodology of Schenkerian
theory's modern incarnations.
I identify four main difficulties in analyzing the conceptual makeup of Schenkerian theory:
1. The bibliography is larger and more diverse than any approach studied so far. It
includes not just modern monographs, but historical texts, commentaries, and peda-
gogical texts.
2. The applications of the theory are practically as numerous as its practitioners with
analysts bringing their own motivations and commitments to their work.
3. The influence of the theory's namesake is not so far gone as to be absent, but the
theory as practiced today has evolved well beyond Schenker's theory.
4. As a lingua franca of modern (North American) music theory, the concepts that con-
stitute it are assumed to be understood by everyone in approximately the same way.
The store of resources to draw upon is vast in comparison to those of other theories. In
chapters two and three, because the specific approaches tended to revolve around a single
18See, for instance, Hepokoski and Darcy's Z-PAC (2006) and especially the work of Janet
Schmalfeldt (2011) for formal concepts with a Schenkerian parentage. DeBellis (2010) and Temper-
ley (2011) have recently written on the relationship between observation and perception in Schenke-
rian theory.
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theorist's work, the scope was both more manageable and relatively coherent. In chapter
four, the requisite bibliography was broader but was still only a small corner of the music
theory literature. More importantly, all these approaches tended to have explicit motivations
and epistemological frameworks, usually being drawn from theorists from similar contexts
working together with similar epistemological perspectives. This is not so with Schenkerian
theory.
Moreover, Schenker himself inhabits a sort of nebulous space of influence. Many Schenke-
rians can trace their pedigree back to Schenker somehow, but at the same time, most of
Schenker's own philosophical framework has eroded, either through conscious erasure (as is
the case with Oster's appendix to Free Composition) or through an unconscious lack of atten-
tion to theoretical foundations in favor of analytical tools.19 As a result, most of Schenker's
own reasons for believing in his system have been excised from modern analytical practice
and relegated (or promoted) to history of theory. Sometimes this epistemological vacuum is
explicitly filled in, but more often than not the analytical tools persist with little attention
to what the symbols are supposed to mean beyond their relationship to each other or to
some idealized grammar for their use.20
But neither are Schenker's original ideas entirely absent from modern practice; and in
more advanced scholarship, Schenker's writing and analyses remain important touchstones.
By contrast, this is not the case for neo-Riemannian theory. The conceptual and historical
distance from Hugo Riemann is enough to make the story quite different. Whereas Schenke-
19Rothstein (1986 [1990]) presents an engaging account of the history of Schenkerian theory in
America, foregrounding the way it was shaped by its practitioners to suit the American academy.
20We will explore the former situation more thoroughly with reference to Brown (2005) below.
202
rian analysis is mostly a continuous practice from Schenker on down, neo-Riemannian theory
was invented in the 1990s by a sort of re-discovery and re-appropriation of some of Riemann's
terms and methodology, fundamentally changing the concepts that underlie them.21
Compounding this diversity of resources and underlying explanations, Schenkerian theory
is a standard part of most graduate and advanced undergraduate curricula, thereby becoming
a sort of lingua franca for tonal analysis. As a result many, many tonal analyses may use
the tools of Schenkerian analysis, even if they are not meant to show hierarchies, trace the
voice leading, present a fundamental structure, or do other sorts of work typically expected
of a Schenkerian analysis. This glut of analyses would seem more manageable, though, if
there was a consistent set of principles or guidelines that clearly informed all of them, but
no such unifying approach exists. The broad strokes are usually similar, but the intricacies
of their execution are idiosyncratic.
In this chapter I address these challenges mostly by limiting the scope of my engagement
with the theory. My overall goal is not to present an exhaustive account of all the different
conceptual resources used and created across Schenkerian approaches, but to display how
the mixture of phenomenal and theoretical concepts occurs. To make this study broadly
applicable, I focus on a core bibliography that I think is common to most modern Schenke-
rians. Generally, I limit my meta-analyses to three types of texts: textbooks, Schenkerian
classics, and colloquia, each of which provides different windows into how Schenkerian ideas
21A more faithful re-imagining of Riemann's theory for modern music theorists is found in Har-
rison (1994). Analyzing the differences and similarities between neo-Riemannian theory and Rie-
mann's own theory has been quite productive in some cases, but when it comes down to it, the
conceptual structure of neo-Riemannian theory just is not the same as that proposed by Riemann.
See, for instance Rings (2011b).
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are conceptualized.
These differences in practice make Schenkerian theory more complicated, but also more
productive. Relatively few Schenkerian theorists take terminological or conceptual clarifica-
tion as their goal, and Schenkerian articles are usually analytically focused: it is assumed
that readers will understand the concepts in approximately the same way as the analyst.
The ubiquity of Schenkerian theory and its concepts leads to unclarity about the nature of
these concepts and assumptions about what terms mean, which may not be shared. Failing
to get clear on these features of analytical practice results in unnecessary disagreement later
on.
The remainder of this chapter unfolds three strategies to understand how mixed con-
cepts work in Schenkerian analysis. First, I examine the most basic Schenkerian concepts
themselves: effects. Following this, I trace how a series of texts treats a single more complex
concept: the linear progression. Finally, I explore an instance of analytical disagreement be-
tween two Schenkerians and show that as the disagreements between the analysts are teased
out in greater and greater detail, the underlying reliance on different aspects of the mixed
concepts becomes more and more apparent.
5.3 Effects and the Origins of Mixture
Schenker's theory already demonstrated some degree of conceptual mixture in its inception.
The best candidate for the basic conceptual vocabulary of Schenkerian theory are effects.
How effects work in Schenker's thought are clarified in Joseph Dubiel's review-essay on
Schenker's Counterpoint and further explored in the first chapter of Robert Snarrenberg's
204
monograph, Schenker's Interpretive Practice.22 This section aims to place the notion of
effects described by these authors into the framework explored in this dissertation. I will
argue that the way Schenker talks about effects and their functions, described by Dubiel and
Snarrenberg, permits this understanding of effects and further that the graphing techniques
of modern Schenkerian theory have more thoroughly mixed these effect-concepts than they
were even in Schenker's own writings. Effects are conceptually mixed at the most basic level
and this sort of foundational mixture results in claims and methodology that is similarly
mixed.
In his review-essay, Dubiel first defines effects as what will (normally) happenin the
mind's ear of a qualified listener, presumablywhen certain things are written. Dubiel
casts the main aim of Counterpoint as accounting for these effects.23 He argues that, unlike
Fux's Gradus ad Parnassum, the text is not meant to be taken as a collection of proscriptions
and restrictions on composition, but as a study of the consequences of various compositional
decisions.24 It is tempting to understand these effects as basically experientialDubiel
talks, cautiously, about these effects as being on or perceived by a mind's earindicating
something like a phenomenal conceptualization. Indeed, we find Schenker himself using
the phrase psychological effects a few times throughout Counterpoint.25 Based on this,
we might think that the most ready-to-hand interpretation is to understand effects as an
idealized phenomenology caused by the sounda sort of phenomenal image of the noumenal
22Dubiel (1990), Snarrenberg (1997).
23Dubiel (1990), 294.
24Ibid.
25Schenker (1910 [1987]), 10 and 26
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Figure 5.6: Example 1 from Dubiel (1990)
object. But as the theory becomes realized in practice, we find features attributed to effects
that makes their proposed identity with phenomenal content problematic.
This tension comes to the fore as Schenker compares his own understanding of the effects
of a passage with that of one of his perennial rivals, Hugo Riemann. In Counterpoint Schenker
sets up a disagreement between himself and Riemann (which is recounted by Dubiel in
his review).26 The debate is over how to understand the perfect twelfth between the C
in the bass and the G in the right hand of the second measure of Figure 5.6 (Schenker's
Example 420, Dubiel's Example 8). Schenker and Riemann would agree, of course, that
twelfths are normally consonant. That is, twelfths communicate the effect of consonance,
orequivalentlycause us to attribute the consonance concept. But in this passage, the
G, while making a twelfth with the bass, displaces the A[ root of the chord. Riemann, it
seems, is happy to call this a local dissonance, the G may be technically consonant with the
bass, but dissonant within the overriding context. The harmony of the passage causes us not
26Dubiel (1990), 314-316.
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to attribute the phenomenal concept of consonance, even if the notes on the page satisfy a
theoretical conceptualization of the same. Schenker, though, has trouble being this flexible;
he cannot abide depriving the twelfth of its proper consonant effect. Instead he argues that
the consonant effect still obtains and is merely papered over by the retardation.
From this passage, Dubiel points out that it is possible to infer...that any `effect' taught
in species counterpoint might under the right conditions be `prolonged' to the point of im-
perceptibility.27 This is a serious problem for a theory of effects as phenomenal content. If
effects were simply phenomenal content then they would only occur in conscious experience.
This is a definitional feature of phenomenal contentthere cannot be any such thing as
unconscious phenomenal content because this content is individuated precisely by its con-
scious experience. And if effects cannot be phenomenal content, then effect-concepts, the
main conceptual vocabulary of Schenkerian thought, cannot be only a species of phenomenal
concepts. If we want to attribute the effect-concept consonance to this interval at a level so
prolonged as to be imperceptible, then this attribution cannot be of a phenomenal concept,
only a theoretical one.
We have seen in earlier chapters the flexibility of phenomenal content. The contingencies
of individual histories can cause what experiences are like to differ from person to person.
This is another strike against a theory of effects as phenomenal concepts, since effects are
meant to always obtain at the occurrence of a given musical configuration. At the very
beginning of Counterpoint Schenker declares,
27Ibid., 316. Dubiel points out earlier in his essay that prolongation in Schenker's writing
doesn't quite mean what it usually means in modern Schenkerian theory. In Counterpoint what is
prolonged are not pitches or harmonies but rules, not in the sense that they are stretched out, but
that they are applied to novel situations.
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[Counterpoint] teaches the most characteristic effect of tonesone might say the
properties of their movement...the beginning artist learns that tones, organized
in such and such a way, produce one particular effect and none other, whether
he wishes it or not. One can predict the effect: it must follow.28
This runs against the apparent mutability of the phenomenal content. Dubiel explains
Schenker's position in more detail:
Since Schenker is so determined that this particular set of norms not be considered
optional (and, very probably, since he himself was unable to get on without them),
he finds himself inclined toward an image of them as psychologically inevitable
(and perhaps even physically real), and toward an image of contrapuntal (and
other) teaching as the awakening of perceptions of what is already there but
unnoticed, rather than as the installation of a system that might prove useful for
a particular repertory.29
The idea of awakening an unnoticed precept is problematic in precisely the same way
as being prolonged to imperceptibility. Unexperienced phenomenal content is impossible; if
effects can be present but unexperienced, then they cannot, at base, be phenomenal contents.
It seems improbable, now, that the effects Schenker describes are, in fact, psychologically
immutable. So how should we understand this claim? Are these contradictions merely the
result of an outdated understanding of psychology or from Schenker's well-known critical
commitments and stylistic conservatism?30 These are possible interpretations, but, in my
28Schenker (1910 [1987]), 14.
29Dubiel (1990), 314.
30Nathan Fleshner provides, for instance, a specifically Freudian reading of Schenker's under-
standing of psychology; see, Fleshner (2012). Under this perspective, the norms are not, at base phe-
nomenal but generated by unconscious processes which may consciously manifest or not. Whether
or not this where Schenker was coming from, this does not seem to be the way that contemporary
Schenkerian analysts think about musical experience. My engagement with Schenker's own text
here is motivated less by an attempt to understand what Schenker meant, and more about coming
to understand how his description of contrapuntal rules has influenced the work of contemporary
analysts.
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view, they fail to do justice to the way that these tensions have been adopted by Schenkerians.
Indeed, it is often by directly struggling with what seem to us now to be contradictory claims
of that the theory becomes most productive. Asserting that effects are mixed concepts allows
us to have it both ways. At times we may treat effects (and attribute effect-concepts) as
the phenomenological/psychological effects that the pitches have on us, how we take them
in perception, yet at other times we want these effects, and their structural implications to
persist even when absent from phenomenology.
Looking more closely at what phenomenal aspects of these effects are like, one comes upon
other questions. Are the effects communicated by a passage just the phenomenal image of
the sound perceived; are they merely the phenomenal content of the sound experience? Or
are they our more complex reactions to these experiences, like emotions or expectations,
which result from having that experience? If a musical gesture has the effect of a passing
tone, does this mean it has phenomenal content similar to a actual passing tone or that the
aesthetic meaning, let us say, of the passage is similar? Put another wayis a passing tone
itself the effect or does it have effects?
There is room in Schenker's text, I think, to consider both interpretations. At times, the
effect just seems to be some specific note configuration. We see this most often in discussions
of the basic dissonances of counterpoint: the passing tone and the neighbor tone. In the
course of discussing the prohibition of tritones in a cantus firmus, for instance, we find,
[I]n the context of the large configuration that grows out of the tonic scale degree,
the eighth-note G, lying between C] and F], in reality produces more the effect
of a passing tone...than that of a tritone.31
31Schenker (1910 [1987]), 55-56.
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In this passage, the effect seems to be of communicating a passing tone note configuration, not
some additional musical experience. At other times, the way Schenker talks about effects
seems to point beyond note configurations. He discusses, for instance, similar motion,
[which] is to be interpreted in its psychological effect as a kind of agreement between the two
voices to strive toward a common goal.32 The effect is not the similar motion itself, but an
aesthetic experience or image or idea that comes from similar motion, an effect of striving
together which is generated by the note configuration.
Snarrenberg's analysis of the central effects of Schenker's theory also points toward the
latter understanding of effects, that they are additional aesthetic attitudes created by the
note configurations. Many of these effects, according to his analysis, are complex with
constituent effects which compose them. The passing effect is Snarrenberg's first and best
example. He calls the effect of the passing tone transience which depends on the prior
existence of the effect of quiescence or stability.33 Snarrenberg defines the effect in full as
follows:
Transience: if tones are configured in such a way as to produce the succession
of effectsconsonancedissonanceconsonancethe total configuration will pro-
duce the effect of transition from one place of stability to another. That, in
short, is the effect of passing.34
So the effect of a passing tone is already complex, consisting of more basic effects like





to the passing effect.35 Returning to Schenker's claim about the passing effect of the
tritone in a cantus firmus, the effect of a `passing' tone is really the effect of transience
from consonance/stability to dissonance/instability back to consonance/stability. We might
call something the effect of a passing tone, but this is really a shorthand to refer to the
collection of effects which accompany that, usually simpler, note configuration. All this is in
favor of the construal of effects as the aesthetic results of note configurations which extend
beyond the construction itself.
This release of effects from their prototypical note configuration, moreover is cited as
Schenker's crucial insight. As Snarrenberg puts it, All of the basic concepts [of Schenkerian
theory] were a part of the musical discourse that he learned from others...His ingenuity lay in
realizing the possibility of extending these concepts to non-paradigmatic tonal configurations,
ones more complex than simple passing tones, suspensions, vertical chords, and melodic
motives.36
These analyses give the correct picture, I think, of what Schenker himself was up to.
While some of the language that Schenker himself uses is opaque or inconsistent, the un-
derlying trends, highlighted by Dubiel and Snarrenberg, show an understanding of effects as
basically psychological experiences that result from how the music is structured. But this
understanding is complicated by Schenker's perspective on psychology, by his belief that
a given musical configuration must result in a certain psychological effect instead of, say,
merely tending to have that result. If this is one's psychological position, then the prospect of




a regulatory system to encourage the right kind of automatic attributions becomes possible.
Modern Schenkerian theory has changed much since Schenker's founding texts, with
the largest shifts being away from theories of tonality to a more thorough working out of
the analytical system. The often tacit conceptual frameworks that these approaches draw
on, however, have different perspectives on psychology and necessity in experience. While
there seemed to be some mixture in Schenker's use of the notion of effects, it once was also
possibleassuming a certain perspective on psychologyto make the complexity go away.
For us, though, this is no longer an option. The reality of perception is that some experiences
are not inevitably had by all and in order to make sense of Schenker's still-valuable analytical
tools, we need to think about them differently. A result has been an even more thorough
mixture of theoretical and phenomenal engagement in practice.
In part, this increase in mixture comes from attempts to accommodate Schenker's claim
that some effects will always obtain for certain note configurations. Taking this as a given,
the analyst must permit both experiential and abstract thinking in their process. This is
what allows us to say, conforming with Schenker, that a passage has the effect of a passing
tone (say, the entire second theme and development of a sonata) without necessarily having
a phenomenology that clearly resembles that of a second species passing tone. The analytical
system's recursive structure allows us to extrapolate to levels that are no longer phenomenally
graspable. Conversely, we might wish for a theoretical realization of something that sounds
like a passing tone, permitting us to create an analysis that matches our phenomenology. In
short, and contrary to what Schenker does most of the time, we use effect-concepts freely
activating the concepts both from abstract relationships shown in a score (using theoretical
concepts) but also from phenomenal experiences.
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Figure 5.7: Mozart, Minuet in D, K. 355, mm. 1-5, reduction.
This conceptual fluidity also allows Schenkerian theory to sharpen our hearing. The
relationship between the theoretical and phenomenal aspects of the mixed concepts is such
that invoking any one of these constituent aspects means invoking the effect-concept. Part
of what we learn when we learn Schenkerian theory is to broaden the grasp of these effect-
concepts, and allow different ways of engaging to become mixed. We may already, say,
experience a surface-level passing tone as possessing a passing effect, but through Schenkerian
theory, we learn to also conceptualize other collections of phenomenal concepts under that
effect-concept.
The practice of graphing to communicate effects reinforces this mixture. As we learn
to use and read Schenkerian notation we connect otherwise disparate concepts by notating
the effect of a passing tone literally as a passing tone. A single symbol for this diversity
of concepts helps us to unify phenomenal experiences and formal definitions under a single,
complex concept.
Figure 5.7 presents an example, showing a voice-leading structure of mm. 1-5 of Mozart's
Minuet in D, K. 355. The passage is the opening gambit of the minuet, preceding the
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entrance of the Urlinie. The main action of the passage is an inner-voice descent from A to
an implied D. One complication to address up front: the harmony on the downbeat of m. 5
is in fact a D augmented triad, including an A] ascends to B after the graph cuts off. If
the graph went on, I would have to tell some story about this A], probably as a chromatic
passing tone to the B, making the harmony a VI6 chord instead of a I. The tonic resolution
shown in the graph (and with it the D which ends the descending line) is completely elided.
However, the decisive V7 in the preceding measure causes me to hear this tonic resolution
in absentia and the outer voices still provide the resolution. The A] is a sort of fly in
the ointment that I notice after I get the effect of resolution. I am asserting the effect of
an authentic cadence here on phenomenal grounds, and permitting this experience to then
inform my formal analysis. A purely theoretical analysis might reject this, insisting instead
on a half cadence or inverted deceptive cadence. The phenomenal effects implied by these
analyses however fail to respect the strong bass motion accompanied by the soaring arrival
of the Kopfton, all of which lead me to the effect of an authentic cadence.
These complications, however, are not the effects I want to focus on. Instead, I want to
turn to two specific symbols in the notation, two instances of a dashed tie, which communi-
cate the effect of prolongation: the dotted tie in the bass that connects D in m. 1 to to D\ in
m. 3 and the dotted tie that connects the same D in m. 1 to the D in m. 5.37 By connecting
both pairs of D's with the same symbol, I assert some similarity between these relationships:
namely that they are both prolongations of a single note. However, my experience of these
two prolongations is quite different. The shorter time span of the first makes it easier to
37I am using the sense of prolonged which is more common in modern Schenkerian discourse,
not the sense used by Dubiel and discussed in note 29 above.
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phenomenally hold onto the harmony over that span. I hear this as a real prolongationwe
might think of it as the prototype for prolongational phenomenology, despite the intervening
harmony it sounds like we never left. The experience that goes with the longer prolonga-
tion is different. It persists over a longer time span and, more importantly, the intervening
chords create a harmonic progression. Instead of sounding like something's stretched out,
it sounds as though the music leaves and then returns. I suspect that complications discussed
above contribute to making this sound like a less prototypical prolongation. The possibility
of hearing the progression as either a half cadence or deceptive cadence introduces some
doubt into the analysis.
The notation itself plays an important role in merging these two experiences together
as well as combining them with the theoretical concept of prolongation. By using the same
symbol they lead me to draw an analogy between the experiences. Despite there being
two phenomenologiesactually stretching out the harmony and leaving and returning to
the harmonyour Schenkerian concept for prolongation contains both, complicating their
individual attribution but allowing this broader connection. Even though I hear the prolon-
gation that stretches over the entire passage as a departure-return because of the intervening
progression, I also ascribe to it the residue of the stretched out phenomenology by labeling
it as a kind of prolongation.
Importantly, the choice of notation is not arbitrary. As musicians we all tend to address
ourselves toward musical notation such that we not only see it as a set of instructions, but
conceptualize it as including some sense of what those gestures sound like. By relying on the
symbols of musical notation, Schenkerian analysis encourages us to use experiential concepts.




Figure 5.8: Two analyses of Haydn's Partita in E major, Hob. XVI:13, mm. 15-24 (return
of A section).
make similar structural claims but with different notation. Figure 5.8(a) shows a Schenke-
rian analysis of mm. 15-24 of the second movement of Haydn's Partita in E major (Hob.
XVI:13), and Figure 5.8(b) shows the same passage, with the same middle- and background
prolongational structures, but realized as a tree diagram, alla Lerdahl and Jackendoff's A
Generative Theory of Tonal Music.38 The structural similarity is no surprise; GTTM was,
in part, designed as a formal realization of Schenkerian theory.39 But while the structural
38Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983).
39Ibid., 106ff.
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claims are similar, because of their different notational schemes, wethe readersaddress
ourselves toward them differently; we rely on different arrays of concepts to understand them.
The tree diagram makes the structure clear and explicit. But the Schenkerian notation also
communicates this abstract structure, and gives us a sense of what sort of experience we
ought to have hearing that structure.40
Consider the motion to the inner voice in mm. 18-20. On the tree diagram, this gesture is
notated as a chain of left branches, indicating that each note is relaxing into the following one.
This gives us the sense that the notes are related in a single unfolding process subordinate
to the overarching B. The Schenkerian analysis implies a similar structure, but by notating
it as a slur, the analysis invokes phenomenal concepts as well as by leaning on previous
experiences playing and singing slurs. By building its notation out of symbols we already
attach musical meaning to, Schenkerian analysis can communicate the complicated, mixed
concepts that constitute effects.
5.4 The Concept of Linear Progression
Let me now focus on the use and structure of a single mixed concept linear progression across
several Schenkerian authors. Some kind of mixture, it turns out, figures into most versions of
the concept, though which phenomenal concepts are used to enrich the theoretical definitions
varies.
40Lerdahl and Jackendoff also use a quasi-Schenkerian secondary system in their treatise, which
is generated directly from the prolongational analyses. However, they view this notation merely as
another way to present the same (or almost the same) information in a more familiar fashion. The
secondary system is only meant to be a tool for learning to read the proper tree-graph that actually
communicates the analysis. Ibid., 201-203.
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Most of the texts examined in this section are somehow pedagogical. While, in general,
less critical attention is paid to texts meant primarily for teaching, examining such texts is
important for understanding the basic concepts that underlie analytical perspectives. It is
from pedagogical texts, and the pedagogues that guide us through them, that beginners gain
the basic conceptual lens through which they understand subsequent research. Understand-
ing conceptuality in these texts provides insight into how their readers might understand
future work. Additionally, pedagogical texts have the practical benefit of making basic con-
cepts slightly more explicit in ways that texts designed for experts (i.e., monographs and
scholarly articles) do not, making them useful for this sort of conceptual analysis.
A recent, basic account of linear progressions is found in Schachter's The Art of Tonal
Analysis. This volume collects lectures given by Schachter in a 2012 graduate seminar at the
CUNY Graduate Center. Schachter's discussion provides a useful starting point as it gives
us a sense of modern Schenkerian discourse on linear progressions and, since it is a series of
lectures meant to teach this basic concept, is relatively explicit.
On the very first page, Schachter gives a working definition for linear progression:
A linear progression is a stepwise motion in one direction between two tones
that are related to each other harmonically. That is to say, at a prior level the
two tones form a vertical interval. Very frequently, they are members of the
same chord; sometimes they belong to two closely related chords, such as IV and
II6.The linear progression creates a profound connection between line (or melody)
and harmony.41
This introductory definition is mostly theoretical in scope. It does not rely on any experiential
understanding of a linear progression. The notion of being related at a prior level is slightly
41Schachter (2016), 1.
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(a) Full score with Schachter's annotations.
(b) Implied voice-leading graph.
Figure 5.9: Schubert, Impromptu in A[ major, Op. 142, no. 2, mm. 1-4.
fuzzy, but assuming a basic harmonic understanding of a passage (i.e., what the span of a
chord or Stufe is), many linear progressions could probably be identified automatically,
without relying on phenomenology at all. If I know, say, that a dominant triad persists over a
number of measures (depending on the passage, perhaps a large assumption), I could identify
any stepwise progression in one direction between chord members as a linear progression
without needing to have any idea what that experience might sound like.
Schachter thickens this theoretical conceptualization in two ways. As his first example he
presents the first four measures of Schubert's Impromptu in A[ major, annotating two third-
progressions, one in the melody and one in the bass.42 Describing these linear progressions
he says, The motion A[B[C in the first four measures of the melody gives a kind of
42Figure 5.9(a) is excerpted from Schachter's Example 1.1. Ibid., 2.
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aroma, you might say, of the A[-major chord, diffusing it over the melodic line.43 I find
this olfactory metaphor phenomenally compelling. As discussed in chapter three, metaphors
can help communicate certain phenomenologies by pointing toward other experiences and
asking the reader to draw a connection between them. The metaphor of an aroma here
allows me to consider the phenomenology of these linear progressions as something light
and suggestive, not overpowering but indicating the presence of something unseena much
richer experience than simply noting that A[ and C form a vertical interval at some prior
level and are connected by a passing tone.44
Schachter phenomenalizes linear progressions further by drawing meaning from the orig-
inal German term for them Züge (sing. Zug).45 This is a common corollary to English
definitions of linear progressions. He says,
Zug in German is a little bit like the word run in English, in that it might
have 100 different meanings, not all of which necessarily share common features.
Many of the meanings of Zug are related to ziehen, which is a verb meaning to
pull or to draw along...So Schenker's Zug is something that is pulling toward
some kind of goal. That it is goal-directed is implicit in the word itself, and that's
something that linear progression doesn't convey very well in English.46
Here, Schachter further lends a phenomenal aspect to the concept of the linear progression.
What this encourages the reader to do is to put a certain meaning onto the English phrase,
to attempt to rehabilitate some of the implicit meaning lost in translation. Part of this
43Ibid., 1. Emphasis added.
44Going deeper, using an olfactory metaphor distances the effect of the linear progression from
language, as smell experiences are usually more difficult to identify and less concrete than visual or
even aural ones.
45Including Cadwallader Gagne (2007), 73, discussed below.
46Schachter (2016), 3.
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Figure 5.10: Conceptual analysis of Schacther's Linear Progression
meaning can be conceptualized theoreticallythe notion that linear progressions are goal-
directed could be formalizedbut Schachter is trying to get us to do more than that.47 We
should not just recognize, believe, or know that the linear progression is pointed toward a
goal, but we are also meant to feel the pull of it, invoking the phenomenal experience of
being drawn toward something or someone.
We can organize the aspects of Schachter's concept of linear progression, as described
in this chapter, according to Figure 5.10. Returning to the Schubert passage, the formal
definition of linear progressions clarifies the voice-leading structure of the opening measures,
shown in Figure 5.9b. The phenomenal aspects of linear progression give the lexical concept
a phenomenal aspect. The olfactory metaphor gives the experience of a constant, subtle
47Rings (2011a) has formalized the notion of goal-directedness, what he calls tonal intention
using transformational diagraphs.
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presence of the A[-major chord over the four measures, and the rehabilitation of the dy-
namic sense of Zug gives the quasi-physical experience of being pulled along by the linear
progression.
A contrasting conceptualization of linear progression is found in Matthew Brown's epis-
temological reconstruction of Schenker's theory, Explaining Tonality.48 The context for
Brown's monograph is quite different from that for Schachter's lectures. First, this text
is less pedagogically oriented than Schachter's lectures or the textbooks discussed below.
Brown's audience consists of experts, but the way Brown re-imagines Schenkerian theory is
so drastic that he must more-or-less rebuild the theory from the ground up. Brown's mono-
graph attempts to naturalize Schenker's theoryto bring its usage under the paradigm of a
natural science. He re-imagines Schenker's theory as being explanatory in the sense defined
by analytic philosophers of science, most notably Quine. Following this paradigm, Brown
identifies a number of prototypes in Schenkerian theory which are developed through a series
of recursively applied transformations.49
Brown defines linear progressions as one of a number of horizontalizing transformations.
The scope of Brown's definition for linear progressions is narrower than Schachter's. Brown's
concept of a linear progression includes only stepwise motion that fills in the leap produced
by a register transfer or an arpeggiation.50 At this juncture, Brown's definition for a linear
48Brown (2005).
49In more traditional Schenkerian parlance, Brown identifies the elements of the fundamental
structure, clarifies its relationship to the basic elements of counterpoint, voice-leading, and functional
harmony, and taxonomizes the various ways that the elements of these structures can be prolonged.
Mark DeBellis (2010) has critiqued the supposed empiricism of Brown's project.
50Brown (2005), 79.
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Figure 5.11: Levels (a) and (b) from Brown's Figure 3.19.
progression excludes phenomenology entirelythe linear progression transformation obtains
when formal, necessary and sufficient conditions are met. And, unlike Schachter, Brown
does not turn to metaphors or alternative translations to impart a phenomenal sense to the
concept.
Brown's concept invokes phenomenology in another, more subtle way. In order to grasp
this, we need to broaden our scope slightly to see how linear progressions fit into Brown's
collection of transformations. Importantly, Brown's concept of linear progression excludes
motions to or from an inner voice. The latter type of transformation, according to Brown's
system, has a different domain, involving a connection between two voices instead of pro-
longing an interval spanned by a single voice. In reference to Figure 5.11, he makes the
following point:
[T]his span is not, in Schenker's terms, a true linear progression; instead of
composing out a single line of counterpoint, the span actually connects the alto
voice of the opening tonic Stufe with the soprano voice of the II6
5
. The span is
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therefore an example of what Schenker termed `motion from an inner voice.'51
This is different from how Schachter seems to think about linear progressions and motions
to/from inner voices. Schachter, along with most Schenkerians it seems to me, construes
motions to or from inner voices as a kind of linear progression.52
Unfortunately, Brown's scheme is unclear about how to differentiate between situations
when there is an implied voice at the end of the stepwise motion, making a motion to/from
an inner voice, and in situations when a stepwise motion is in fact a real linear progression.
Brown leans in part on Schenker's authority for this distinction, though, with one exception,
Schenker's usage in Der freie Satz is likewise unclear. At times, it does seem that Schenker
conceived of Züge and Untergreifen (reaching under, usually rendered as motion into an
inner voice) as distinct prolongations. The clearest sign indicating this conceptual distinc-
tion is Schenker's argument that an initial ascenta kind of ascending linear progression
which terminates at the first tone of the Urliniecannot be a motion from an inner voice.
John Rothgeb clarifies in an editorial footnote:
[T]he concept of motion from an inner voice includes the notion of reaching-down
from an already established higher register in order to rise back to the original
one. Clearly no such reaching down could occur at the first level without the
prior establishment of the first tone of the fundamental line.53
Obviously, some context will be importanta motion may seem like a proper linear pro-
gression on one level but be revealed as a motion to or from an inner voice in a broader
51Brown (2005), 126. Figure 5.11 is excerpted from Brown's Figure 3.19.
52See for instance, Schachter (2016), 22 and Cadwallader and Gagné (2007), 127-130.
53Schenker (1935 [1979]), 49
224
contextbut understanding how our conceptualizations change when we make this shift is
important.
Later, Schenker contradicts the Züge and Untergreifen distinction, seeming to say, in
accordance with Schachter, that motions to or from inner voices just are linear progressions.
[A] linear progression is, above all else, the principal means of creating content
in passing motions, that is of creating melodic content. The descending linear
progression always signifies motion from the upper voices to the inner voice;
the ascending linear progression denotes a motion from the inner to the upper
voice...In all linear progressions, whether descending or ascending, the principle
of the primary tone holds; the mental retention of the primary tone achieves
coherence.54
The distinction seems to hinge on the notion of mental retention of the boundary notes of
the linear progression. Usually this is construed as the initiating tone being stretched out
across the progression, a sort of mental echo, but Jonas argues that we can also have mental
protension: Ascending progressions, incidentally, are to be understood as if the tone toward
which the progression is directed...were implied in advance (by virtue of our inborn sense of
the overtone series) and `fetched,' so to speak, from below by an inner voice.55
Given all of this, in what sense are these implied or retained tones real? Is this an
argument about theoretical concepts or is it an argument about phenomenal concepts? We
may consider these tones to be theoretically implied, meaning that we imply them in our
analysis in order to conform to a sort of theoretical axiom. This, I think, is what Schenker
was up to and it seems to follow from Rothgeb's footnote. Schenker had a certain belief




tone in order to say that the dissonance that we have in a linear progression is precisely the
same sort of thing that we have in counterpoint (motion against a stationary whole note).56
The other option is that the tone is phenomenally implied somehow, meaning that some
valence of the tone is present in our phenomenology even if it is sonically absent. This can be
a difficult idea to get a hold of. An analogy to visual phenomenology is instructive. Consider
observing a cube.57 From any given position we can directly observe between one and three
sides of the cube. But even though we don't see the far sides of the cube, the presence of
those sides remains a feature of our phenomenology of the object. We can test this just by
realizing that we would be surprised if it turned out that there were no back sides to the
cube at all. Our surprise here indicates that we expected something to be there and the way
that we experienced the object would be changed thereafter. When we see something the
phenomenology is not just what we see, but includes assumptions about what we take the
object to be. If the mentally retained (or protended) notes are like this, then we can say
that they are an aspect of our phenomenal experience of the music. The notes influence our
phenomenology in a real way even if they are absent in the sonically given experience.
Brown is not clear on this point, but I imagine that this kind of phenomenology will
determine whether any given transformation counts as a linear progression or as a motion
to/from an inner voice. The sonically-absent-but-phenomenally-present tones exist as an
interval spanned by a single voice in the case of a linear progression, while the boundary
intervals belong to different voices in the latter. The phenomenology that is invoked will
56This relates back to section 5.3 as well, and the discussion of the effects.
57This example is drawn from Sokolowski (2000), 17ff.
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hinge on the way that the absent-but-present tones are presented: as elements of a single
voice or as polyphony.
I should note that these sorts of implied tones are different from what Schenkerians
normally mean by implied tones. Typically an implied tone is a member of a harmony that
we take to be present in one voice, even if it actually occurs in another voice or is absent
altogether. The surrounding context (most often, a linear progression) implies its presence
in that line. Usually this takes the form of a specific step in a linear progression being
literally absent in the relevant register but implied because the rest of the linear progression
is present; and the tone is usually present somewhere else in the harmony. Figure 5.7 above
shows a situation where the 1ˆ that ends the the linear progression is literally absent, but
because the rest of the fifth progression unfolds in a typical fashion and the cadence (let us
say) implies a tonic resolution, we say that the 1ˆ is implied by the structure of the melody.
This is shown on the graph as a D in parentheses. The realization of this implication is
necessary for the structure of the melody to unfold in the traditional fashion.
Of course, Schenker, Jonas, and Brown are not typically the first places where novice
Schenkerians encounter the notion of linear progressions, and we can get additional insight
into the structure of this concept by examining introductory textbooks. These texts usually
provide the first working definition for various Schenkerian concepts, and because they inform
the original conceptual frameworks, they will likely exert a greater than average influence
on further thought which invokes these concepts.
These texts mostly present linear progressions in the straightforward manner, like that
of Schachter's original definition, leaning mostly on a theoretical definition without much
influence from experience. The most common of these first texts is often Cadwallader and
227
Gagné's Analysis of Tonal Music: A Schenkerian Approach. They describe linear progression
in this way:
Scalar motions...which unfold the interval or intervals of an underlying chord, are
known as linear progressions...They may prolong a single chord or form a motion
that connects related chords.58
They go on to mention that the term comes from the word Zug but, presumably for reasons
of pedagogical clarity, do little to reinforce the phenomenology of this concept.59 A similar
basic, formal definition is given by Tom Pankhurst in his SchenkerGUIDE.
A linear progression (Zug) involves stepwise motion in one direction between
two harmony notes...Most linear progressions are best understood as the elab-
oration of a leap between notes that belong to different voices within a single
chord...Linear progressions play a central part in Schenkerian analysis because
they allow us to show how passages of music of various lengths are elaborations
of the sort of stepwise motion favored in species counterpoint; they provide a
unifying thread around which complex surface embellishments can be woven.60
Unlike Schachter and Cadwallader and Gagné, Pankhurst does not invoke the dynamic char-
acter implied by the word Zug.61
These definitions are delivered in relatively phenomenology-free forms, and this reflects,
I think, one of the basic pedagogical techniques of Schenkerian theory: learn to write gram-
matically correct analyses first and reflect on their subtle meanings later. I do not intend to
58Cadwallader and Gagné (2007), 73.
59Ibid.
60Pankurst (2008), 27.
61Another pattern that occurs in many of these textbooks but seems to have fallen out of fashion
is to construe descending linear progressions as reflections of the Urlinie at a lower structural level.
This perspective is most prevalent in Forte and Gilbert (1982) as well as Neymeyer (1992). Schenker
himself makes this connections as well in Free Composition: All characteristics of a fundamental
line...also apply to descending linear progressions of the first order. Schenker (1935 [1979]), 44.
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cast this strategy negatively, in fact, this is probably the best way to build up an array of
mixed concepts. Start with the theoretical aspects of each concept and learn to identify that
musical feature on the basis of its formal characteristics. Over time, after doing many anal-
yses and deploying these concepts over and over, a certain phenomenology becomes reliably
associated with each theoretically conceptualized definition. This adds phenomenally con-
ceptualized aspects to the formerly formal concepts and creates thoroughly mixed concepts
that can then be attributed either through formal features or phenomenology. I suspect,
however, that it is exactly the do-it-yourself nature of this phenomenal enrichment that
results in later analytical disagreements. We tend to agree on the basic formal definitions
of any central concept and share a belief that experience is somehow important to doing
analysis. But we may not yet agree on how these concerns ought to be weighed in analysis
and when to give the different aspects of these concepts priority.
It should be clear now that the precise scope of the concept of linear progression will differ
from analyst to analyst. My goal isn't to propose a definition or a conceptual structure that
ought to replace this diversity but to highlight the ambiguity in the various given definitions
and, hopefully, foster reflection on the extension of these concepts and how we use them.
What supplementary claims do we make when we call something a linear progression or a
Zug? Is there a difference between calling something a linear progression and a motion to
or from an inner voice? And what constitutes this difference? Exactly how these questions
are answered will vary from analyst to analyst. Again, it is not so important that we always
come to an agreement on the answers, but that we ask the question in the first place and
that we try to come to understand how we coordinate these different ways of thinking and
try to understand how our perspective would shift if we had different analytical priorities.
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On these points, I think the best that we can do is just report what the experience is like
for us and try to lay out what else we invoke besides the relatively widespread theoretical
definition of the concept.
For methat is, under the conceptual array that informs my own Schenkerian practice
there is a substantive difference between a linear progression and a motion to or from an inner
voice. Linear progressions are not just stepwise progressions connecting two notes, but they
are also directed, pulling toward one end or the other, and this is part of what distinguishes
linear progression from motions to/from inner voices. This difference inheres in the degree
to which I hear the stepwise motion as driving the piece forward. Linear progressions, to
me, provide direction to the piece. Motions to or from inner voices, while providing some
motion, serve mainly as a kind of connective tissue, forging a tighter connection between the
various voices in the texture.
Both kinds of stepwise motion are present in Figure 5.8(a) above. The fifth progression
that spans mm. 18-20 in the upper voice is a motion to an inner voice. It only serves to
stretch out the prolongation of the Kopfton by connecting the line to an inner voice; the
high B remains active throughout. This contrasts with the octave-progression in the bass,
spanning all the way from mm. 18-22. This stepwise motion is a proper linear progression,
it pulls the bass line down to the register of the final, structural cadence.
We might imagine this difference between linear progressions proper and motions to/from
inner voices as that between the running and standing rigging of a sailing ship. While made
of similar materials, they have different functions. Standing riggingthe cordage which
holds the mast to the deck under tensiondoes not itself move. It is fixed in place but
provides structure holding the pieces of the ship together. Running riggingthe cordage
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which actually controls the sailson the other hand is the tool used to move the ship one
way or another. This metaphor, I hope, helps reinforce both the phenomenal and theoretical
distinctions I see between linear progressions and motions to/from inner voices. The latter
provide stability and coherence in the piece, while the former give the music much of its
dynamic life.
5.5 Analytical Colloquium: Schachter and Rothgeb on
Schubert's Moment Musical, op. 94, mvt. I
As an alternative to examining how concepts are defined and used in introductory or ped-
agogical texts, colloquia present an opportunity to see analysts defending claims against
alternatives. These sorts of debates provide us another window into conceptual structure as
analysts explicate their process, commitments, and motivations oftentimes more than they
otherwise might. This is particularly so with music-theoretical traditions, like Schenkerian
theory, whose analytical achievements sometimes overshadow theoretical discussions. With
these kinds of approaches, we usually get just enough theory to get started on analysis, and
the nuances of the theory are meant to be discovered over the course of doing analyses. This
is not to say, of course, that there aren't many good treatments of Schenker's work and
Schenkerian analysis at the level of theory. But in most modern discussions of Schenkerian
analysis, the theoretical background is assumed and discussion circles around the analyses.
Here, I will focus on a colloquium between Carl Schachter and John Rothgeb on Schu-
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bert's Moment Musical, op. 94, I.62 By comparing two approaches with approximately the
same methodology, we see how Schenkerian theory deals with different analytical perspec-
tives within its own borders as well as the different ways of thinking that underlie their
disagreements.
In addition to Schachter's and Rothgeb's analyses, I make my own analyses a party to the
colloquium. Since I will be presenting my own perspective as well, I think it is important to
provide context for my analytical claims, and I will try to be as explicit as possible about how
various concepts are applied. Before studying Schachter's and Rothgeb's analyses, I produced
my own analysis of the movement. The idea was to get familiar with the movement and to
develop some thoughts of my own from an as yet unspoiled perspective. I recorded my own
impressions of the piece and made my own set of voice-leading graphs Then, when I came
to read the analyses, I included my own findings in the piece, making myself an interlocutor
in the discussion.
As I worked through my analysis, I tried to be aware of my process and of how I was
making analytical decisions. I took note of when I consulted the score, when I listened,
when I played or sang, and when I imagined what something might sound like. I tried to
be honest with myself about questions that I didn't yet have good answers to and tried to
record anything that still seemed unclear after I finished a portion of the analysis.63
Schachter and Rothgeb's debate is part of a larger colloquium that begins with two non-
62Schachter (1977a) and (1977b) and Rothgeb (1977), in Readings in Schenker Analysis and Other
Approaches, edited by Maury Yeston.
63This itself was an interesting meta-analytical task. Just being honest, admitting to not knowing
why something was a certain way or lacking strong feelings about how a passage ought to be
construed was an interesting exercise that revealed some of the seams that I try to cover up when
actually writing up an analysis.
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Part A B A
Section a b a' a b a' retrans. a b a'
Measures 1-8 9-21 20-29 30-37 38-50 51-58 59-66 67-74 75-87 86-95
Figure 5.12: Formal analysis of entire movement.
Figure 5.13: Schubert, Moments Musicals, op. 94, I (mm. 1-8)
Schenkerian analyses of the piece, A Quantitative Analysis by Matt Hughes, which concerns
very precise counting of pitch-classes, their relative length, and so on, to produce a variety
of statistical analyses meaning to represent the movement's contents; and A Compositional
Analysis by Lawrence Moss.64 These are followed by a back-and-forth between Schachter
and Rothgeb, with Schachter presenting an analysis of the entire movement, Rothgeb ques-
tioning some of his points, and Schachter responding.
An outline of the overall form of the movement is shown in Figure 5.12. The movement
consist of three large parts in an ABA form with the B part acting as a kind of trio but
ending with a retransition that prepares for the repetition of the A part, transforming the B
section's tonicized G back into a dominant. Each large part is in turn divided into a smaller
rounded binary form. Rothgeb's first two concerns with Schachter's analysis come in the
8-measure phrase that opens the movement, the score of which is shown in Figure 5.13. This
passage serves as the a section of the first large A part.
Rothgeb's first complaint concerns Schachter's claims that the melody of beat 3 in m. 1
64Hughes (1977) and Moss (1977).
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Figure 5.14: Various readings for mm. 1-2.
through m. 2 (the ascending sixth followed by the descending third) is a statement of the
arpeggiated triplet motive presented on beat 2 of the first measure, with the first descending
third inverted to an ascending sixth.65 If we consider this to be an instance of the arpeggiation
and a development of the first descent, Rothgeb argues, then we must consider the high E
to be merely transitory and not deserving of any particular structural weight. If it really
is a repetition of the motive, then the constituent notes ought to have the same relative
function, but here they do not. This is particularly problematic because this E is thought
by both authors (and myself) to initiate both the fundamental structure of this part and the
Urlinie of entire movement. Figure 5.14 shows these two options. The first analysis shows
the reading that Rothgeb believes follows from Schachter's motivic claims, while the second
shows Rothgeb's suggestion (which is also more or less the way that Schachter graphed this
measure himself).
Schachter counters by arguing that the motivic relationship still obtains despite the
change in relative structural importance. Indeed, he says that changes in melodic or har-
monic function often form a large part of the `significance' of a repetition.66 Schachter
agrees, of course, that this E ought to be accorded structural weight, but disagrees that this
hinders identifying this arpeggio as an instance of the descending arpeggio motive.
65Rothgeb (1977), 185 and Schachter (1977), 171.
66Schachter (1977), 193.
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This disagreement highlights not so much the problems with the concept of structural
weight, but rather the complexities of the concept of motive in Schenkerian thought. In
much of Schachter's writing, it seems, the important constituents of a motive are tones. It
is the invocation of specific pitch classes in a particular order that makes a statement of
a motive important and not their contour or structure (either their intervallic structure or
their functional structure as here). Following this understanding, the motive is just <G,
E, C> in order. This provides a sort of basic element that can then be worked out in various
ways including changes in relative structural weight.67 Schachter makes similar claims about
motives being flexible with regard to structure elsewhere, and as far as I can tell from his
analyses, he does not identify transpositions of a gesture, for example, as instances of a
motive. Motives, it seems, for Schachter are relatively thinly described and in the terms
discussed above, various effects may follow from this motive depending on the context it
appears in. For Rothgeb, on the other hand, the concept of motive seems to include notions
of structural functions. A statement of the same pitches doesn't count as an instance of that
motive if the relative structural weight of those pitches is not preserved.
Richard Cohn has also noted this disagreement. He places Rothgeb's and Schachter's
positions on this point into two contrasting camps of analysis. Cohn sees Rothgeb's positions
as hewing closely to Schenker's theory, under which the structural functions of the motive are
crucial, whereas Schachter's account draws more from Schenker's analytical practice, which
asserts motives more loosely.68 Another way to distinguish these perspectives on motive is
67I imagine, also, by the way, that this motive would be distinct from the rhythmic motive of




to consider what elements make up each author's concept of motive. Both are mixed, but
the kind of mixture is different. In practice, Schachter's concept of motive strikes me as
more theoretical in some ways, depending not on how the gesture sounds, but on the pitches
that make it up. Of course, any token motive-concept will have a phenomenal experience as
well whenever it appears while listening, but as a reader of the analysis, the concept I use is
primarily theoretical. This hinges on a reliance on the score to locate motives, particularly
hidden ones. If one's sense of key location is eroded, by a number of modulations, let us
say, one may not be able to tell what pitch classes one is hearing and therefore not be able
to attribute Schachter's motive-concept appropriately without the score. The reference for
Schachter's concept for this motive are the specific pitch classes and their order, an abstract
object that doesn't necessarily manifest in phenomenology nor need to be phenomenally
experienced to be identified. Rothgeb's concept, on the other hand, relies on much more
phenomenally salient features, including relative structural weight. There is something it
sounds like to hear a particular pitch as, in this case, the Kopfton (or, on a first listening,
the most plausible Kopfton candidate so far), and for Rothgeb, this overrides the recognition
of these two three-note licks as presenting the same motive.
Rothgeb's next critique comes two measures later in m. 4. First, he argues that the G on
the downbeat (because of its occurrence with the E) should be read as an appoggiatura to
the chordal 7th F and not as a continuation of the G in the preceding measure. He further
argues that the E of the tonic resolution does not really arrive until the fifth eighth-note,
instead of on the third eighth-note that Schachter indicates.69 Figure 5.15 shows these two
69Rothgeb (1977), 186.
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Figure 5.15: Rothgeb's vs. Schachter's analyses.
analyses of the melody with their associated bass lines (both Rothgeb's and Schachter's
original graphs only show the right hand). The crucial difference is whether the G on the
downbeat is prolonging the initiating pitch of the linear progression or decorating its second
step; thus whether the downbeat is more closely related to the preceding upbeat or the
following weak beat. On the graph this is shown by where the slur or tie is located.
I'll leave the downbeat for now and focus on the E's. When I worked through the piece
myself, I also debated between these two choices, and I eventually settled on Schachter's
reading. Rothgeb's analysis allows the right hand gesture to terminate on the last beat of
the measure, with the end of the voice-leading motion corresponding with the end of the
rhythmic gesture. The best evidence I find in favor of this reading is a kind of tidiness in the
symmetry between the voice leading and the rhythm.70 The melody of the bass ultimately
made me decide to select the less elegant treble line. I chose this analysis because the
ascending stepwise motion in the bass made the arrival on the first C sound stronger, and
the motion away from the G more decisive than the fourth-leaps that follow. That is to say,
I decided to follow the phenomenological criterion, to try to express my phenomenology of
the measure. And, indeed, this is also Schachter's response:
70Rothgeb, unfortunately, gives little justification for why he prefers to read it this way, except
to say that surely it is so. Ibid.
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Now the bass expresses two motions of a fourth from G to c. The first of these
is filled in with passing tones in a rhythm of eighth-sixteenth-sixteenth. The
driving force of this rhythm emphasizes the c of the third eighth and makes it
sound like a goal. The second fourth, presented without passing tones in a more
neutral rhythm, sounds like an echo of the first.71
The operative concept, the one that determines which E gets a stem, is again structural
weight, and Schachter and I both relied on the phenomenal aspects of this conceptthat
certain notes sound like structural momentsthey sound strongerwhile others sound deco-
rative. We can point to the features of the music that caused us to conceptualize the passages
this way, in this case the passing tones and their rhythm, but the decision is ultimately made
on the basis of the way it sounds, not because we noticed the passing tones in the score.
Schachter's next gambit is an interesting one. While he argues for the third-eighth-E
primarily on the basis of the phenomenology, he shores up this argument with additional
theoretical evidence. He argues that it is difficult to find a good voice-leading role for the
C in the bass (dissonant with the prolonged G), while the leap down to a G and back up
is a common way to prolong a tonic triad (particularly with the E-D-E motion in the right
hand).
Schachter's response to Rothgeb's first pointthat the downbeat G is an appoggiatura to
the F and not a prolongation of Gis long and a bit convoluted. Schachter invokes a general
problem when crafting Schenkerian analyses: If, in the course of a melodic line, elements of
tonic harmony are projected over a prolongation of V, which is the more significant: their
function as dependent `nonharmonic' tones in their immediate context or their power to
71Schachter (1977), 195, emphasis added.
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represent displaced principal tones in a broader context?72 Schachter doesn't answer this
question, saying instead that we must judge each instance on a case-by-case basis, permitting
us to use either phenomenal or theoretical criteria when making the decision. In the passage
under discussion, Schachter finds the V to be unobtrusive enough to cause little more than
a ripple on the surface of the prolonged I and he cites the G-F-E([) third-progression as
an important underlying element of these measures, which he believes is foregrounded in his
analysis.73
The second large disagreement between Schachter and Rothgeb comes in mm. 11-12, at
the beginning of the b section. Figure 5.16 shows the the score for these measures as well as
Rothgeb's and Schachter's analyses on two levels. The crux of the disagreement comes from
the harmonic ambiguity in m. 11. In fact, Schachter admits to the analytical difficulty of the
passage in his original essay: The melody wavers between c2 and b1 as if uncertain about the
course it should take. In so doing it resembles somewhat the shifting figure-ground patterns
of the psychology textbooks; which is the main tone and which is neighbor?...Only reference
to a broader context provides us with an anchorage by means of which we can stabilize and
order our perceptions.74 The broader context which Schachter selects is a voice exchange
prolonging a C major chord and taking the B as a lower neighbor.
Before turning to Rothgeb's response (spoiler alert: he's going to argue for an E minor
chord here), notice the shift in conceptualization underlying Schachter's analysis. When





Figure 5.16: Schubert, Op. 94, I, mm. 9-12 with two analyses.
passagethe bass sounded like it landed on the C on the third eighth, and that the leap back
down to G was a means of decorating this chord. Here, however, Schachter admits that the
phenomenology is confusing, so we need to find some other way to understand it, presumably
because our graph only permits us to show only one analysis. This motivation to produce a
single reading of a piece is oftentimes an assumed feature of Schenkerian theory and as an
axiom it exerts its influence over the theoretical aspects of Schenkerian concepts. With an
uncertain phenomenology, Schachter looks in the score for some voice-leading feature whose
presumed stability will allow us to make sense of this measure and he find a Schenkerian
favorite: the voice exchange.
Rothgeb, by contrast, prefers to read the B as the chord tone with the C as a neighbor.
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Figure 5.17: Rothgeb's Example 11.4.
While he admits (and he must) that the notes for a voice exchange are there, he argues
that the prolongational function of such a reading is inappropriate to this passage: The
mere appearance of a soprano tone in the bass and vice versa does not necessarily define a
true exchange: an analogy of function must always be presupposed.75 This is similar to his
claims about motive identification from m. 1. Even though the notes are there, if they do not
function in analogous ways, one cannot really say that the motive is there. In the terms
outlined in this dissertation, I take this to be again invoking a phenomenological imperative,
emphasizing the phenomenal aspect of these analytical concepts. Just because we can find
the relationship on the basis of the notes, does not mean that relationship is worth pointing
out. In this case, the phenomenal priority of E minor (for Rothgeb) overrides any C major
prolongation implied by the voice leading.
Rothgeb seems to hear the measure as an E5
3
minor because of its similarity to the clear
E major harmony of the previous measure, with some of the surface rhythms even returning
to solidify this relationship (Example 5.17 shows Rothgeb's example demonstrating this).76




Figure 5.18: Schachter's analysis of mm. 38-50
does not make this argument, this section goes on to prolong E minor, so Rothgeb's reading
permits this entire section (mm. 9-19) to tonicize E.
I will close by turning away from the disagreements in the published colloquium to inject
more of my own perspective. My original analysis departs most from Schachter's in the
overall thrust of part B (mm. 30-66), which is not discussed by Rothgeb. Schachter's analysis
casts this entire part as a prolongation of D in the upper voice. (Schachter's middleground
graph for the b section is shown in Figure 5.18).77 My take on this part, on the other hand,
shows a good deal more internal structure and descending motion. In fact, the relationship
between the a, b, a' sections of the B part seems significantly more interesting than those
of the A part, involving a broad descent structured by its own 5-line and featuring an
interruption in m. 50. In its final descent in the retransiton, the tonic function with which
it ought to close is swapped out at the last second for a dominant function, propelling the
music toward the repetition of the A part.
Figure 5.19 shows my own analysis of mm. 38-50, the b section of this part and the place
77Schachter (1977), 179.
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Figure 5.19: Alternative analysis for mm. 38-50.
where the differences between Schachter's and my interpretations are most apparent. Like
Schachter, I analyze the entire passage as prolonging V, but while Schachter maintains that
the D first stated in m. 34 (not shown in the graph) is prolonged over the course of the
entire section, I hear this D as the first instance of a Kopfton for this part. This D then
begins its descent one measure before the repeat (m. 37) moving from 5ˆ to 3ˆ. Schachter's
analysis presents this as a relatively minor descent under the still-prolonged D, which is
recaptured in m. 39. The difference becomes more pronounced in our analyses of mm. 38-50.
Measures 38-39 and 40-41 form sequential pairs, with mm. 38, 40, and 42 forming a A-B-A
neighbor figure in the middleground, while mm. 39, 41, and 42 form a D-E-D neighbor figure.
Schachter's analysis reads this as a return to the D with the A-B-A figure as an inner voice;
my analysis, on the other hand, shows the A-B-A figure as continuing the descent initiated
in m. 37, with the D-E-D as ornamental, thereby prioritizing the A and subordinating the
D.
The remainder of this little development consists of a number of 3rd-descents, first from A
to F], which stops short of a fifth-progression to D, but is completed quickly thereafter. The
dominant seventh, prolonged through mm. 44-50, is arpeggiated with each element getting
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its own third-progression before returning to the A in m. 50 to effect the interruption.
Measures 51-58 present an exact repetition of mm. 30-37 except with the opening gambit
in G minor, participating in the now trademark mode mixture of this movement. Following
this little recap, we enter the retransition in mm. 59-66. Additional material is needed to
bring this part to a close as mm. 51-58 descend only to 3ˆ. The retransition continues the
descent to G, but just as we arrive, mm. 62ff., the F] is swapped for an F\, turning the G
tonic of this part back into the dominant of the movement as a whole. This last-minute
chromatic shift undercuts this part's ability to stand on its own (as the A parts do) resulting
in the harmonic impulse to return to the A part to complete the movement.
I think the main reasons I have for disagreeing with Schachter are mostly phenomenal, or
at least they start out that way. To my ear, the descent initiated in m. 37 is too decisive to
subordinate to motion to an inner voice and is followed by a b section prolonging 2ˆV, which
then leads to a repeat of the a section. My thinking shifts to invoke theoretical concepts
at this point. I know that this kind of repetition is often found in interrupted forms and
this leads me to be confident in this analysis. If there is an interruption, then the Urlinie
must descend all the way to 2ˆ beforehand. That is, I justify my reading on both phenomenal
and theoretical groundsmm. 38-50 prolong 2ˆV both because the preceding measures sound
like they are pointing toward it and because that progression is required for the interruption
implied by the repetition in m. 51ff.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Two Ways Forward
This study of music-analytical concepts has been mostly reflective and after the fact. I have
examined how certain modes of conceptualization have influenced recent analytical thought,
saying less about why, in my view, this inquiry is so important (beyond general claims
for methodological clarity). I conclude with two glances forward to how an understanding
of conceptualization in music analysis can be used to improve the work of music theory.
Understanding the conceptual outlooks that underlie conflicting analyses can help one see
what would be required for them to be reconciled, and understanding the complexity of one's
own conceptual framework can improve how one teaches parts of this framework to students.
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6.1 Reconciling Analytical Disagreement
I have already discussed several situations in which different analysts' conceptualizations
result in different analytical judgments.1 Looking beyond specific music-analytical concepts,
one finds that analytical disagreements can come not just from differences in how specific
musical features are conceptualized, but also from differences in analytical outlook that both
reinforce and result from conceptualizing music in certain ways. Recent disagreements on
how best to construe classical form provide a good entry point to this problem
Caplin's and Hepokoski's Readings of Beethoven's Die Ruinen von
Athen
The debate between William Caplin and James Hepokoski's theories of classical form relies
on a difference in their perspectives on what classical form is, and we can understand this
disagreement as a difference in the underlying concepts that inform their outlooks.2 Summa-
rizing briefly, Caplin's theory depends on the idea of formal function, or the experience of
a music-segment's status as as beginning, middle, or end in the piece's temporal flow.3 Seg-
ments of music communicate their functions through the motivic and especially harmonic
techniques typical of each function. Tonic prolongation, for example, signals a presenta-
1The most sustained discussion is in sec. 5.5.5, on Rothgeb's and Schachter's differing readings
of Scubert's Moment Musicale, op. 94, I.
2This account of this analytical disagreement and the ethical-theoretical analogy was originally
presented in Hansberry (2014).
3While unclear in the original publication of the theory, the temporal aspects of formal functions
are clarified in Caplin (2010b), 23.
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tion, or beginning function, while harmonic sequencing is usually found in a continuation,
or medial function.4 According to Caplin, his theory is concerned less with applying labels
like sentence, period, or sonata, than with identifying how formal functions are created and
relate to each other. Each formal type (like period or sonata) is said to have an essential
form-functional make-up. Each is defined by having the right kind of beginning, middle, and
end. Identifying movement forms is a matter of of identifying the low-level formal functions
and inferring the large form based on what functions are present and how they relate to each
other.
This outlook on formal analysis engages both theoretical and phenomenal concepts.
Caplin argues that a collection of the right kinds of stylistic features, used in combina-
tion, ought to lead to the experience of that function for a listener familiar with the relevant
stylistic norms.5 Formal functions, while in fact mixed concepts, find their greatest utility
in their phenomenal conceptualization. One can only be sure that a given function applies
when the trained listener experiences that function while listening to a given passage. Formal
types, by contrast, are a fully theoretical affair, implied by the presence of the right kind of
formal functions.
Contra Caplin, James Hepokoski (with his co-author Warren Darcy) considers sonata
movements in relation to a set of abstract, historical and rhetorical norms. These norms
are determined by the most common characteristics of contemporaneous pieces. Under




derived statistical norms and taking departures from those norms (called deformations) as
opportunities for hermeneutic interpretation.6 These norms are organized into characteristic
spaces (that is, Primary Theme Space, Development Space, etc.), which are punctuated
by structural cadences. Further, each space contains music that has its own set of norms.
Hepokoski's reliance on historical context also influences his attributions of formal types.
His Sonata Theory purports to take the listening position of an historical listener, whose
expectations are shaped by the most common formal and rhetorical choices in the repertoire
of that time. This is to say that a piece is identified as a sonata when pieces of that genre
are usually sonatas, regardless of extreme departures from the formal ideal.
Despite all of Hepokoski's arguments that his analyses, in part, reconstruct historical,
dialogic listening, the theory seems significantly more theoretical in its application, to me
anyway, than Caplin's. In part, I suspect, this is because an understanding of the vast array
of defaults (the tiered composition options available in the style) is only readily available
to listeners intimately familiar with hundreds and hundreds of sonata movementsan ex-
periential frame that eludes me, but is certainly possible. This is not unique to Hepokoski,
though, both his and Caplin's theories invoke plausible listener experience to justify their
formal analyses. Caplin just sets a lower bar, requiring only a more general knowledge of
low-level stylistic features instead of a broad knowledge of most of the repertoire.
One can see how these two outlooks confront each other by seeing how they respond to
a difficult case: Beethoven's overture to Die Ruinen von Athen. Categorizing this overture
is not a straightforward task under either paradigm. Figure 6.1 shows three formal analyses
6Hepokoski and Darcy (2006), 29.
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of the movement. In the center is a relatively neutral analysis identifying just the major
thematic sections and key areas; above is Hepokoski's analysis and below is Caplin's. The
first 28 measures are a slow introduction to the main action of the piece, presented in G
minor, the parallel minor of the home key. Measure 29 initiates a new theme in G major
which concludes in m. 61.7 Then new thematic material is introduced in the subdominant
C major. Measure 104 marks some kind of articulation, as the exact tonal center becomes
obscured, but comes back into focus in m. 128 with the return of the G major material
originally presented in mm. 2960.
Both theorists analyze the opening slow section, mm. 128, as introductory to the form.
They also agree on the main theme in the home key, filling mm. 2960. Their disagreements
begin in mm. 61ff. with the introduction of the C major theme. Caplin sees this section as
the beginning of a relatively straightforward interior theme of a large ternary form, whereas
Hepokoski argues that the movement ought to be read as a highly deformed sonata and that
these measures instead contain the secondary theme of the exposition. While sonata form
and ternary form are both three-part structures, the boundaries and functions of the forms
are quite different in the two analyses. Caplin groups Hepokoski's second theme and the
development together as a single medial function, papering over one of Hepokoski essential
expositional moments, the closure in the secondary key. The focus of their disagreement is
in how to characterize the difference between mm. 61100 and mm. 101129. For Caplin,
their functions flow together while for Hepokoski there is a strong rhetorical break at m. 100,
7I will assume certain criteria for a theme, opposed to a transitional section, as being relatively
tight-knit, in Caplin's terminology. Meaning that music sticks closely to the expected durational
and cadential paradigms. At this level of analysis, Hepokoski usually accepts Caplin's terminology
without problem.
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Figure 6.1: Competing Analyses of the overture to Die Ruinen von Athen
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inaugurating the beginning of the development.
Hepokoski faces a number of challenges in arguing that the overture is a sonata. First,
there is no obvious transitional section leading the first theme into the second. Measures
5160 are only retrospectively heard as transitional at the sudden onset of the second theme.
Second, Hepokoski's Secondary Theme is in an unusual key, the subdominant (instead of
the dominant) and, more importantly, is entirely absent from the recapitulation. Further,
in lieu of a proper development section, the overture has only the briefest working-out of
earlier material before returning to the main G major theme in m. 129.
For Caplin, the absence of these features, and, apparently, the phenomenal experience
of the right series of formal functions, disqualifies any sonata reading.8 Hepokoski, on the
contrary, insists that the movement should be properly understood as a highly modified
sonata form based on historical considerations. He argues that since nowhere in the repertoire
does Beethoven use anything but a sonata for an overture movement, departing from this
convention would be highly unexpected for historical and historically-informed listeners.
This expectation is further compounded by the presence of a slow introduction (a rarity
in ternary forms).9 Thus, for Hepokoski's imagined listener (perhaps Hepokoski himself,
even) the fact that this is an overture would lead a listener to already employ the theoretical
and phenomenal concepts associated with sonata forms, not ternary forms, and failure to
characterize this experience as such would ultimately mis-analyze the movement.
Responding to each other's analyses, both theorists admit that their disagreement stems
8Caplin (2010a), 93-94.
9Hepokoski (2010a), 105. This formal analysis is the basis of Hepokoski's hermeneutic interpre-
tation of the overture, hearing the ruins of Athens themselves represented in the formal degradation
of the recapitulation. See Hepokoski (2010b), 85-86.
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not from low-level musical facts (themes, keys, etc.), but rather from their differing the-
oretical approaches. But while acknowledging that they work under different paradigms,
they have little more to say about how to confront this problem. Instead they turn back to
analysis to hash out their disagreement, reasserting their individual approaches. As a result,
they tend to talk past one another, making little progress toward any kind of agreement.
Music-analytical Cultures
Rarely are sustained analytical debates about disagreements in identifying musical features;
instead they are about how to interpret the music. Often in the course of such disagreements,
one finds oneself invoking history or consistency or experience to try to justify one's analytical
claims (indeed, as I have done throughout this dissertation). But this only works if (a) one's
interlocutor already thinks about music (and, more importantly, music theory) in the same
way or if (b) either party is willing to change their outlook on music and music theory. In
short, music-analytical disagreements often have less to do with the music itself and more to
do with how that music is conceptualized. Disagreements that lack this kind of cooperation
between parties are what ethicist Bernard Williams calls notional confrontations.10 Parties
do not agree, but at the same time, neither side can be convinced with descriptive evidence
alone because each side looks at the problem differently. Williams argues that it is important
to understand what the real options of any given interlocutor are, because this can short-
circuit doomed debates before they begin.11
10Williams (1985), 160.
11Ibid. This is not the only attempt to engaged ethical thought to better understand music-
analytical discourse. Parkhurst (2013) argues for a different ethics-informed meta-theory based on
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Whether something will be a real option for us will depend on the ways of thinking
furnished by the kinds of concepts we deploy. In the context of his meta-ethical theory, and
influenced by Gilbert Ryle, Williams calls these thick concepts. In the context of ethics, thick
concepts have two distinct though interrelated features: (1) they have descriptive content,
and (2) they ascribe a culturally-relative pro or con judgment. Coward, for example, is
a thick concept because it both describes an actionfleeing from dangerand passes a
negative judgment.
One can generalize this notion by letting thick concepts be just those which underlie thick
description. The general idea of thickness originates in Ryle's distinctions between thin and
thick descriptions of actions. A thin description only and most basically takes account of the
physical facts of the situation, while a thick description includes culturally determined and
interpretive satisfaction conditions.12 This significantly broader understanding of thickness
includes more than just those with a pro/con judgment.
Generally, thick concepts gain their thickness by existing in a certain kind of culture. To
create a thick-conceptual analog for music theory, we need an understanding of culture that
extends to finer contrasts in practices and beliefs than we typically rely on when distinguish-
ing cultures. While we usually use the term culture to refer to much larger and much more
differentiated populations, the same kinds of features which differentiate cultures broadly
differences in beliefs, practices, histories, artifacts, etc.are in play, albeit in a more limited




of beliefs or assumptions about music, but also has a set of practices (its music-analytical
techniques), and artifacts (the analyses produced by these methods). Moreover, the groups
of analysts who subscribe to these beliefs and practices often trace the history of their ideas
from different fonts. Adherents to Caplin's form-functional theory derive their system from
Schoenberg's theories of form, while Hepokoski's followers tend to have more interest in
hermeneutic analyses than in formal ones. These analytical cultures then generate thick
concepts that inform how analysis is done and how the analystswhen they unreflectively
adopt their cultureperceive the music.
In the Beethoven overture, Caplin's and Hepokoski's use of the concepts Interior Theme
and Secondary Theme are instances of thick music-analytical concepts. They are partially
descriptive, that is, guided by the musical facts at hand: harmonies, surrounding themes,
etc., charted in Figure 6.1. Caplin's Interior Theme contrasts with the main theme in
key and has looser implications vis-a-vis tonality, interior structure, and the like, than a
Subordinate Theme of a sonata would.13 Hepokoski's concept Secondary Theme invokes a
set of descriptive norms (that it is in the dominant, always closes with the first PAC, part
of an exposition, etc.), though in analysis, Hepokoski allows these norms to serve only as
guidelines. Identifying this music as the Secondary Theme, however, still describes facts
about the music, including its coherence as a single theme and its differentiation from the
primary theme.
The concepts Interior Theme and Secondary Theme are thickened by the additional
information they bring in about the music-segments they are applied to. They involve a
13Caplin (1998). 212-213.
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Coward Interior Theme Secondary Theme
Descriptive
features























Table 6.1: Coward, Subordinate Theme, and Secondary Theme as thick concepts.
certain kind of judgment, not of the pro/con variety, but a judgment that the movement
is of a particular kind, either sonata or ternary form. Both theorists' deployment of these
concepts comes along with their decision to describe the movement as either a large ternary
form or as a sonata.
The different analytical cultures determine these formal types differently. Perhaps the
most important distinction in direction of judgment: bottom-up versus top-down. For
Caplin, formal attributions start on the level of small formal functions and larger formal
decisions are made on that basis. So, the absence of a particular formal function, notably
a secondary theme in the recap, prevents him from reading the overture as a sonata. For
Hepokoski, the largest level of formal attribution is made first, namely that the piece ought
to be in sonata form on the basis of historical and statistical factors, while smaller analytical
decisions (including the application of the concept Secondary Theme) are guided by these
large-scale formal judgments.
Bringing these analyses into alignment would require re-imaginingon the part of one or
both partieshow formal-analytical decisions ought to be made. Real confrontation requires
reflection on the part of the interlocutors not just about their own position but about the
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concepts that underlie them. Agreement about issues that invoke thick concepts comes either
through the realization that one's concepts are thick, and therefore culturally contingent or
through the realization of some yet unrealized implications of a thick concept or through the
adoption of a new thick concept. Reflection is paramount here. When a thinker reflects on a
concept and realizes its thickness (and therefore, its contingency) it loses its status as merely
descriptive and becomes interpretative. The thinker can no longer hold the assertions made
on the basis of that concept as simple facts but rather as interpretations viewed through a
certain lens.
6.2 Towards Conceptually Reflective Pedagogy
Beyond guiding us toward real confrontation, and perhaps toward agreement, reflecting on
the conceptual apparatuses that underlie analysis can also inform a more effective pedagogy.
As conceptual arrays coalesce into outlooks, informed by music-analytical cultures, they
slowly become transparent to their user. The more that one engages in a certain kind of an-
alytical practice or studies a particular theoretical paradigm, the more ingrained these ways
of thinking become. The transparency of these conceptual frameworks oftentimes creates the
analytical disagreements discussed in the previous section and throughout this dissertation.
The transparency of these frameworks to their possessor, moreover, can also inhibit effec-
tive teaching when the complexity of these frameworks is not adequately controlled when
presenting these ideas to students for the first time.
In chapter one, I mentioned Zbikowski's work on coordinating concepts into models and
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models into theories.14 While I disagreed with the simple nature of concepts he proffered,
I agree, of course, that one's theoretical perspective depends on the the underlying con-
cepts that make it up and the connections between these concepts. Research in teaching
and learning indicates that conceptual organization is a crucial element to effective teaching
and foregrounds how expert, instructor knowledge organization differs from novice, student
knowledge organization.15 One's understanding of a given topic is organized by the con-
ceptual frameworks at one's disposal and consists both of concepts and their interrelations
forming a complex web of connections and inter-conceptual meanings. To an expert in a
given subject area, these frameworks will include many different concepts with a rich mesh
of connections between them. These conceptual frameworks help make sense of new data
and place it into the context set up by this framework.
Students, however, tend to possess few if any of these connections, and small changes in
how these concepts are presented can greatly affect the way that they are organized and re-
called later on.16 While, one hopes, students are constantly learning new concepts in a theory
or aural skills class, it is a mistake to assume that they can draw the same kinds of connec-
tions between them as their teachers do, since they lack a complicated conceptual framework.
In this context, a theoretical conceptualization of a musical feature may develop indepen-
14Zbikowski describes several levels of theory, with the major of his discussion focusing on lower
level, systematic theories. I am more concerned with what he calls extended theories, though
by his definitions even these are more limited than what I have been calling an outlook in this
conclusion. Zbikowski (2002), 132.
15Ambrose, et al. (2010), chapter 2.
16Ambrose, et al. present several case studies in which changes in course design result in very
different recall strategies for students. National Research Council (2001) provides a particularly
salient example.
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dently of a phenomenal conceptualization. While in the case of simple theoriesphenomenal
and theoretical approachesthis conceptual monism is not inherently problematic (except
perhaps in its tendency to create strong adherents on one side or the other), for complex
theories, mixed approaches in particular, the stakes are much more important. Without the
conceptual framework to associate the different aspects of complex music-analytical concepts,
students' options for understanding will be limited.
Mixed concepts present an especially important case, where we want our students to de-
velop multiple concepts but associate them as aspects of a single complex conceptimportantly,
not all of these elements imply each other, as they may seem to for us. And we can see this
lack of implication when analyzing the concepts. The research from teaching and learning
suggests that we develop an understanding of our own outlooks, an understanding of the
analytical culture in which we each participate, and cultivate an understanding of other
options, so that we can help our students to organize better their conceptual development.
In Burstein's study of half cadences, he makes this point foregrounding the pedagogical
importance of getting clear about the conceptuality of basic terms. He asks us to consider
a common pedagogical situation: a student seeming to misidentify an apparently obvious
cadential progression.
Although in such cases the teacher usually gently corrects the student's analytic
faux pas, perhaps the student is not entirely mistaken, for it may well be that
novices sense ambiguities in these situations that can too readily pass by those
inured through years of cadential labeling.17
For us, experienced music analystslet us sayour concepts may be over-determined, or, as
17Burstein (2014), 225.
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described earlier in the article, what ought to be properly considered preference rules have
calcified into well-formedness rules.18 They have a veneer of stability precisely because
the conceptual framework that contains these rules has become transparent. The way that
we conceptualize half cadences, particularly in its theoretical aspects, makes the decision
seem straightforward. If we adopt this conceptualization as the definition of half cadence,
like a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, we gain a significantly more well-defined
concept but at the detriment of our phenomenal experience of half cadences. The student,
however, may retain a relatively under-determined concept for half cadences, they have
more loosely associated theoretical and phenomenal conceptualization of a half-cadence.
This under-determinacy may exist on both facets of the conceptthat is, students may not
be able to reliably identify half cadences either on paper or by earbut I suspect that in
most situations like the one Burstein describes, the student is relying on her hearing of the
passage. The passage fails to give the impression of a half cadenceher experience lacks that
phenomenal contentand so she, correctly, attributes a different cadence concept or none at
all. In response, one may decide whether such a reading is plausible or not, but because this
judgment arises from thick analytical concepts contained in a conceptual outlook, to properly
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